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$129 Billion Puerto Rico Bankruptcy Plan Could Be Model for States

After years of wrangling with its creditors, Puerto Rico disclosed a plan Friday for resolving the biggest governmental bankruptcy in United States history, by cutting $129 billion in debts to about $86 billion — a reduction of 33 percent.

Puerto Rico’s public debt obligations

CURRENT

$129.2 billion

$2.7

Other*

Water Authority

$4.6

Government

Development

Bank†§

$4.7

Electric Power

Authority†

$10.1

Sales tax

supported

bonds†§

$17.6

PROPOSED

REDUCTIONS

$86.0 bil.

n.c.

$2.7

n.c.

$4.6

$2.6

45% reduction

General

obligation

bonds

and related

debts

$7.4

$35.0

27% reduction

$12.0

(Supported by

tax revenue)

32% reduction

$11.8

66% reduction

Public

pension

fund

$54.5

$45.0

17% reduction

Puerto Rico’s public debt obligations

CURRENT

$129.2

billion total

Other*

$2.7

Water Authority

$4.6

Government Development Bank†§

$4.7

Electric Power Authority†

$10.1

Sales tax supported bonds†§

$17.6

PROPOSED

REDUCTIONS

$86.0

billion total

Unchanged

$2.7

Unchanged

$4.6

45% reduction

$2.6

General obligation bonds

and related debts

27% reduction

$7.4

$35.0

(Supported by tax revenue)

32% reduction

$12.0

66% reduction

$11.8

Public pensions

$54.5

17% reduction

$45.0

Puerto Rico’s public debt obligations

CURRENT

$129.2

billion total

Other*

$2.7

Water Authority

$4.6

Government Development Bank†§

$4.7

Electric Power Authority†

$10.1

Sales tax supported bonds†§

$17.6

PROPOSED

REDUCTIONS

$86.0

billion total

Unchanged

$2.7

Unchanged

$4.6

45% reduction

$2.6

General obligation bonds

and related debts

27% reduction

$7.4

$35.0

(Supported by tax revenue)

32% reduction

$12.0

66% reduction

$11.8

Public pensions

$54.5

17% reduction

$45.0

*Includes HFA, PRIDCO, Children’s Trust and the University of Puerto Rico. †Restructuring in separate proceedings. §Confirmed by the court.

Source: Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico

By The New York Times

The plan hatched by a seven-member federal oversight board is now before a federal judge, who will decide any disputes. There are sure to be plenty — the various parties are tangled in an unprecedented financial collapse. Puerto Rico’s inability to pay its debts required Congress to create a new law, called Promesa, that allowed a territory to essentially seek bankruptcy protection.

If the plan survives the challenges ahead, it could be a model for how struggling states deal with their financial problems in the future. Illinois, New Jersey and others are weighed down by heavy debts, particularly their pension obligations. But like Puerto Rico before Promesa, states cannot declare bankruptcy — it would require congressional action to extend a version of that framework to them.

The efforts to make Puerto Rico solvent have been complicated, requiring novel maneuvers by the oversight board that must garner the support of enough stakeholders to move forward.

Those parties, which include bondholders, pensioners, current government employees and others, will have a chance to vote on the deal they’re offered, and so far support has been mixed. Some bondholders have supported the plan, while others have signaled a willingness to fight it out in court. The island’s teachers rejected the plan in a preliminary vote, but 167,000 government retirees haven’t yet been polled.

Puerto Rico’s plan makes certain bondholders seem like the big losers. It would trim the island’s bond obligations to $41 billion from $75 billion — a 45 percent reduction. But that’s just an average. Under the surface, some bondholders will get 64 cents on the dollar, while others will get just 35 percent. A lucky few — those holding a certain type of sales tax-supported bond — come out with 93 cents on the dollar. Others could risk getting nothing at all.

The new plan may look like it’s wiping out billions in debt overnight, but in reality, a lot of the losses have been sustained already. The bonds have been actively traded since they were issued, and the territory’s steadily worsening financial situation pushed their value down over the years. Their prices bottomed out after Hurricane Maria two years ago.

Puerto Rico government

general obligation bonds issued in:

2009

2012

2014

120

percent of face value

100

Value

decreases

under the

proposal

80

64%

60

June 2016 President Obama signs Promesa, the bankruptcy-like law to restructure the island’s debt. All debt payments are put on hold until a judge approves a plan.

45%

40

35%

20

0

’10

’12

’14

’16

’19

Dec. 2012 Moody’s downgrades Puerto Rico‘s general obligation bonds to one notch above junk status, sending the bonds’ values lower.

Feb. 2014 Values fall again when the general obligation bonds are downgraded to junk status.

June 2015 Bond prices tumble further as Puerto Rico‘s governor says the island will ask bondholders to accept less than they’re owed.

June 2016 President Obama signs Promesa, the bankruptcy-like law to restructure the island’s debt. All debt payments are put on hold until a judge approves a plan.

Sept. 2017 Hurricane Maria hits Puerto Rico, and bond values plummet amid fears the island will never be able to pay its debt.

Puerto Rico government general obligation bonds issued in:

2009

2012

2014

120

percent of face value

June 2016 President Obama signs Promesa, the bankruptcy- like law to restructure the island’s debt. All debt payments are put on hold until a judge approves a plan.

100

80

Dec. 2012 Moody’s

downgrades Puerto

Rico's general obligation

bonds to one notch above

junk status, sending the

bonds’ values lower.

Feb. 2014 Values fall again

when the general obligation

bonds are downgraded to junk

status.

June 2015 Bond prices tumble further as

Puerto Rico‘s governor says the island will ask

bondholders to accept less than they’re owed.

Sept. 2017 Hurricane Maria hits Puerto Rico,

and bond values plummet amid fears the island

ill never be able to pay its debt

64%

60

45%

40

35%

20

Value

decreases

under the

proposal

0

’10

’11

’12

’13

’14

’15

’16

’17

’18

’19

Puerto Rico government general obligation bonds issued in:

2014

2009

2012

120

percent of face value

June 2016

President Obama signs Promesa,

the bankruptcy-like law to

restructure the island’s debt. All

debt payments are put on hold

until a judge approves a plan.

100

Value

decreases

under the

proposal

Dec. 2012

Moody’s

downgrades

Puerto Rico’s

general

obligation bonds

to one notch

above junk

status, sending

the bonds’

values lower.

80

64%

60

Feb. 2014

Values fall again

when the general

obligation bonds

are downgraded

to junk status.

45%

June 2015

Bond prices

tumble further as

Puerto Rico’s

governor says

the island will ask

bondholders to

accept less than

they’re owed.

40

35%

20

Sept. 2017 Hurricane Maria hits Puerto

Rico, and bond values plummet amid fears

the island will never be able to pay its debt.

0

’10

’11

’12

’13

’14

’15

’16

’17

’18

’19

Sources: Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico; Refinitiv

By The New York Times

For an investor who bought, say, a 30-year general obligation bond when it was issued in 2009, then held it until now, the new debt plan spells a 36 percent loss. He might be kicking himself for not selling back in 2012, when he could have come close to breaking even. In Puerto Rico, these bonds carry a constitutional guarantee and were supposed to be bulletproof.

But an investor who bought the same bond amid the devastation of Hurricane Maria, when nearly everybody else was selling, would have paid around 20 percent of the face value. From his perspective, the new debt plan more than triples his money.

To nudge some disappointed investors into supporting the plan, the oversight board is playing something of a game of chicken with those who bought Puerto Rico’s most recent vintages of general obligation bonds, issued in 2012 and 2014.

The board has said it believes the newer bonds should never have been issued because they took the island over its legal debt limit. The new plan offers investors who hold them settlements well below the 64 cents on the dollar the other bondholders are getting. If they don’t like it, they can sue, and try to convince the federal judge overseeing the case, Laura Taylor Swain, that their bonds are valid. If they win, they would get 64 cents on the dollar like everyone else. If they lose, they would get nothing — and the money set aside for them would be given instead to the investors already getting 64 cents.

Other legal challenges await the plan from bondholders who believe the board was far too generous to Puerto Rico’s retired government workers.

Over the years, the government of Puerto Rico, seeing the huge problem the unfunded pension obligations presented, made some moves to limit the damage. In 2013, it forced new hires into a defined contribution plan, similar to a 401(k). A few years later, it forced all current employees, regardless of hire date, into such a plan.

Decreases in benefits of the

Puerto Rico general workers pension

100

percent of initial benefits

Additonal

benefits

decrease

under the

proposal

Promesa

in effect

80

APRIL 2013

Facing a large unfunded pension obligation, Puerto Rico’s legislature closes the plan to new hires, who instead enter a 401(k)-like program. Retirees and existing employees also see some benefit reductions.

69%

Aug. 2017

The legislature, at the oversight board’s urging, freezes the pension plan. Current workers in the plan stop accruing new benefits and join the 401(k)-like plan instead. Retirees are unaffected.

60

40

20

Employee Retirement

System pension

0

’10

’12

’14

’16

’19

Decreases in benefits of the Puerto Rico general workers pension

100

percent of initial benefits

Promesa

in effect

Additional Benefits

decrease under

the proposal

80

APRIL 2013

Facing a large unfunded pension obligation, Puerto Rico’s legislature closes the plan to new hires, who instead enter a 401(k)-like program. Retirees and existing employees also see some benefit reductions.

69%

Aug. 2017

The legislature, at the oversight board’s urging, freezes the pension plan. Current workers in the plan stop accruing new benefits and join the 401(k)-like plan instead. Retirees are unaffected.

60

40

20

Employee Retirement System pension

0

’10

’11

’12

’13

’14

’15

’16

’17

’18

’19

Decreases in benefits of the Puerto Rico general workers pension

percent of initial benefits

100

Promesa

in effect

Additional benefits decrease under the proposal

80

APRIL 2013

Facing a large unfunded pension obligation, Puerto Rico’s legislature closes the plan to new hires, who instead enter a 401(k)-like program. Retirees and existing employees also see some benefit reductions.

69%

Aug. 2017

The legislature, at the oversight board’s urging, freezes the pension plan. Current workers in the plan stop accruing new benefits and join the 401(k)-like plan instead. Retirees are unaffected.

60

40

20

Employee Retirement System pension

0

’10

’11

’12

’13

’14

’15

’16

’17

’18

’19

Source: Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico

By The New York Times

Those moves did reduce the island’s pension obligations, but not enough to save the system from collapse. The new restructuring plan would cut the island’s $54.5 billion pension obligation to $45 billion, this time affecting even retirees. Their pension would be cut on a sliding scale: The biggest pensions would be reduced by, at most, 8.5 percent, and the smallest pensions would not be cut at all.

That will be a big complaint of general obligation bondholders, who cite the constitutional provision putting them at the front of the line to be paid.

Puerto Rico’s retirees, on the other hand, would normally be at the back. That’s because the island’s pension fund is completely empty after being used for years as a source of money to pay the government’s expenses. An empty pension fund would ordinarily make the retirees unsecured creditors entitled to almost nothing.

But the retirees make up such a large share of the island’s economy that leaving them in the lurch might chill efforts to rekindle economic growth.

So the federal board leaned on language in Promesa to improve the retirees’ legal standing. That language, not present elsewhere in American bankruptcy law, requires Puerto Rico to “provide adequate funding for public pension systems.” The board also persuaded the island’s lawmakers to dismantle the empty pension fund and in the future make each year’s pension benefits a mandatory outlay of the budget.

The result is retirees get a better deal than almost any other creditor group: at least 91.5 cents on the dollar.

Natalie Jaresko, the board’s executive director, said the board’s main goal was reducing Puerto Rico’s debts to a level its economy could sustain. That has been a two-step process.

First, the board looked at the debt burdens of America’s 10 most indebted states, calculated the average, and pared back Puerto Rico’s debt to an amount less than that. Then it began pushing for changes meant to make the government perform more efficiently, rebuild the public trust and encourage businesses to grow and hire. To make it all work, consumers on the island need to be able to spend money — including Puerto Rico’s pensioners.

“Sustainability is not a requirement of the law, but we really wanted it to be at the center of everything we did,” Ms. Jaresko said. “We weren’t going to end up in a situation where 10 years from now, 12 years from now, Puerto Rico would have to restructure again.”

A correction was made on 
Sept. 27, 2019

An earlier version of this article misstated the extent of the loss for a hypothetical investor who bought a 30-year general obligation bond issued in 2009 and held it until the present. Under the bankruptcy plan proposed for Puerto Rico, that investor would see a loss of 36 percent, not 46 percent.

How we handle corrections

Mary Williams Walsh is a reporter covering the intersection of finance, public policy and the aging population. She previously worked for The Wall Street Journal and The Los Angeles Times, mainly in foreign bureaus. More about Mary Williams Walsh

A version of this article appears in print on  , Section B, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: Puerto Rico’s Solvency Plan Trims Its Debt by a Third. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

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