3458
political sociology
the specific mechanisms within each that can be
found across multiple movements. Examples of
such mechanisms that they identify include
brokerage, the linking of previously unconnected units; category formation, the creation
of identities; and certification, a target recognition of a movement, its tactics or its claims.
However, despite this distancing by its founders, PPT remains the dominant paradigm for
social movement research.
SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement; Framing
and Social Movements; Political Opportunities;
Social Movement Organizations; Social
Movements
REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED
READINGS
Goodwin, J. & Jasper, J. M. (2004) Rethinking Social
Movements: Structure, Meaning and Emotions.
Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD.
McAdam, D. (1982) Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970. University
of Chicago Press, Chicago.
McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N.
(1996) Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures,
and Cultural Framing. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (2001)
Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
McCarthy, J. D. & Zald, M. N. (1973) The Trend of
Social Movements in America: Professionalization
and Resource Mobilization. General Learning,
Morristown, NJ.
McCarthy, J. D. & Zald, M. N. (1977) Resource
Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial
Theory. American Journal of Sociology 82: 1212–41.
Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Piven, F. F. & Cloward, R. (1977) Poor People’s
Movements: Why they Succeed, How they Fail.
Vintage Books, New York.
Tarrow, S. (1994) Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Mass Politics in the Modern State. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Tilly, C. (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution.
Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA.
Tilly, C. (1995) Contentious Repertories in Great
Britain, 1758–1834. In: Traugott, M. (Ed.), Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action. Duke University Press, Durham, NC, pp. 15–42.
political sociology
Ryan Calder and John Lie
Political sociology analyzes the operation of
power in social life, examining the distribution
and machination of power at all levels: individual, organizational, communal, national, and
international. Defined thus, political science
becomes a subfield of sociology. Parsons (1951),
for example, treated the political as one of the
four principal domains of sociological analysis.
In practice, however, political sociology has
developed as a sociological subfield, with its
distinct concerns and fashions.
Aristotle, Ibn Khaldun, or Montesquieu may
rightfully claim to be the founder of political
sociology insofar as they highlighted the social
bases of power relations and political institutions. However, most contemporary scholars
trace their intellectual lineage to Marx or Weber.
Political sociology emerged as a distinct subfield
in the 1950s, especially in the debate between
pluralists and elite theorists. In the 1980s and
1990s political sociologists focused on social
movements, the state, and institutions.
MARX AND WEBER
According to Marx (and Engels), economic
structure and class relations are the basis for all
political activity (Miliband 1977). The dominant mode of production determines who wields
power in society. Under the capitalist mode of
production, the capitalist class controls the state,
which serves to perpetuate its domination of
subordinate classes and manage ‘‘its common
affairs.’’ There are two principal strands in
Marxist political sociology. The instrumentalists portray the state as the tool of a unified
capitalist class that controls both the economic
and political spheres. In this model, the state is
virtually epiphenomenal to the dominance of the
ruling class. The structuralists view the state (as
well as politics more generally) as a relatively
autonomous product of conflict between classes
and sometimes within classes.
Whereas Marx viewed social classes as the
basic units of competition, Weber (1978) recognized that competition occurs among many
different types of entities, including not only
political sociology
social classes but also status groups (defined in
terms of consumption, codes of honor, education and credentials, ethnicity, and other criteria), as well as political agencies and agents.
Contestation for power occurs both across and
within various institutions and organizations:
heads of state clash with parliaments and civilservice bureaucracies over legislation; trade
unions and professional groups vie to influence
legislators; politicians and bosses fight for control of a political party. The political sphere,
while linked to events in other spheres, has its
own logic of contestation.
Against the Marxian stress on the economy
and class struggle, the defining feature of modern western societies for Weber is the ineluctable advance of rationality. Thus, the bases of
political authority shift from traditional or charismatic claims toward legal-rational forms of
legitimation and administration. For example,
the whim of a king or lord who asserts the right
to rule based on dynastic precedent (traditional
authority) or heroic acts and personal qualities
(charismatic authority) is replaced by state control of the populace according to normalized
standards and codified laws (legal-rational
authority). For Weber, the modern state also
extends and entrenches its domination of society
by expanding its coercive apparatus, chiefly in
the form of bureaucratization. The central function of modern mass citizenship is to legitimize
this iron cage; even in a democracy, real power
would reside in the hands of a few.
ELITE THEORY, PLURALISM, AND THE
THIRD WORLD
That power in society is always concentrated
in the hands of a few is the basic assumption of
the elite theory of society (Bottomore 1993).
The elite theorists drew heavily on Weber, but
placed greater emphasis than Weber on power
rather than authority as the key to political dominance. Whereas Weber agreed that the power to
make major political decisions always concentrates in a small group, he viewed the authority
that stems from popular support as the foundation for all institutions that provide this
power. For the elite theorists, it was the reverse:
power made authority, law, and political culture
possible.
3459
Michels (1966) proposed ‘‘the iron law of
oligarchy’’: the thesis that all organizations –
whether political parties, trade unions, or any
other kind – come to be run by a small group of
leaders. He saw the oligarchical tendency as ‘‘a
matter of technical and practical necessity,’’ citing several causes for this tendency: the impracticality of mass leadership, the organizational
need for a small corps of full-time expert leaders, the divergence of leaders’ interests from
those of the people they claim to represent, and
the masses’ apathy and thirst for guidance.
Schumpeter agreed with elite theorists, including Pareto and Mosca, that mass participation in
politics is very limited. Emphasizing the lability
and pliability of popular opinion, he stated that
‘‘the will of the people is the product and not
the motive power of the political process’’
(Schumpeter 1976).
With The Power Elite (1956), C. Wright
Mills produced a radical version of elite theory.
Mills described a ‘‘power elite’’ of families that
dominated three sectors of American society:
politics, the military, and business. The power
elite was cohesive and durable because of the
‘‘coincidence of interests’’ among organizations
in the three sectors, as well as elites’ ‘‘similarity
of origin and outlook’’ and ‘‘social and personal
intermingling.’’ Radical elite theory presumed
the passivity of mass politics, which was articulated most influentially by Marcuse (1964).
Radical elite theory was largely a response to
pluralism, which was particularly influential
in US social science in the two decades following World War II. Pluralism has its roots in
Montesquieu (1989), an advocate of the separation of powers and of popular participation
in lawmaking, and Tocqueville (2004), who
famously observed decentralization of power,
active political participation by citizens, and
a proliferation of associations in the early
nineteenth-century US. In addition to these earlier theorists, pluralists also drew inspiration
from Weber, particularly in his view of the political sphere as a realm of constant contention.
The basic assumption of pluralism is that
in modern democracies power is dispersed
among many groups and no single group dominates. Power is dispersed in part because it has
many sources, including wealth, political office,
social status and connections, and popular
legitimacy. Pluralists also note that individuals
3460
political sociology
often subscribe to multiple groups and interests, making pluralist systems more stable in
their opinion. In this model, the state is largely
an arbiter facilitating compromise between
competing interests.
The 1950s and early 1960s were the heyday of
pluralist theory, coinciding with the apparent
stability of liberal democracy in the US, which
most pluralists viewed as an exemplar. David
Truman’s 1953 book The Governmental Process
was a defining work of the period, focusing
on interest groups as its basic unit of analysis
and examining how their interaction gave rise to
policy (Truman 1971). In Who Governs? (1961),
Robert Dahl argued that city policies in education and development were a function of input
from many individuals and groups, and that
neither individual office-holders nor business
leaders wielded overriding influence. Lipset
and colleagues (1956) challenged empirically
Michel’s iron law of oligarchy in their analysis
of a trade union.
The Cold War directed attention to democratization in the face of rapid industrialization,
transition from colonial rule, and other conditions that prevailed in the third world: the world
outside of Europe and North America. Modernization theory posits that societies follow a
stage-by-stage process of political, economic,
and social development. It typically portrays
western democracies as consummately ‘‘modernized’’ societies. Different modernization theorists have highlighted different social conditions
as critical to democratization. For example,
Lipset (1994) has argued for the importance of
‘‘political culture,’’ defined as popular and elite
acceptance of civil and political liberties. Allied
with pluralism, modernization theory delineated
an optimistic, evolutionary account of democratization and development. Moore’s Social
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966)
provided a profound critique – not only stressing the role of power and class struggle, but also
the fact of distinct trajectories of political development – and laid the foundations for historically oriented political sociology. Dependency
theory emerged in response to the apparent failure of modernization theorists’ prescriptions in
the developing world. Drawing heavily on
Marx, dependency theory argued that the economic and political problems of the developing
world were not a function of ‘‘backwardness,’’
but rather of developing societies’ structural
positions in the capitalist world-economy
(Cardoso & Faletto 1979). Dependency theory
inspired much of world-systems theory and
would come to engage in dialogue with it
(Wallerstein 1984).
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, THE STATE,
AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISMS
Crises of authority and production shook the
industrialized world in the 1960s and 1970s,
including the Civil Rights Movement and protests against the Vietnam War in the US, the
social upheaval of May 1968 and radicalization
of the Left in France, and the global oil shocks
and stalling of growth regimes. These events
suggested flaws in pluralist models of democratic society that assumed stable competition
among groups and consensus about the rules
of the political game. Meanwhile, anti-colonial
nationalist movements in Africa and Southeast
Asia drew further sociological attention to questions about collective behavior and the conditions for successful mobilization against state
structures. In this environment the study of
social movements evolved and gained prominence within sociology.
The three major theoretical models of social
movements have corresponded with the pluralist, elite, and Marxist models of institutionalized
power in society (McAdam 1982). The classical
model of social movements portrays them as the
result of structural pathologies that led to psychological strain and the desire to pursue nonconventional channels for political participation
in an otherwise open system. The ‘‘resourcemobilization’’ model of social movements posits
that they arise and grow because rational individuals decide that the benefits of joining outweigh the costs and because the necessary
resources are available and worth investing. As
such, they do not reflect social pathologies or
psychological abnormalities, but are a natural
feature of political life (McCarthy & Zald
1977). Finally, the political-process model of
social movements blends elite theorists’ position
that power is highly concentrated in society with
the Marxist conviction that the ‘‘subjective
transformation of consciousness’’ through popular movements nevertheless has the immanent
political sociology
power to force social change (McAdam 1982). It
stresses the interplay between activist strategy,
skill, and intensity on the one hand, and the
favorability of resources and political opportunity structures to movement tactics and goals,
on the other.
One objection raised in the late 1970s to the
dominance of post-World War II theoretical
models in the pluralist, elite, and Marxist
camps was that social scientists had been focusing on social and economic activity and had
largely ignored the operations of the state
as an autonomous entity. Advocates of ‘‘statecentered’’ approaches sought to remedy what
they saw as a ‘‘society-centered’’ bias in scholarship. In the introduction to Bringing the State
Back In, Theda Skocpol (1985) remarks on the
trend toward viewing states as ‘‘weighty actors’’
that shape political and social processes. She
notes that ‘‘states . . . may formulate and pursue
goals that are not simply reflective of the
demands or interests of social groups, classes,
or society’’ – that is, states are autonomous.
Research on how the modern form of the state
arose has been an important part of the movement to refocus attention on the state: how
states became centralized, developed functionally differentiated structures, increased their
coercive power over their populations, and
developed national identities that superseded
class and religious differences. The bellicist
model of state formation points to the pressure
to organize for, prosecute, and pay for war in an
environment of interstate competition on the
European continent as the driving force behind
the evolution of the modern state. As Tilly
(1979) put it, ‘‘states make war, and war makes
states.’’ Other scholars have emphasized different factors. Anderson (1979) stressed the power
of class relations and struggles. Gorski (2003)
has called attention to the significance of religion and culture. Mann (1986) has traced
European state formation and the growth of
western civilization in general as a function
of interrelations between four types of power
networks – ideological, economic, military, and
political – with each taking on different levels of
importance at different stages and locales in
European history.
The initial call to ‘‘bring the state back in’’
was followed by a recognition that as broad a
concept as ‘‘the state’’ is best analyzed in terms
3461
of the various institutions that compose it.
This led to a renewed focus on institutions,
both within the state and outside it. The socalled new institutionalisms build on the ‘‘old’’
organizational institutionalism of mid-century.
Selznick (1949) had called attention to the
importance of informal institutions and extraorganizational interests in shaping policy outcomes.
Each of the new institutionalisms defines and
operationalizes institutions differently, largely a
function of its origins in a social science discipline. Rational-choice institutionalism, which
grew out of the economics literature, defines
institutions as the formal rules or ‘‘structures
of voluntary cooperation that resolve collective action problems’’ (Moe 2005). Historical
institutionalism defines institutions as formal
and informal rules and procedures (Thelen &
Steinmo 1992). Finally, organizational institutionalism is rooted in the sociology of organizations and embraces a wider definition of
institutions than the other two institutionalisms.
In addition to formal rules, it considers habits,
rituals, and other cognitive frameworks to be
institutions, thus situating a large part of the
force of institutions within the minds of actors
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983).
REDIRECTING POLITICAL
SOCIOLOGY
Recent changes in national and international
political environments have taken political
sociology in new directions. Political sociologists
have participated in the proliferation of literature
on globalization, including work on postnational
citizenship (Soysal 1994) and transnational
advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink 1998). The
postmodern turn in the human sciences has
found adherents among students of post-industrial politics (Bauman 1999). There is growing
interest in the realm of ‘‘subpolitics’’ that analyzes power outside the traditional realm of politics as a contestation for state power (Beck
1992). In this regard, gender remains understudied in the realm of politics (Gal & Kligman
2000). Theorization of the politics of ethnicity
and identity has taken on new urgency in the
wake of genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia (Lie
2004).
3462
political sociology
Theoretically, there are serious challenges
to the very foundations of political sociology.
Rational-choice models are based on game theory, treating individual entities in political contexts as rational actors seeking to maximize
their utility (Friedman 1996). In so doing, they
deemphasize and at times ignore the social origins or dimensions of politics. From very different perspectives, Unger (1997), who argues
for the autonomy of politics, and Foucault
(1977), who probes the microphysics of power,
bypass traditional sociological concerns with
groups and institutions. For Unger and Foucault, political sociology misrecognizes the very
nature and operation of power.
The evolution of political sociology has mirrored the great political movements of modern
history. Just as class-based models of state and
society have drifted upward and downward with
the political cachet of socialism and communism, and conservative elite theory linked itself to
Italian Fascism in the 1920s, so pluralist models
have been fellow-travelers of liberal democracy’s
credibility and theorists of social movements
interrogated the global upheavals of the 1960s
and 1970s. Today, as the meaning of national
boundaries and identities changes in a global
age, political sociology continues to expand its
intellectual horizons and investigate new configurations of power.
SEE ALSO: Democracy; Institutional Theory,
New; Marx, Karl; Pluralism, American; Pluralism, British; Political Leadership; Political
Machine; Political Parties; Politics; Politics
and Media; Power Elite; Power, Theories of;
Revolutions; Social Movements; State; Weber,
Max
REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED
READINGS
Anderson, P. (1979) Lineages of the Absolutist State.
Verso, London.
Bauman, Z. (1999) In Search of Politics. Blackwell,
Oxford.
Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society. Trans. M. Ritter. Sage,
Newbury Park, CA.
Bottomore, T. (1993) Elites and Society. Routledge,
London.
Cardoso, F. H. & Faletto, E. (1979) Dependency
and Development in Latin America. Trans. M. M.
Urquidi. University of California Press, Berkeley.
Dahl, R. (1961) Who Governs? Democracy and Power
in an American City. Yale University Press, New
Haven.
DiMaggio, P. J. & Powell, W. W. (1983) The Iron
Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.
American Sociological Review 48: 147–60.
Foucault, M. (1977) Discipline and Punish. Vintage,
New York.
Friedman, J. (Ed.) (1996) The Rational Choice
Controversy. Yale University Press, New Haven.
Gal, S. & Kligman, G. (2000) The Politics of Gender after
Socialism. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Gorski, P. S. (2003) The Disciplinary Revolution:
Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modern
Europe. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Keck, M. E. & Sikkink, K. (1998) Activists Beyond
Borders: Advocacy Networks in International
Politics. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.
Lie, J. (2004) Modern Peoplehood. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Lipset, S. M. (1994) The Social Requisites of
Democracy Revisited. American Sociological
Review 59: 1–22.
Lipset, S. M., Trow, M., & Coleman, J. (1956)
Union Democracy. Free Press, Glencoe, IL.
McAdam, D. (1982) Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970. University
of Chicago Press, Chicago.
McCarthy, J. D. & Zald, M. N. (1977) Resource
Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial
Theory. American Journal of Sociology 82: 1212–41.
Mann, M. (1986) The Sources of Social Power, Vol. 1.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Marcuse, H. (1964) One-Dimensional Man. Beacon
Press, Boston.
Michels, R. (1966) Political Parties: A Sociological
Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern
Democracy. Free Press, New York.
Miliband, R. (1977) Marxism and Politics. Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Mills, C. W. (1956) The Power Elite. Oxford University Press, New York.
Moe, T. M. (2005) Power and Political Institutions.
Perspectives on Politics 3 (June): 215–33.
Montesquieu, C. (1989) The Spirit of the Laws.
Trans. A. M. Cohler, B. C. Miller, & H. S. Stone.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Moore, B. (1966) Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy. Beacon Press, Boston.
Parsons, T. (1951) The Social System. Free Press,
New York.
Schumpeter, J. (1976) Capitalism, Socialism, and
Democracy. Allen & Unwin, London.
Selznick, P. (1949) TVA and the Grass Roots: A
Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization.
Harper & Row, New York.
politics
Skocpol, T. (1985) Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research. In: Evans,
P., Rueschemeyer, D., & Skocpol, T. (Eds.),
Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Soysal, Y. N. (1994) The Limits of Citizenship:
Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe.
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Thelen, K. & Steinmo, S. (1992) Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. In: Steinmo, S.,
Thelen, K., & Longstreth, F. (Eds.), Structuring
Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative
Analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Tilly, C. (1979) Coercion, Capital, and European
States, AD 990–1990. Blackwell, Oxford.
Tocqueville, A. de. (2004) Democracy in America.
Trans. A. Goldhammer. Library of America,
New York.
Truman, D. (1971) The Governmental Process: Political
Interests and Public Opinion. Knopf, New York.
Unger, R. M. (1997) Politics, 3 vols. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Wallerstein, I. (1984) The Politics of the World-Economy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Weber, M. (1978) Economy and Society. University of
California Press, Berkeley.
politics
Peter Murphy
The discipline of sociology has generated few
outright political classics. The most splendid of
all of the sociological classics, Weber’s Economy
and Society, contributed a great deal to the
understanding of political behavior. Yet it is
not a political work in the same sense as Aristotle’s Politics or Hobbes’s Leviathan. Economy
and Society sometimes hints at but never enumerates the ‘‘best practical’’ regime. Aristotle
and Hobbes had no doubt that such a regime
existed, even if they disagreed about what it was.
Weber’s comparison of traditional, charismatic,
and procedural authority bears a passing resemblance to the comparison of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy perennially made by the
great political thinkers. But the resemblance is
limited.
The discipline of politics persistently asks
‘‘what is the best type of state?’’ Answers vary,
but the question is constant. The prime object
of sociological inquiry is not the state but
society. Even Weber, who was politically astute,
3463
preferred terms like ‘‘authority’’ and ‘‘domination’’ to ‘‘the state.’’ Sociological categories
have a much broader application than expressly
political categories like ‘‘democracy’’ or ‘‘monarchy.’’ Weber’s discussion of legitimate authority was a major and enduring contribution to
understanding the consensual foundations of
power. But it did not replace the older and
equally enduring topic of political regime. The
limits of political sociology are exemplified by
the following. A democracy can be traditional,
charismatic, or procedural, depending on time
and circumstance. Even if we can resolve which
one of these types of legitimate authority we
favor, and which we think would be most feasible for a country in a given period or situation,
larger questions still remain. Is democracy preferable to monarchy or military rule? Which
regime – stratocracy or democracy, oligarchy
or monarchy – is most compatible with tradition, charisma, and procedure?
Lewis (2003) illustrates neatly the difference
between political sociology and classic political
inquiry. Lewis uses Weber’s categories to analyze the pervasiveness of traditional authority –
such as clientalism and patrimonalism – in
contemporary Arab societies. But the alternative
postulated to this – democracy – is originally a
Greek term with a very old lineage extending
back to antiquity. Its provenance belongs to
political thinkers from Plato and Aristotle to
Rawls and Strauss.
In short, sociology is not political science
reborn. Yet sociology does have a political resonance. It is a kind of deferred politics. This
stems from one overwhelming fact. Sociology
emerges out of the disintegration of hierarchical
societies or, in Weber’s terms, out of the fraying
of traditional authority. At its core, sociology is
an answer to a neo-Kantian question: How is
society possible without the binding agent of
hierarchy? This is a political question insofar
as, until the beginning of the nineteenth century, all states – whether they were city-states,
monarchies, or empires – were built around
social hierarchies. Political forms turned on
the social orders of master and servant, noble
and commoner, tribute receiver and giver, citizen and free person, slave owner and slave.
Something staggering began to happen in the
late eighteenth century. The traditional social
authority of hierarchy started to be replaced.