The Generic Eternal:
Modernism, Alienation and the Built Environment
Otto Paans
The beginning of the 20th century marks a clear break in the conceptions of architecture and
urbanism. The swiftly developing technological possibilities of that epoch spawned technoutopias that contributed to a shift in how buildings were produced, and cities were planned.
For once, a kind of “ideal world” seemed realizable, and technology and rationality would play
key roles in bringing about a Heaven-on-Earth about. Prefabricated building parts, new
construction methods, industrial component production and an almost unshakeable belief in
social engineering forever changed the way humanity built its living environment. We are – I
suspect – still in shock when confronted with the scale and consequences of this break and
its unprecedented radicality. Almost a century after modernism, we can safely say that this
rupture has not completely made good on its promises. Nevertheless, one of its effects is
widely and diffusely experienced. It has thrown large parts of the built environment into an
aesthetic condition I shall refer to as the generic eternal.1
This is an “aesthetic” condition in the 18th century sense that Kant used that term, but that
we also find in the work of Michel Serres. 2 “Aesthetic” in this sense broadly means “as
experienced by all or any of the senses”. What is meant here are not merely the five senses,
but also the mental dispositions they influence and form. From a contemporary point of view,
the aesthetic in this sense can be easily expanded into the essentially embodied: the senses
and the mental capacities we possess do not work in isolation, separated from each other. On
the contrary, they cannot either be thought or exist without bodily dispositions and
realization. To think about aesthetics then, is to think about the fullness of experience itself –
and how this experience is shaped by the environments we inhabit.
The timeless, ascetic, neutral, sublime quality that modernist architects and planners
idealistically envisioned for their creations has been softened and harnessed to create a world
that is austere, but not too sober; not divested from its ambition to be sublime, but palatable;
rationalistic but not too unappealing; universally agreeable but unfortunately bland; purged
of local features but not yet anonymous. It is generic in a similar sense that Apple laptops
and Braun toothbrushes are – it is eternal because it seeks to embody a regular, industrial,
futuristic and fashionable aesthetic without ever reaching for a specifically Romantic sublime
experience. It is simultaneously generic and eternal – universal and faux-sublime.
The built environment it is not merely a neutral world in which we happen to find ourselves
stranded. It actively reflects values and ideas about society and its organization.
Simultaneously, the built environment is a tool for directing and controlling behaviour –
values and ideas are built into it and elicit responses from users and operators alike. Finally,
we are affected by our environment; it is a formative force in shaping our self-image and the
1
A slightly different version of this essay is published in the open-source philosophy journal Borderless Philosophy
issue no. 2, at: <https://www.cckp.space>. Partially, some ideas on non-place have been worked out in the
publication Situational Urbanism: Directing Post-war Urbanity (Berlin: JOVIS Verlag, 2014).
2
) For instance, in his books The Five Senses (London: Bloomsbury, 2016) and The Incandescent (London:
Bloomsbury, 2018).
experience of our subjectivity. If we put this differently and more formally, we can consider
ourselves aesthetic beings, whose self-images are formed through essentially embodied
experience, a process in which inhabited environments play a crucial role. Studying and
describing the relationships between us and the built environment is a way of understanding
ourselves through the artificial worlds we create. It follows from this line of thought that
describing what the “generic eternal” is and how it came into being is an exercise in selfexamination through that which we create.
This essay has five sections. The first part concerns two philosophical, foundational
assumptions built into the technology-driven, modernist urban utopias from the beginning of
the 20th century. This necessitates a short excursus into the 19th century, because
architectural modernism did not fall from the heavens fully formed and operational. The
second, third and fourth parts concern three aspects of the generic eternal. The second part
shows how the two modernist assumptions were taken to their extreme end, resulting in a
situation that Marc Augé has labelled as “supermodernity.” This new development made
modernity “liquid” or “omnipresent.” This development can be best epitomized by Marx’s
famous dictum that “all that is solid melts into air.” What melts into air is the idea of belonging
itself, culminating in a process of universal alienation. One of the causes of this alienation is
that the built environment of supermodernity is replete with instructions, injunctions, tacit
imperatives and direct commands, giving rise to the widespread phenomenon of “instructive
spaces.”
The third part shows how the modernist assumptions and instructive spaces led to
“ubiquitous alienation.” This phenomenon paved the way for a counter-response – a
widespread urban condition that can be characterized as a softened modernism in search of
authenticity. This type of modernism is again generic and eternal. It is characterized by a
series of tensions – on the one hand, it seeks to negate the ubiquitous alienation resulting
from modernity; on the other, it refuses to relinquish its modernist doctrines, reproducing the
very phenomenon its attempts to overcome.
Fourth and by way of concluding the argument, the first three sections allow us to discuss
the generic eternal as an aesthetic notion that harbours deep dialectical paradoxes, but that
is also an existential, aesthetically experienced condition in today’s urbanized world. This
world is not sublime in the Romantic sense, merely pleasurable, or pleasing from an artistic
point of view. Yet, the experiences it affords touch the core of our being, in determining in
how we experience the world.
The fifth section summarizes the line of reasoning set out in this essay.
I implicitly assume some things in the latter part of the essay. Notably, I am committed to the
view that the environments that we create shape us in return; that the built environment as a
whole is readable or at least interpretable; that it obliquely or directly reflects cultural and
societal values, even if the creators of these environments may not commit themselves to
these values personally; and finally, that by careful analysis, a philosophical reflection about
the human condition can be formulated, based on meticulous observation combined with
theoretical speculation.3
3
A note for Anglophone readers: in the Dutch/German speaking part of Europe, the approach adopted here goes
by the name cultuurfilosofie or Kulturphilosophie and is an integral part of philosophical practice. The idea is that
philosophy is well-suited to describe and designate (duiden/deuten) cultural phenomena, especially when it teams
up with adjacent disciplines like sociology or geography. The work of for example the Frankfurt School and
philosophers of modern media like Regis Debray or Axel Honneth is representative of this tradition.
I
L’Esprit Nouveau: An Age of Velocity Under Two Assumptions
Everything is accessible to man; and man is the measure of all things. Here is an
affinity with the Sophists, not with the Platonists; with the Epicureans, not with the
Pythagoreans; with all those who stand for earthly being and the here and now.
The scientific world-conception knows no unsolvable riddle. Clarification of the
traditional philosophical problems leads us partly to unmask them as pseudoproblems, and partly to transform them into empirical problems and thereby
subject them to the judgment of experimental science.4
If anything, the quote above is about velocity and change. The windows are opened, and fresh
air is let in, doing away with the old order and its pseudo-problems. From now on, every
problem is accessible and solvable. Nothing will stand in the way of the fast train of progress.
This thought is unparalleled in its radicality. History itself is shown the door and was to be
replaced by an account of progress, a list of accomplishments and breakthroughs. Only
cutting-edge information would suffice to realize the secure “progress of progress”. How did
we get to the point where a radical thought like this one could be formulated? Part of the
answer to this question lies in two basic ontological assumptions of modernity, namely
natural mechanism and its closely-related compositional atomism.
These two assumptions are paradigmatically visible in Descartes’s Meditations and Discourse
on Method. Descartes supplied the metaphysical backbone for what was to become the
modern, scientific worldview: namely, reality as presented through a double dualism: mental
vs. material. First, material (essentially non-mental) reality as a mechanistic stage that could
be manipulated and measured by a detached, objective observer, drawing a fundamental line
between the master and the matter he manipulates. Second, material (essentially nonmental) reality as the physical domain of physical causes and effects as fundamentally
distinct from the mental domain of mind and cognition.5 Since only humans (and actual or
possible angels) possessed souls, all other beings and systems can be regarded as machines,
confining reason to mastery of an inert environment. Descartes is quite explicit on this point:
animals are to be regarded as mechanical objects, and every operation of the human body
can be explained with reference to mechanical operations. The muscles, sensations, and
emotions can be seen as workings of valves, levers, and pressure vats.6 The physical world is
exclusively mechanical, and every action is necessary and caused by some prior event. As
mechanical events can be predicted by means of mathematics or the application of a priori
truths, the distant observer can manipulate and guide the world with an unparalleled certainty
and purpose. As such, Laplace’s demon is a hallmark personality of modernity, its ideological
core personified in an all-knowing, all-seeing manipulator of worlds. The promise of
prediction, in turn, framed rationality in instrumental terms: if an appeal to rationality was
made, it was purely on practical, predictive grounds. In short, instrumental rationality
becomes a ground for justification: an action was justified precisely to the degree that it was
rational, an idea that was expressed through the notion of instrumental reason.
4
Mach 1929: 6/16.
Bamford 2002: 247-248
6
Notably in the Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences,
part V.
5
In turn, Descartes’s idea that the physical world is essentially mechanistic entails that entities
can be decomposed into their constituent parts. This logic seemingly works well for
conducting scientific investigations in the realms of physics and chemistry. Molecules can be
reduced to atoms and atoms to subatomic particles. Organisms can be dissected, and their
individual organ functions can be mapped and described. This approach, however, provides
no handholds for creative activities like painting, inventing, tinkering, or designing.
Architectural theorist Greg Bamford notes perceptively that sometimes designing relies on
actions of decomposition and re-composition, but that we end up in a different place than
where we began.7 When an architect decomposes a problem, it may be to advance to a next
stage of problem-solving instead of recomposing the problem in the same way it is
encountered. The difference here is between designing and assembling: designing cannot be
reduced to assembling premade parts into a whole whose shape is known in advance.
Someone who has assembled a car cannot for that reason alone be said to have designed
one.
Figure 1: Designing or assembling? The ontology of Modernism deeply influenced architectural
practice, and the idea of assembling a building by multiplying a standard unit became quickly
established. Cecilienplatz, Hellersdorf-Süd, Berlin, DE. (Photo by author).
This atomist ontology underpinned the radical faith in mankind proposed by the Vienna Circle.
Descartes’s simple, materialist ontology, minus the realm of the mental, would be married to
symbolic logic to create a pure, unified, reductionist science of precise concepts:
The scientific world conception is characterised not so much by theses of its own, but
rather by its basic attitude, its points of view and direction of research. The goal ahead
is unified science. The endeavour is to link and harmonise the achievements of
individual investigators in their various fields of science. From this aim follows the
emphasis on collective efforts, and also the emphasis on what can be grasped
intersubjectively; from this springs the search for a neutral system of formulae, for a
symbolism freed from the slag of historical languages; and also the search for a total
7
Bamford 2002
system of concepts. Neatness and clarity are striven for, and dark distances and
unfathomable depths rejected.8
Strange as it may seem, this radically scientistic doctrine influenced the fine arts even more
than the scientific practices from which it derived. The marriage of objectivity and artistic
creation seems like an incompatible combination, but modernist authors, artists, and
architects viewed this issue differently. The most sublime or aesthetic qualities would emerge
through rationality, not in spite of it. History itself would be erased by the velocity of progress,
resulting in a sublime, neutral system of formulae that would absolve of the world of its sins,
shortcomings and imperfections. This sanitized new world would represent the pinnacle of
aesthetic perfection.
The positivist conception of universal logical and/or natural laws as the highest good had a
decisive impact on ideas about speculation and exactitude, for example in the writings of Theo
van Doesburg (1923) and Le Corbusier (1929):
Our epoch is hostile to every subjective speculation in art, science, technique, etc. The
new spirit, which already governs almost all modern life, is opposed to animal
spontaneity, to nature's domination, to artistic flummery and cookery. In order to
construct a new object we need a method, that is to say, an objective system.9
The use of the house consists of a regular sequence of definite functions. The regular
sequence of these functions is a traffic phenomenon. To render that traffic exact,
economical and rapid, is the key effort of modern architectural science.10
According to Van Doesburg, subjective speculation is portrayed as animalistic, and an
objective system is proposed to break away from this oppressing hold of subjectivity. In
addition, Van Doesburg equates method (in this case: a systematic approach) with objectivity.
He regards subjectivity and systematic approaches as mutually exclusive. Le Corbusier
shares this emphasis on objectivity, when he speaks of usage as a regular sequence of definite
functions. The conviction that the usage of a house (or city) can be fully determined in
advance directly mirrors the idea that no problem is outside the reach of science or
engineering – with the engineer taking on the role of Laplace’s demon. Le Corbusier treats
architectural design as a practice that manipulates fully determinate and exact symbols in
configurations that are themselves fully determinate and exact. Elsewhere he evokes the
language of engineering as one of the great lessons to be learned from modern architecture:
“[via] the use of the sliding rule; for with it we can resolve every equation. The laws of physics
are at the base of all human achievement.”11 The Positivists held that every problem could be
solved by science; and, in turn, many modernist architects and designers subscribed in
various degrees to the view that engineering could solve every design problem.
This attitude signals a clear break with the Romantic aesthetic ideals, according to which the
sublime is often located beyond rationality, not inside it. Sheer instrumental reason would
provide the new aesthetic ideal, justified by its cogency, coherence and functionality, solving
all the problems of mankind and thereby providing a life free of cares and filled with scientistic
8
Mach 1929: 5/16
Cross et al. 1981: 195; the original text is by Theo van Doesburg, and is titled Towards a Collective Construction,
published in De Stijl in 1923
10
Cross et al. 1981: 195; the original text is by Le Corbusier, presented at the 2nd Congress of CIAM in Frankfurt,
1929
11
Le Corbusier 1987: 147
9
sublimity. Of course, these ideals had to take a physical shape; correspondingly, we find the
first guidelines for modernist practices in architecture appearing in the 1920s and 1930s:
As history has shown, the forces liberated by centuries of agitation and disorder are
now uniting and orientating themselves in a common effort. Thus, we see looming a
great epoch. A great epoch has just begun, because all forms of human activity are
finally organizing themselves according to the same principle. The spirit of
construction and synthesis, of order and conscious will are again manifesting
themselves; it is no less indispensable to display it in the arts and letters, in the pure
and applied sciences, and even in philosophy.12
Modernist design practice and Positivist philosophy were in agreement on at least the
following point: order was the hallmark of everything rational, and since rationality was
amenable to atomist-reductionist analyses, inference from first principles became its
dominant mode of construction. In turn, a structure that was through-and-through rational
in this sense displayed a kind of unity: this would be some sort of unifying, perceptible
aesthetic quality that the eye would behold and recognize instantly. Le Corbusier derived it
from the unity of classical Roman architecture. The human scale of doors, windows and steps
would be the measure for the dimensions of a building or the open space surrounding it.
Suffused with instrumental rationality, such spaces would directly trigger the aesthetic
sensibility of the inhabitant. Of course, such an aesthetic vision is tremendously ambitious,
placing a heavy load on the part of “visible rationality”: the more that instrumental rationality
is visible, the more that aesthetic sensibilities would be activated. But how could one render
instrumental rationality visible? The answer to this practical question was twofold: austerity
and exactitude. A building without superfluous parts would already appear instrumentally
rational. If the necessity of each part could be easily perceived, then instrumental rationality
itself would emerge:
This contemporary style, which exists throughout the world, is unified and inclusive,
not fragmentary and contradictory like so much of the production of the first
generation of modern architects.13
Unity manifests itself in different domains: in stylistic characteristics, in its functional
programme, in its conception of one coherent vision, and in the avoidance of any
contradictions. Precisely these characteristics would later be criticized by Robert Venturi and
Denise Scott-Brown in their 1965 book Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture.
Modernism, however, insisted on unity as a supreme aesthetic principle.14 The “inclusivity”
mentioned in the quotation above is worth exploring. When Modernist planners insisted on
inclusiveness, they actually meant the application of building templates that were throughand-through instrumentally rationalized and exact. The idea was that when all available
scientific data were integrated in the guidelines for building and city planning, nothing could
go wrong and a perfect instrumentally rational space would be realized.
12
Ozenfant and Jeanneret 2008: 182
Hitchock and Johnson 2008: 166
14
One qualification is necessary here: when I refer to “modernism”, I will broadly mean the body of ideas
developed by CIAM (Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne) between 1928 and 1959, as well as the ideas
developed by its main proponents. Modernity in architecture is of course of multifaceted development – it cannot
be treated like as a monolithic block, but should be regarded as an assembly of different schools of thought.
However, this essay deals with the CIAM-based line of thought.
13
A striking example that illuminates the consequences of direct translation of theoretical
doctrines into architectural practice can be found in the 1946 research publication De Stad
Der Toekomst, De Toekomst Der Stad (“The City of the Future, The Future of the City”) in which
the application of modernist ideas to develop so-called “neighbourhood units” in urbanism
were theorized and investigated by a study group working for the municipality of Rotterdam.15
The idea was that the neighbourhood would be the prime organizational unit of the city,
further subdivided in units for clusters of families and individual families.16
Figure 2: The neighbourhood of Zuidwijk (Rotterdam, NL) was built slightly later than Pendrecht,
but departed largely from the same assumptions about the structure of society and the precise
allocation of functions – based on idealized descriptions of everyday activities (Source: Bos 1946).
The whole study was based on socio-cultural and urban research that included factors like
the necessity for societal life, the optimum size of neighbourhood communities, the influence
and importance of greenery, a survey of the city before and after 1800 and an investigation
of the urban inheritance of the 19th century. The approximate size of the envisioned families
was based on the “modern American family.”17 The resulting spatial grid that emerged was
laid out according to a theoretical hierarchy with distinctly atomist tendencies. The atomist
ordering of society provided compositional principles and a spatial distribution of buildings
and functions.
According to the hierarchical logic employed in modernist urbanism, the city consisted of
neighbourhoods, while neighbourhoods could be subdivided in further modules of a fixed size
and with presupposed behaviour. Each unit existed independently but had fixed relations to
others on the same level and the level above it. Consequently, the applied logic is also
atomistic and mechanistic in its form, relating back to the idea of the malleable society, as
15
Bos 1946
Zweerink 2004: 17
17
Zweerink 2004: 17
16
well as the atomism inspired by the scientific conception of the world. Later on, this atomist,
idealized tenet in modernist architecture became a focus for criticism, the critics pointing out
that modernists made unrealistic, overly instrumental-rationalist assumptions about “the
typical human.”18 This approach became broadly known as functionalism, or the idea that for
each activity in a city, a precise shape and design could be made.
However, the term “functionalism” itself underwent significant changes in the period from
1920 to 1950. During the 1920s, when architects spoke of function, they aimed at exactitude:
an organizational and spatial descriptive geometry that could be precisely determined before
realization.19 The degree to which the belief in the precise ascription of functions shaped
modern architecture (and subsequently problem-solving) can be discerned from for example
the CIAM Declaration of La Sarraz (1928) or the Athens Charter (1943). Both documents
present the foundations of an all-encompassing architectural approach aimed at spatially
ordering the built environment, by reference to (and inferred from) empirical data. The
positivist idea that problems could be solved by decomposing them into discrete empirical
questions and then logically combining the findings so as to yield scientific proposals thereby
received a specifically architectural expression.
The focus on unity and exactitude led via reductionism to a kind of purist aesthetic that looked
sleek and austere.20 Every element that was deemed superfluous was removed (although this
led later on to conflicts about the purity of the style) and since buildings and cities became
prefabricated industrial products, economic thinking on shape, size, properties and costs was
required. On this point, Le Corbusier is quite insistent on this point when he invokes the
efficiency of ocean liners, cars and airplanes to underline efficient use of materials in finding
solutions by invoking the alliance between “cold reason” and ”imagination”.21 The upshot of
his argument is that the application of instrumental rationality to a given problem inevitably
yields a solution, and that the universal laws of mathematics and economics guide such
design efforts to an optimal solution. This solution is beautiful by virtue of its elegantly
addressing an issue in the most economical way possible. Beauty is thereby converted into a
function of efficiency. Not surprisingly, the archetypal figures of this kind of modernism were
engineers and architects – the two main actors in the alliance between cold instrumental
reason and imagination. This modernist dichotomy between “the engineer” who manipulates
materials in the most efficient way possible and “the architect” who evokes “plastic emotions”
precisely re-inscribes Descartes’s mind-body dualism in the architecture of the early 20th
century. It is a continuous duality between instrumentally rational, efficient manipulation of
the physical world on one hand, and the existence of a “spiritual”, Platonic world of eternal
Forms and ideality on the other. Again, not surprisingly, it was exactly at this juncture that
the ideological underpinnings of the modernist project would start to crack: how much
emotion can a building display without becoming superfluous, subjectivist or “irrational”?
The way to avoid this conundrum was to emphasize unity, exactitude and clarity – just as
positivist thinkers had done in their philosophy.
18
Paans and Pasel 2017 (forthcoming)
Nowicki 2008: 284; Whether all proponents of architectural modernism viewed functionalism in the same way
seems debatable. For example, theorists like Ludwig Mies van der Rohe in his text The Office Building (1923) and
Adolf Behne in his text The Modern Functional Building (1926) had a definitely more flexible conception of
functionalism – in their view, modernist functionality enabled flexible usage.
20
This tendency is also visible in Adolf Loos’ text Ornament and Crime (1908), where Loos defends an extremely
austere and purist aesthetic ideal suited to modern times. The idea was that bodily ornamentation stemmed from a
lack of civilization – people who resorted to such practices had not reached the epitome of modern culture yet.
21
Le Corbusier 1986: 109
19
Figure 3: Le Corbusier's Cité Radieuse de Marseille (1947-1952) in Marseille (FR) embodied the ontological
assumptions of architectural modernism. Notably, the emphasis on repetition and an idealized basic unit is
easily perceivable. The sculptural ventilation stacks on the roof illustrate the tension between form, emotion
and function – their form is not strictly functionally determined. (Photo by author).
The emphasis on unity, exactitude and clarity led easily to austerity as an aesthetic ideal.
However, even this ideal was not just the result of an emphasis on unity and clarity. It was
also based on the more fundamental metaphysical notion of neutral formulae in positivism.
The “neutral set of formulae” that would be the basis of all building was perceived as a
coherent code that provided a direct insight into the structure of the universe. Le Corbusier
held that the laws of physics determined human behaviour and that engineering possessed
the tools for universal problem solving. In turn, this attitude necessitates the assumption of
a direct structural realism, a kind of immediate metaphysical insight into the structure of the
universe that enables humankind to manipulate the world at will. For instance, the unit-based
and individual house-based structure of many modernist cities was intended to function as a
predictable, machine-like structure, recursively generated from many parts according to a
step-by-step computational algorithm. If each part behaved as predicted, the ideal functional
city would realize itself through careful assembly, while its aesthetic qualities would be
guaranteed by adhering to strict compositional principles. The role of the urbanist was to
supply the boundary conditions for the functioning of the machinery, and, once in place, the
whole system would function in an utterly deterministic way, like a series of cogwheels. Each
step would be predictable in advance, as the behaviour of individual parts was known from
the outset. Modernist public spaces consequently had an ultra-logico-mathematical, regular
outlook. Although the modernist approach to architecture and city planning matured on
paper, its large-scale implementation had not yet taken place. The Second World War delayed
the realization of many modernist ideas that had been developing in the 1920s and 1930s.
The application of these ideas had to wait until the early 1950s, when European town planners
started to look beyond the immediate concerns of reconstruction and rebuilding.
To understand why this modernist-functionalist approach did so well with the town planners
and the general public, we need to take into account the societal structure and ideas about
private life during the 1950s and ‘60s. In the reconstruction period following the Second
World War, state institutions became more and more influential in organizing people’s private
lives, the start of a development that would culminate into the post-war welfare state.22 So,
an institutional and biopolitical grid emerged between state and citizen, controlling various
aspects of private life. Healthcare, education, birth control, housing, and social work were
increasingly professionalized and organized. The emergence of this “social field”, combined
with the belief that society could be transformed at will is characteristic of this historical
period.
An article written about the urban expansion of Pendrecht, located in Rotterdam, is typical
for its displaying of generally prevailing views on society and its relation to the built
environment. Pendrecht consisted of modular building types (typically distributed on
calculated expected family sizes) and continuous open and half-open spaces. Its urban
designer commented: “Our democratic system preferably excludes ‘not-partaking.’ We stand
in space and are a part of it.”23 In a plea for realizing flats (1953) she argued that high-rise
“frees” the soil of anything which is “owned.” “It removes the private, but it gives the public,
the collective back to us.” 24 Clearly, public concerns were deemed more important than
private concerns. The idea that the public space was there for the individual was non-existent
at the time. Public space was the platform for “the collective.” Here, in keeping with the
atomist convictions of modernism, a kind of social atomism is at work. Individuals are taken
to form groups, and groups to form collectives. A collective with strong bonds is taken to be
a society. The atomist tendencies assumed in building cities were without hesitation projected
on society as a whole.
The idea was that a neutral, repetitive or even recursive, and collective structure would be a
background for all activities engaged in by inhabitants: “We’ve decided very consciously that
we don’t use any variation in buildings, because it makes no sense. We trust that the diversity
and the social configurations of the inhabitants will manifest itself, so that the apparent
similarity and monotony will be negated.” 25 The “social field” was envisioned as something
emergent, something that is able to develop on its own in a neutral and supportive spatial
setting. Put differently, it is “an empty stage on which a continuously changing image of
publicness and citizenship will present itself”.26 So, the generic outlook of much post-war
urbanism in Western Europe was not only a tangible result of industrialized building methods
and an austere aesthetic ideal, but also a conscious design decision inspired by social
atomism. The assumption was that “life itself” would take over, so that the outlook of the
environment was irrelevant. Functionality and instrumental rationality were not only
employed as tools, but the whole outlook of architecture was subsumed under these two
principles. In turn, life itself would develop and flourish when the city was instrumentally
rational. Instrumental rationality itself, however, was increasingly defined in terms of discrete
functions and spatial programmes.
22
van Winkel1999: 25
van Winkel 1999: 30; The text cites an unpublished 1958 lecture of urbanist Lotte Stam-Beese
24
van Winkel 1999: 30
25
van Winkel 1999: 31
26
van Winkel 1999: 31; The text cites Lotte Stam-Beese’s publication “Aantekening bij het uitbreidingsplan
Pendrecht” (“Note accompanying the urban extension plan Pendrecht”).
23
Figure 4: The strictly functionalist tenets of modern city planning resulted in highly uniform public
spaces. A photo like this could have been taken in many modernist city expansions. This particular
example is from Overvecht (Utrecht, NL), but could have been taken in a multitude of areas. (Photo
by author).
For the generations of architects working after the 1920s, the concept of functionality
became synonymous with flexibility expressed in a fixed, open-grid structure, as this open
ground plan and the utilization of load-bearing columns allowed for multiple forms of spatial
organization. Although the underlying theory was deterministic, the results looked
surprisingly flexible and malleable. Therefore, “the discovery of formal symbols of the
unchanging laws of the universe seems to replace the invention of form without precedent”.27
Modernist architectural practice relied on the underlying unified, law-like basis given by laws
of the universe itself. Once again, there is a clear link with the positivist idea that the natural
sciences are the measure of all things, including architectural production and design. In this
regard, Le Corbusier speaks in The Modulor (1950) of metric systems derived from the human
body as “precise measures which constitute a code, a coherent system: a system which
proclaims an essential unity.”28 Earlier, he had already remarked that the engineer’s aesthetic
derived from mathematical law, and therefore possessed harmony.29
Likewise, Janik and Toulmin write the following about the building methods of the Bauhaus –
an insight that underlines the pervasive presence of precise measures and abstract
structures:
Far from being functional, the resulting structures have been, one might say, the
nearest thing yet seen to the physical realization of a pure Cartesian system of
geometrical coordinates. The architect defines merely the structural axes of reference,
27
Nowicki 2008: 286.
Le Corbusier 2008: 302
29
Le Corbusier 1986: 15
28
and within these the occupier is free to pursue an effectively unlimited range of lives
or occupations.30
In this case the Bauhaus – but also other proponents of modernity – conceived functionality
as the creation of grids or structures that allowed for multiple courses of action.31 Not unlike
Laplace’s demon, the architect is conceived as a manipulator of possible worlds. Within the
grids he creates, endless possibilities unfold. Apart from the economic efficacy of modernist
building practices, Janik and Toulmin note how the very substance of architecture seems to
melt into thin air. The materials of modernism are coordinates – as far is materiality is
concerned, it does not get more insubstantial than this. The “neutral set of formulae” was
used to create systems of relations that would be eternally useful because of their openness
and rational setup.
Just as the universe provides a coherent code in the form of an essential unity of laws, so
architectural production had to match this unified ideal. Not unlike a “unified science,” in the
positivist sense, modern architecture would employ its problem-solving methodology to
define a “unified architecture”, based on findings of the sciences.32 Indeed, in 1947 Siegfried
Giedion emphasized how scientific planning, the formulation of “the architectural problem of
today” must lead to a “new idea of architecture” to be instilled in “technical, economic and
social thought.” 33 These CIAM-inspired models for producing architecture were deeply
instrumental-rationalist and highly abstract. They provided a formal framework producing
organizational guidelines, and an architectural expression that had a deeply austere,
functional relationship to materiality.34
From all this, we can glimpse some of the core assumptions that led to the built environment
as we now know it. Modernism relied on an ideal of purity, just as their positivist counterparts
emphasized a kind of conceptual clarity and methodological rigor. This attitude represented
– and necessitated – a radical break with the past and the embracing of unlimited progress.
Naturally, the engineering sciences and natural sciences were held up as examples of “beauty
through rationality”. The aesthetic ideal for progress became austerity, because this was the
clearest expression of neatness, instrumental purpose, unity and clarity.
It should be emphasized how de-historicizing this vision essentially is. The emphasis on
starting with a clean slate, the universality of scientific instrumental rationality, the overall
applicability of modernist design guidelines and the purported superiority of the modern over
the traditional has shaped well over a century of architectural practice. For us, these tenets
are ingrained in our built environment. Hotels, airports, hospitals, housing tenements,
highways, and shopping malls all have been thoroughly influenced by these ideals.
30
Janik and Toulmin 1973: 253
Interestingly enough, this was not the starting point of Bauhaus education, but a development away from its
original goals.
32
See for a critique of the idea of a unified science Adorno and Horkheimer 2017; Presently, this ideal is still alive
in for example E.O. Wilson’s concept of consilience.
33
Giedion 2008: 318
34
So much so, that Ernesto Rogers elicited a harsh critique from Peter Smithson when he presented the BBPR
designs for the 1956 Torre Velasca in Milan at the CIAM conference in 1959. The fact that the tower could be
interpreted as a direct (or, even worse, historicizing) reference to traditional medieval towers built in the region
was enough to label the proposal “immoral.” This anecdote shows that modernistic architecture was not as
“neutral” or value-free as it claimed to be.
31
Figure 5: The austere and repetition-based aesthetic of modernism on full display. In this case, the
ahistorical vision of modernity is quite visible, as this hotel is located next to the historic inner city
of Dresden (DE) but does not even attempt to fit in or refer to its rich history. (Photo by author).
Modernism promised not merely to start with a clean slate: it rejected the past in favour of a
new world enabled and ultimately constituted by technology. The radical thought with which
this essay started could be developed only because reality itself was deemed inherently open
to mastery by technical means. In realizing the re-creation of reality, history was seen as
residue that needed to be removed, an obstacle on the high road of progress. The ideals of
the 1920s and 1930s have had a tremendous influence on city planning and the conception
of buildings. With the rise of globalization, modernity entered a new phase. Its core
assumptions started to affect its own products, a situation that Ulrich Beck labelled “reflexive
modernity,” and that Marc Augé called “supermodernity.” I’ll examine the consequences of
this important development in the next section.
II
The Generic Eternal, First Aspect: Instructive Space
During the 1990s, globalization became an increasingly prominent theme in debates about
place and placemaking. The fact that you could travel to a vast array of places around the
globe and buy exotic foods and clothes in the shop around the corner, made the whole idea
of fixed places with separate identities appear superfluous. In geography (the science which
is usually occupied with the definition of place), the usual conception of a place as a fixed
location (say Berlin, Los Angeles or Shanghai) had to be reconceived. A first attempt in this
direction was made by Doreen Massey.35 Massey defined place as the product of the flows
which pass through it, a theme that – given the visibility of mobility – is well understandable.
With the increasing means of mobility, the speed of the mass-media also increased.
Globalization was not only a matter of more physical traffic between different points on the
globe, but it was also an endless and omnipresent stream of information. If an earthquake
has taken place on the other side of the planet, then you would know about it in one hour
35
Massey 2005
after it happened. Information created connections in space and time, connecting the globe
through a network of messages – a kind of continuous and ubiquitous level of background
noise in which everything was steeped.
As mentioned already, Marc Augé refers to this state of affairs as supermodernity. It was as
if the modern project had accelerated its speed, bringing more and more people and events
together. Where the drawings of Le Corbusier featured cars rushing towards the horizon on
an endless highway, globalization pushed the envelope even further – airplanes took the place
of cars. On top of this, digital communication put temporality itself into question. Information
can cross the globe without travel time and short-circuits older conceptions of time. The
world has become simultaneous instead of sequential.
The increased means of mobility obviously required a new infrastructure built for speed. Le
Corbusier could confidently maintain that a city built for speed was built for success.
Nowadays, this statement is applied to the world – a world built for speed is built for success.
When the steam train was invented, railroads had to be constructed for its efficiency to unfold.
With the mass production of the car, elaborate highway networks had to be made. When air
travel was introduced, airports and runways had to be constructed. With globalization, the
presence of those places becomes increasingly visible. The amount of time we spend in those
“in-between” locations is significant. Imagine the number of hours we have been waiting in
airport seats, on a train platform, stuck in a traffic jam on the highway, or simply immobilized
in an airplane waiting on a tarmac, while the time passes by. The same logic applies to places
like office corridors, parking garages, shopping malls, and hotels. All these places are “inbetween”, and bear the stamp of stalled temporality, of tentative stability. They all play a role
in some part of our daily lives. The office is a space for spending the time allocated for work,
the highway or the subway is the space for spending time allocated for travel. Residential
areas allocated destinations for relaxation or leisure, as are gyms and shopping malls.
Augé tried to characterize these so-called non-places with some precision. This is a difficult
task, as non-place is simply a phenomenon that is ever-present, but simultaneously
subjective: one person might say that J.F. Kennedy airport is a non-place, while someone else
disagrees and experiences the same location completely differently. This makes it hard to
create a list of clear criteria for what counts as a “place” or “non-places.”
In its geographical sense, the concept of place is defined by its elements, which makes it
possible to discriminate between “here” (a set of properties) and “there” (another set of
properties).36 With penetrating anthropological acumen, Augé noticed that there is a third
way of defining places: traditional societies define a dense network of history, relations and
identity, that ties them to the place where they are living. For instance, many African tribes
have elaborated “founding myths” which explain why they live on this particular spot on the
Earth. Stones, rivers, trees and hills are features of the landscape with which these tribes
have connections, and which mean something to them. A particular tree might not bear any
significance for the average person, but for a particular tribesman it might be a powerful
symbol loaded with meaning. The elements of a particular location are inherently physical
and yet also belong to a unifying narrative. They are not reproducible but are invariably tied
to a location and a history.
36
Most notably Yi-Fu Tuan in Space and Place: The perspective of experience (1976), Tim Cresswell in Place: A
Short Introduction (2004), Doreen Massey in For Space (2005) and Kevin Lynch in Good City Form (1981)
This logic functions today just as strongly as in the past. Couples who celebrate their
anniversary might return to the place where they first met. To anyone else, this location is
just as generic as any other spot, but not to the two people who embedded this location in
their long-term memories. The same principle applies to street names: Red Square in Moscow
will always be associated with its communist past, as does the piece of Berlin Wall that still
stands. Michel de Certeau described this characteristic eloquently:
[T]hese words slowly rose, like worn coins, the value engraved on them, but their ability
to signify outlives its first definition. (…) A strange toponymy that is detached from
actual places and flies high over the city like a foggy geography of meanings, held in
suspension, directing the physical deambulations below…37
Histories direct actions and partially determine attitudes. The idea that place can be
described as a network of history, social and intersubjective relations, and identity is
anthropological in approach, but has important dispositional consequences. It saliently
determines the meaning people attach to a physical location, a level of meaning that
transcends the physical, readily identifiable characteristics of a location. The
“anthropological place” is deeply historical and narratively constituted, in contradistinction
to the proliferation of new places created under the aegis of supermodernity.
Our societies are by no means traditional any longer. The condition of supermodernity
profoundly and irrevocably changed the relationship that we have to history and to
intersubjective relations in a dramatic way. The non-place — “there’s no there there”— is a
pervasive spatial phenomenon by which we experience supermodernity in its full depth. It is
the polar opposite of anthropological place. It is constituted by two characteristics: the
discouragement of lasting social relations, and the imposition of a new mode of existence on
individuals.
Discouraging lasting social relations
Non-places are not made to actually develop rich and prolonged human social relations in.
You can move through them (in the case of the highway or the hotel corridor), you can stay
a short time (in the case of hotel rooms, or conference centres) and you are able to consume
or satisfy your immediate needs (supermarket, shopping mall). In the case of post-war
residential areas, public spaces are conceived as utilitarian non-places, thereby undercutting
the belief that the collective would emerge naturally on them.
Augé describes this urban condition in terms that point towards alienation: “The space of
non-place creates neither singular identity nor relations, only solitude and similitude”.38 This
description is fitting because it emphasizes how directly the doctrine of atomism structures
the contemporary – yet modernist – built environment. Each of the users is as it were a social
atom in an environment composed of repeated, similar entities. The logic of those
environments is replicated on functional grounds, creating a world of similitude and
predictability. This recurring similitude can be very comforting in some situations (for
instance, if one travels a lot). In other instances, it undermines the creation of meaning and
attachment to an environment. If we apply these descriptions to modernistic buildings and
public spaces, their lay-outs consists largely of signs, addressing and instructing all
inhabitants, but relating to none of them. This characteristic touches not only on residential
city expansions and housing tenements. It applies to contemporary shopping malls,
37
38
De Certeau 1984: 104
Augé 2006: 83
supermarkets, airports and concert venues as well. The real similitude does not reside in the
building details as such, but in the way that the assumptions of the design structure the
actions and possibilities of users.
Imposed identities
Non-places create identities, or rather they forcibly impose them.39 In anthropological places,
relations and references from the surroundings are responsible for the emergence of a
meaningful framework of interpretation and narrative orientation. The identity derived by
individuals from existing symbols has clear referents in time, space, and spacetime. One may
be the father of a family, the owner of an old estate, the youngest one in a long line of
landowners, etc. Identity, narrative, duration, and place are inextricably intertwined.
In the non-places of supermodernity, an identity is created from scratch and imposed on the
individual. In a comparable way, modernistic planning theory treated every person as
“citizen.” One template would be enough to cater for all the different needs because – after
all – everyone was essentially similar. No matter what your background or capabilities, the
template is forced on you.
This is an essentially existential matter. By means of this “instructive attitude” the non-place
affects one’s very mode of existence, seen from the perspective of the functional demands of
that location. When one is labelled a “citizen” or “traveller”, one is treated as existing only as
such. The relations that the environment and other people create towards such a labelled
person are suffused with a strange distancing. One is approached and treated as the
“subject”, “consumer” or “passer-by”. Nothing else is needed, and therefore everything else
is omitted. This mode of existence is thoroughly impoverished and one-dimensional, because
it rests on a reduction of everything one is constituted by as a person. Or rather – the
instructive space forcibly omits and erases all factors that make up a complete person,
ignoring them in the interest of a smoothly functioning environment. One is approached as
an object that must be guided, controlled, managed and directed. There are close parallels
between the “machines for living” of the modernist designers, “instructive spaces” and the
institutional grid that emerged in the post-World War II welfare state.
By “instructive spaces”, therefore, I mean spaces that are constituted by their forcible
imposition of fixed, reductive identities on individuals, aiming at directing their behaviour by
placing then in a predefined and/or narrowly defined role, and reinforcing the behaviour
deemed appropriate for this role by means of continuous instruction, coercion, nudging and
guidance.
Following the mould of the Industrial Revolution, labour and paid employment were the two
core pillars in modern society: in the 25 years after the Second World War, the prospect of a
constant labour force enabled the idea of life-long careers and forms of social security, a
development that reached its peak in the establishment of the 20th century welfare state.40
In addition, it consigned mostly the male part of the population to this labour force.41 The
social institutions of modernity were as it were filled with imperatives (“shoulds”) that
directed people’s lives within a fixed frame of rules and regulations.42 I have discussed how
39
Augé 2006: 84
At least in Europe. In the US, the situation was quite different, although by and large both economies possessed
a relatively steady labour force. See Eichengreen 2006 for a comprehensive account of the economy of Europe in
the second half of the 20th century. See also Baily and Kirkegaard 2004.
41
See for an elaborate exposition of this concept: Beck et al. 1994: 4
42
Bauman 2007: 9
40
these imperatives were included in the case of modernist architecture and urbanism. Social
institutions and their correlative spatial settings embodied normative claims on individuals.
One could participate in “collective activities”, if one behaved like an obedient citizen,
passenger or consumer. The terms “passenger” or “consumer” are sets of behavioural and
dispositional norms imposed on an individual. The dictatorial agency is no longer a person,
but instead a set of norms that is anonymously decided and gradually imposed via a multitude
of means.
These instructions are being provided to individuals through “instructive spaces”, as defined
above. If modernity emphasized a universal rational eternality, supermodernity combines its
austere aesthetic with an incessant barrage of information. The tendency to treat knowledge
as information was already present in modernism from the very start. The “neutral spaces”
of modernity were presented as impartial, open and non-normative. Nevertheless, these
spaces simultaneously embodied clear normative conceptions of what a member of society
should do and to some degree think. The fictions of the “typical user” or “average person”
were used as planning templates and placeholder labels for sets of norms about behaviour or
thought. It would really make no sense to plan a building, city or neighbourhood in breathtaking detail if one possesses no preconception about future behaviour or thinking of
individuals. Modernism harboured a deep and divisive dualism: it promised to usher in an
“open society” of liberated individuals, but at the same time, it simultaneously predetermined
their lives and actions in great detail. This dualism reaches a peak in supermodernity. In its
clearest manifestation, it is visible in the role and use of signifiers, whether they are conferred
upon persons by visual, textual or spoken means.
In an instructive space, persons are treated as synonymous with the imposed identity and
therefore, one-way communication suffices to instruct you and to give you feedback (“access
granted or denied”). This instructive narrative has meaning only as a “user’s manual.” The
digital instructions on a sign, automated check-in procedures at the airport, self-scanning in
supermarkets, automatic gates, reflective lines and arrows on the road, coloured lights which
indicate movements or stops, traffic signs to delineate parking areas – they all instruct
persons and approach them as users. Without this user’s perspective, their meaning is
obscure. We can clearly observe this in the case of traffic signs:
“The private motorcar is the logical instrument for exercising that right [of free
movement], and the effect on the public space, especially the space of the urban street,
is that the space becomes meaningless and even maddening unless it can be
subordinated to free movement.”43
In a space controlled by texts, signs, instructions, diagrams, symbols, and spoken messages
(e.g., public announcements), users are forced to assume the identity imposed upon them by
instructive spaces. In an airport, one must assume the norms that apply to the identity label
“traveller”. This means that one must be there on time, and must submit to security
regulations, that one’s right to free movement is constrained, and that the space in which one
is allowed to move around is determined, ordered, segmented and subject to norms imposed
from all sides and without consulting those subjected to the consequences. To facilitate and
shape this process, texts, signs, instructions, diagrams, symbols, and spoken messages
determine behaviour and thought alike, varying from the security regulations on bringing
liquids on an airplane, to the repeatedly spoken message of “mind your step.”
43
Sennett 2002: 14
Even when not moving, users of non-places are trapped between signs that instruct them
what to do next. As such, one is being kept in a state of suspension, lacking a definitive
existence outside one’s forcibly consigned identity role as “passenger” or “traveller”. This
state is the diametrical opposite of anything that resembles dwelling or belonging. Instead of
encouraging a form of actually inhabiting space, non-places encourage a form of continuous,
purposively guided suspension for its users. Careful and continuous instruction softly and
invisibly guides, nudges and forces behaviour and mental dispositions.
The almost invisible omnipresence of non-places gradually changes the mode of existence of
humanity in the 21st century.
The phrase “generic eternal” can therefore be viewed in a second, more pessimistic vein. It
describes the generic, displaced condition in which much of the developed world exists. Its
inhabitants are steeped in it. The generic eternal has become an integral part of the lifeworld
of humanity. Even worse, it is as it were a ubiquitous architectural presence, the main spatial
residue of postmodern consumer societies that did not break with the modernist tenets of
their past. Koolhaas referred to this accumulating spatial residue as “junkspace,” and the
thrust of his idea is quite accurate.44 As junkfood superficially mimics the qualities of real
food, so junkspace is a pretend-space, an instructive environment trying hard to be a place
where people can realize meaningful attachments to either the location, others, and most
importantly, themselves.
Junkspace is overripe and undernourishing at the same time, a colossal security
blanket that covers the earth in a stranglehold of seduction…Junkspace is like being
condemned to a perpetual jacuzzi with millions of your best friends. A fuzzy empire of
blur, it fuses high and low, public and private, straight and bent, bloated and starved
to offer a seamless patchwork of the permanently disjointed.45
The emergence of this omnipresent junkspace condition, combined with the modernist
“generic eternal” outlook can be traced back quite easily to the core promises of modernism
and its ontological world-image. Around the late 1970s, the modernist era with its promises
of universal progress became the scapegoat for postmodern thought. Yet, the modernist
revolution of building practices could not be undone, and has retained its hegemony in many
public spaces, from airports, hotels, and conference centres to schools, homes for the elderly,
and supermarkets. Its economic efficiency and straightforward focus on functionalism
became arguments for continuing modernist building practices while at the same time
criticizing its doctrines and assumptions.
While postmodern thought insisted that the metaphysical and utopian underpinnings of
modernism had lost credibility, it overlooked the fact that modernist building practices were
still widely used and were not superseded by a specific “postmodern” way of building. Instead
of introducing a clear break, postmodernism became a transformation phase for modern
building as it had been known prior to that. Beck in this regard has rightly spoken of a
“reflexive modernism” – a new kind of modernity in whereby which the premises of modernism
(universal progress, clarity, aesthetic austerity) transformed the modern agenda itself.46 We
saw a manifestation of that development in Augé’s idea of “supermodernity.” This is, as it
44
Koolhaas 2002
Koolhaas 2002: 176
46
Beck et al. 1994
45
were, modernism in the highest possible gear – a development that cannot but transform
modernity itself.47
Returning to Augé’s examples of non-places, we can observe that these are settings that
superficially answer to social codes. A non-place might not be the social setting that allows
people to enter into deep, personal relations. However, it is a setting that still conforms to
humane and socially acceptable behaviour. A hotel substitutes for “home,” and as such
appears as a configuration in which people feel at ease, although in an anonymous, fleeting
way. The same logic applies to airports. Although an airport is a space of transits and
continuous instructions, travellers are subjected to a system of visual and spatial coding
which creates an atmosphere of artificial “homeliness” even when far away from home. It is
precisely the tension between meaningful belonging and alienated suspension on which
Augé’s analysis rests. The non-place is the spatial embodiment of a world of flows and
processes, but also of a universal logic of static, anonymous, atomic similitude. Here, the
environment we build opens up an existential question: what does it mean to exist in a world
of universal alienation?
This question is profoundly important, because if we take Augé seriously, then a significant
part of the built environment allows only for solitude and similitude – a mass of loose,
anonymous, atomic individuals all engaged in their own soliloquies, utterly detached from
each other and historical perspective. At its worst, we see such a world in post-apocalyptic
novels and movies, in which the past is as it were erased and accessible in a deformed,
fragmentary way. If Augé is right, then, the condition of universal alienation deeply permeates
our built environment. One of the responses to this alienation is a search for authenticity,
leading us to the second aspect of the generic eternal.
III
The Generic Eternal, Second Aspect: Ubiquitous Alienation and Authenticity
Because Junkspace cannot be grasped, it cannot be remembered. It is flamboyant
yet unmemorable, like a screen saver. Its refusal to freeze ensures instant
amnesia.48
In the preceding sections, I discussed how modernism based the building of the recent and
contemporary world on the ideals of unity, exactitude and clarity. This pure, sober aesthetic
would awaken the appreciation through its display of utter instrumental rationality – an order
that spatially echoed the timeless order of the universe yet designed to be a “machine for
living.” The acceleration of the modern project led to the proliferation of places devoted to
flows and passing through. Such places possess an instrumentalized rationality combined
with the austere modernist aesthetic under the auspices of today’s political order. In
particular, they impose a new mode of existence on individuals, pressing them in certain
predefined moulds by instructing them on their behaviour. Such places thus resist durable
social relationships and lasting communal ties. The convergence of the modernist aesthetic
ideals and the accelerating development of modernity in non-places led to a kind of
ubiquitous alienation.
47
Something that Ulrich Beck in his last – unfinished – book also recognized, when he named it “The
Metamorphosis of the World”. By and large, Beck’s central idea is that modernism is reflexive – i.e. that it created
the conditions which change the very phenomenon from which they originated.
48
Koolhaas 2002: 177
By “ubiquitous alienation”, I mean a tacit, pre-reflective, subjectively and essentially
embodied, subjectively experienced feeling of alienation that permeates instructive spaces
due to their instrumental, reductive and objectifying attitudes towards individuals.
Ubiquitous alienation, in turn, led to a counter-revolution in building. It is as if the spectre of
solitude had to be warded off in order to be able to cope with the too-austere, too machinelike reality that supermodernity represents. What means do we have for banishing the
spectre? The answer is re-introducing authenticity, even though modernism’s core tenets of
efficiency and unity still reign supreme. The type of authenticity that is hankered after is itself
a phantom image, however. It is a kind of imagined community, in which social relations were
close-knit, everyone could leave the door unlocked, and there was a clear, perceptible link to
history and one’s roots. Moreover, in this imagined Eden, there was an overall coherence in
individual and social affect (feeling, desire, and emotion) belief, and action – in short, a selfconsciously unified society of like-minded individuals.
Anyone who visits a hotel, an airport, a supermarket, a shopping mall, a hospital, a parking
garage, a data storage centre, or even some new city quarters can witness the curious
insertion of seemingly authentic locations or elements into spaces where they stand out in
the most curious way possible.
The functionalist, modernist building aesthetic creates a tension between genericity and
specificity: for modernism, one source of beauty is instrumental rationality, at the expense of
historicity or that which already exists. The tension between these two forces gives rise to a
kind of hybrid style that is organizationally modernist, but in terms of atmosphere and
detailing superficially attempts to mimic authenticity. This mix is deeply unsuccessful in its
ambitions, because it succeeds in affording a kind of shallow emotional well-being, but only
at the price of architectural blandness, discord, and boredom. One need only take a close look
at a contemporary airport or hotel lobby to see this “softening of the austere” in full swing.
The building layout may present itself as modern and industrial, yet inside a cosy bar or
classical interior, it directly contradicts the aesthetic ideal represented outside. Again, and in
particular, an airport may present itself as modern and industrial, with its LED-lights,
escalators, computer screens, luggage belts and utterly functional layout. Yet, the terminal’s
Italian restaurant has fake baked clay tiles as flooring and may even feature red-and-white
blocked tablecloths. The Irish pub features an interior that is supposed to represent a cosy
place one could find in an idealized Irish village. The aesthetic effect of these two worlds —
eerily reminiscent of “The Village” in the 1960s TV cult-classic The Prisoner— is shocking
because this softening of the austere aesthetic ideal highlights the contrasts and makes it
painfully clear that both worlds coincide, yet never co-exist on an equal basis. In Koolhaas’s
words: they are permanently disjointed, and this continuous dissonance is presented barefaced. It is the essence of junkspace that is constituted in such a way. It wears its disharmony
proudly, while in reality it is not a conscious design choice, but a consequence of our way of
building.
Figure 6: Shopping street in Nijmegen (NL). It makes an attempt at referring to history but is at the
same time ordered around logo's, commercials, and brands - a visual disharmony trying to be
harmonic over even authentic in a historicizing sense. (Photo by author).
The idealized past is represented as a type of environment that is an exception to the rule. It
is represented as a fragment of another, distant world – rumoured to have existed in the nottoo-distant past. There is a strange dialectic going on between the all-too-austere spaces of
supermodernity and its fragmentary and confused representations of authenticity. One pole
of the dialectic is the ubiquitous alienation – so Derrida was extremely precise when he states
that:
[u]nreserved alienation is thus unreserved representation. It wrenches presence
absolutely from itself and absolutely re-presents it to itself.49
Environments of alienation and discord struggle with a certain lack that is precisely analysed
by Augé and Koolhaas. They cannot afford lasting social relations, nor can they point to more
than their rational efficiency, their superficial cosiness or their austere aesthetic ideals – and
in some cases doses of all three. In this impoverished and disjointed atmosphere, an extra
element is needed, namely the presence of apparent authenticity. However, in instructive
spaces, there is little to go on. Consequently, such spaces must literally “wrench” a kind of
authentic presence from the impoverished elements of which they are made up. Here, the
second pole of the dialectic enters: these authentic moments must be represented to itself.
What this means in practice is that these exceptions (let’s say the Irish pub in an airport)
must be integrated in a way that seems natural and seamless.
Architecturally, this is an impossible assignment. The tension between the functional, austere
demands of the instructive space and its orchestrated exception cannot but stand out in the
very tension it represents. The key to describe this tension is the word “unreserved.” The
representation of architectural exceptions is unreserved in the sense of being without style,
without a broader aesthetic framework in which they can be placed – and even without
ambition to do so. Thus, visitors are confronted with a strange spectacle: in a single
49
Derrida 1997: 296
instructive space, the ersatz representations of multiple worlds do not co-exist, but they
collide. The Chinese (or broadly Oriental) restaurant coincides with the American fast-food
chain and the Italian restaurant, next to the minimalist fashion store. These fragments never
come together – even worse, they clash violently, creating an absurd visual clamour, as if all
members of a marching band play their music at their own tempo. These fragments of space
try hard to be worlds or substitutes for an authentic experience, but they cannot.
Notwithstanding their unreserved presence, they do not form a coherent part of the world,
but remain architectural fragments, a kind of spatial residue aimed at countering the lingering
feeling of alienation. The term “unreserved” can be read in a second manner: the spatial
disjointedness of instructive spaces represents a kind of shamelessness. The appalling lack
of aesthetic sensibility alongside the openly displayed instrumentality creates a spectacle
that is abhorrent: a factory where the slaves are required to behave as if they are not locked
up. They have to be proud that they are denizens of the factory, and act as if this state of
affairs is perfectly justified.
Figure 7: Applied on a large scale, junkspace itself provides a whole new experience. Its visual
clamour and disharmony are elevated to such levels here in Atlantic City (USA) that it is quite
incomparable with any other architectural style. (Photo by author).
The tension inherent in the junkspace condition is at its most visible in all efforts to rehistoricize contemporary buildings. The new colleges at Yale University, for example, are built
in an or ersatz or faux Neo-Gothic style that was much in vogue in the late 19th century.50
With modern materials, however, one is overwhelmed by the impression that this style is a
mere anachronism in a modern world. The idiosyncrasies of that style (its emphasis on
elaborate brickwork, its stone ornaments, the size and segmentation of the buildings) are
copied without considering that these were consequences of a certain way of building,
dictated by technical and economic considerations embedded in a given historical context. In
a scathing critique, architectural critic Christopher Hawthorne concedes:
50
See Betsky 2018 for a critical discussion
Expensive dormitories, in particular, have begun to exhibit an incurious (and in its
worst form an infantilizing) nostalgia, with Yale and USC, among other schools, leaning
hard on the kind of Gothic Revival excess that first became popular a full century ago.
Unlike the architecturally ambitious and defiantly un-cozy complex I lived in as a Yale
undergraduate in the early 1990s (…) the new campus architecture is meant to be
familiar and comforting above all.51
In a response to an uncertain world, fake authenticity is offered as an antidote or soft pillow.
Hawthorne is absolutely correct when he traces a connection between the agenda of
providing comfort and infantilization. At some point, one must grow up – and this means
necessarily experiencing some discomfort. The defence of Yale for choosing this architectural
style was that the buildings reflected the university’s values. One wonders what these values
are. Hawthorne again:
[I]f a university speaks through the names of its buildings, the architecture it chooses
for those buildings speaks more plainly still. So what does the taste for Hogwarts-style
dormitories say about the Yale or the USC of 2017? It says that the primary job of
residential architecture on campus is to provide a sense of consistency and familiarity
for donors and incoming students alike — to soften the edges of the college
experience.52
The critical point here is that architecture can be experienced like an impressive artwork or
an especially taxing piano-playing class. It confronts one with limits and boundaries, but it
heightens and trains one’s critical judgment. Taking the sharp edge of anesthetizes the
exercise of that critical faculty. Worse still, the instructive tendency is just as present in fake
authentic buildings – only this time the packaging is different.
Likewise, the insistence on including “traditional” architecture in the old city centre of
Frankfurt points in the same direction. Traditional buildings are valued for a world they
visually and architecturally represent, even if this means resorting to an architectural style
that only outwardly looks as if it had been there forever. Whether this is the intention of the
designers or not, some see it as a reference to a world that has gone and that should not be
resurrected.53
A third example is the new English garden towns commissioned by Prince Charles. 54
Hankering after a simpler and more idyllic, 19th-century England in which life was
uncomplicated and the common folk were safely tucked away from ever being viewed by the
aristocracy, Charles proposed an unprecedented step in the direction of archaic neotraditionalism. The new towns had to be built in a historicizing style, emphasizing bent streets,
ornate buildings, and refined brickwork – architecturally pretending that the 20th century
either did not take place or was irrelevant.
51
LAT 2017
LAT 2017
53
See for the controversy FAZ 2018; In a critical text, architectural theorist Stephan Trüby accused the designers
of the new inner city of Frankfurt of being complicit in rekindling a kind of revisionist vision of Germany’s history by
focusing on historical building styles. Trüby explicitly connected the design choices to the rise in right-wing politics
in Germany, an accusation that seems far-fetched and ill-founded to me. However, his position illustrates the
controversies that can arise in working with historical styles or an “idealized past”.
54
See Morris and Booth 2009 for a critical discussion of the finished model village of Poundbury.
52
These instances are not just a matter of archaic taste or outdated personal preference. They
do not only seek to revive a historical building style or city layout. They intend to revive the
whole world that belongs to that historical epoch – or at least a highly idealized and selective
version of such a world. These building projects are attempts to come to terms with modernity
by removing it from sight, as it were, retreating into a highly reactionary world that is throughand-through fake, inauthentic, or “twee” – a distorted appearance if there ever was one.
Again, this compulsively historicizing response is a direct mirror image of the ahistorical clean
slate of CIAM-inspired modernism. Where this type of modernism tried to conceive a new
world by erasing history altogether, the silent presence of history surfaced again as a new,
imagined ideal, archaically mimicking traditional building styles in a world that has
irrevocably changed.
In airports, hotels, shopping malls and even residential areas, these aesthetic tensions
coincide in one building or area, rendering them painfully visible. On the scale of whole towns
or districts, one could in principle pretend to live in the 19th century, while still visiting modern
shopping malls or taking the bus. This split between a fake authenticity and the residue of
modern building (in the form of non-places) has been called the “disneyfication” of the world
– as if reality were a consumer theme park in which each style and preference can be made,
realized and juxtaposed in one (global) space. The authentic “anthropological place” has
receded into the background, and in the search for handholds and roots, such places are
artificially created and offered as commodities. Authenticity is marketed as a product, leading
seamlessly into the commodification of lived reality itself.55 In such ersatz or faux historical
environments, lived reality is consciously manipulated to create the atmosphere of a world
that is rumoured to have existed, and thereby serves as an antidote for the generic eternality
of our environments.
In what then, is genuine, “real”, authenticity sought? Simply put, in the production of a quasihistorical content, or in the creation of a “mythical space”. The anthropological place alludes
to founding myths, symbols and traces of the past, integrating them in a meaningful unity
that can be read and interpreted again and again. The street names, monuments and signs
mentioned by De Certeau detach themselves and become myths, worlds in themselves.
Merleau-Ponty put this very perceptively:
The myth itself, however diffuse, has an identifiable significance for primitive man,
simply because it does form a world, that is, a whole in which each element has
meaningful relations with the rest.56
The myth has not only value for the primitive man, but just as much for the city-dweller in the
21st century. The whole of meaningful relations within the myth is the substrate of the
anthropological place. The generic, eternal non-place constitutes precisely the opposite state
of affairs: it is an instructive space of which we can make very little sense because it is not a
world at all. The great ambition of modernity—to conceive of an austere, eternal, neutral and
above all unified world without the burden of history—here runs up against its limits.
55
The trap to be avoided here has been perpetuated by some deconstructionist thinkers and the likes of Žižek. It
consists in claiming that either a) the “authentic” is an ideological construction, based on unfounded presuppositions,
or b) the “authentic” is a phantasy, a kind of phantasmatic element in order to come to terms with harsh reality. Both
options make good points about the notion of “authenticity” as such but deny its real-world existence. I do not agree
with this line of thought and think that authentic experiences do exist – no matter the theoretical model one uses to
analyze such experiences or debunk them as epiphenomena.
56
Merleau-Ponty 2002: 341
The austerity of modernism allowed only for the bare bones of a space to be manifestly
present. Mies van der Rohe once characteristically described his architecture as “bones and
skin,” referring to his use of glass curtain façades and steel beams. Bones and skin – nothing
more. Planned authenticity attempts to put some flesh on the bones, picked from a narrative
that can be easily marketed as a commodity. History or tradition are great products, as the
condition of ubiquitous alienation stimulates the search for roots and perspective in time. The
“here” and “there” have to be reconstructed from imaginary fragments – the apparent
authentic must provide a temporal perspective to counter the ubiquitous alienation brought
about by ahistorical, instructive spaces.
In this particular case, the loss of the temporal perspective leads to the strange experience
that the environment seems to have fallen from the sky fully formed and without any reference
to history. Time seems to be erased from the factors that co-exist and make up our
experience. On this point, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological analysis of the nature of coexistence is again very accurate:
But co-existence, which in fact defines space, is not alien to time, but is the fact of two
phenomena belonging to the same temporal wave. As for the relationship of the
perceived object to my perception, it does not unite them in space and outside time:
they are contemporary’.57
Space and time are not alien to each other; more than that, by their very nature they are
constituted to be integrated with each other. Spaces beget meaning through their visible
presence in time. Indeed, this is what classical architecture shows. Its persistence through
time adds historical layers and references that anchor it in lived experience – but this is not
possible without the experience of time in the form of history. Physical presence makes space
and time co-exist in an object, suffusing it with meaning. Pure presence, in the simplest sense
of the term, is a necessary condition for the creation of such meaning – or to put it differently:
for a place to have content, it has to have a certain presence. Mere existence is not enough.
Yet again, Merleau-Ponty outlines why this should be so:
[The] “order of co-existents” is inseparable from the “order of sequences”, or rather
time is not only the consciousness of a sequence. Perception provides me with a “field
of presence” in the broad sense, extending in two dimensions: the here-there
dimension and the past-present-future dimension. The second elucidates the first.58
Merleau-Ponty’s formulations here touch on the concept of “anthropological place.” The
anthropological place is comprised of identity (presence) relations (here-there) and history
(past, but also future). When perceiving a given space, the anthropological place is the field
of presence in space and time that enables us to relate to the larger spatial-historical context.
Modern architecture, however, erased time from the equation altogether, preferring to deal
with space in functionalist, atemporal terms. At the same time, it unwittingly re-introduced
time into architecture, contradicting its very foundations. The first reintroduction of time in
the products of modernism was its eternal ideal: the city of the future would do away with all
need for re-conception, since the “order of the universe” was reflected in it. History had come
to an end, and the only thing that needed to be done was to realize paradise, as its conception
in thought had already taken place. The very ideal of eternity might have been an expression
of the “end of history”, but it is not possible to think about eternity without thinking
57
58
Merleau-Ponty 2002: 309
Merleau-Ponty 2002: 309
simultaneously about its constituent concept: time. One notion is necessary to think the other.
This leads to a dialectical reversal: by omitting temporality and expressing the ideal of
eternity, that which is absent becomes present in its very absence. In the same way, a recently
deceased family member is saliently absent at the first reunion of the whole family. The void
that someone left behind makes him all the more present – without him physically being there.
In the same way, the absence of temporality makes it all the more conspicuous in modernist
architecture. Not coincidentally, the response was to re-introduce the appearance of
authenticity as an expression of temporality. By bringing historical building traditions back
into architectural practice, the modern and the authentic would meld into a new hybrid form
that united the best of both worlds. 59 This response takes a view of perception that is
somewhat naïve. It hopes to combine architectural fragments and clues into a new style that
will represent the new synthesis of the traditional and the new, as if history is a kind of cabinet
from which one can pick fragments at will. However, the act of perception is not just adding
new experiences to a virtual library in one’s mind:
In the natural attitude, I do not have perceptions, I do not posit this object as beside
that one, along with their objective relationships, I have a flow of experiences which
imply and explain each other both simultaneously and successively.60
The experience of place consists not only of processing input from the senses. It is also the
process of actually making sense of the environment by arranging input into a sensuous
model which can be comprehended. This model comes into being by means of affects that the
space affords. This process is not merely intellectual and synthetic, it is irreducibly and
essentially embodied and aesthetic. The processing of experiential fragments and assembling
them in constellations that are meaningful to us is affective and cognitive.
To summarize this phase of the discussion, the deeply entrenched assumptions inherent in
the modernist project have created the conditions for environments of universal alienation.
The presence of these environments is thoroughly instrumentalized, austere, and geared
towards efficiency. Their efficiency is ensured by continuous instruction and guidance,
leading to the phenomenon of instructive spaces. As antidote to this situation, a new type of
generic apparent authenticity suffuses the rationalized instructive spaces, providing a fake
temporal perspective in an environment of alienation.
In supermodernity, identities are present as someone’s imposed role, enforced through
instructive spaces through one-way messages and feedback. Time and history have been
erased, to be replaced either by fake historical narratives or by an austere world of
technological progress, in which the past is nothing more than an annoying spectre haunting
the present.
59
No wonder then, that someone as acute as architectural historian and critic Kenneth Frampton proposed what he
called a “critical regionalism”, blending the local context, modern tools of thought and local materials into a new
kind of architectural style. Frampton’s otherwise fascinating and promising response demonstrates exactly what I
am about to argue later: namely, that such hybrids still operate under the core modernist assumptions. Consequently,
they necessarily re-iterate a new cycle of modernity that does not overcome the past but reinforces its tenets under
a new form, all the while claiming to have overcome it.
60
Merleau-Ponty 2002: 327
IV
The Generic Eternal: Two dialectical reversals
Die Menschen bezahlen die Vermehrung ihrer Macht mit der Entfremdung von
dem, worüber sie die Macht ausüben.61
Thus, not only is modern society a cage, but all the people in it are shaped by its
bars; we are beings without spirit, without sexual or personal identity (…) we might
almost say without being.62
I met a traveller from an antique land,
Who said—“Two vast and trunkless legs of stone
Stand in the desert. . . . Near them, on the sand,
Half sunk a shattered visage lies, whose frown,
And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command,
Tell that its sculptor well those passions read
Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things,
The hand that mocked them, and the heart that fed;
And on the pedestal, these words appear:
My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings;
Look on my Works, ye Mighty, and despair!
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal Wreck, boundless and bare
The lone and level sands stretch far away.”63
If anything, the aesthetic condition I’ve been calling “the generic eternal” is a complex of
paradoxes. Modernism promised the ultimate liberation of mankind, but it succeeded in
creating some of the most generic and oppressive building prototypes imaginable. It began
with an almost monastic emphasis on purity and austerity yet gives unwittingly rise to an
uncontrolled proliferation of historicizing narratives and building styles. It attempted to erase
history and start over, yet it creates the precondition for reactionary historicizing styles and
architectural escapism.
Normative Images of Efficiency and Aesthetics
Modernism succeeded in solving a variety of practical problems, ranging from providing
excellent infrastructures, to healthy housing and efficient working places. My claim is that the
ubiquitous alienation it produced stems therefore not just from its practical efficacy: it stems
from the underlying world picture of domination of nature and its related natural mechanism.
In an imaginary yet eerily real world-picture in which individuals are cogs in an omnipresent,
globally interconnected machine called “the built environment”, deviations must be
minimized to guarantee the functioning of the machine as a whole. Disruptive behaviour must
be regulated, and norms must be prescribed to delineate of acceptable behaviours. In short,
the imaginary yet eerily real world-picture of modernity was effective for solving a range of
practical problems but is unable to offer a normative image for a future world. To function as
intended, modernity has to operate with the “cold sneer of command.”
61
Adorno and Horkheimer 2013: 15; Translation: People pay for the power they exert over others by alienation
from those over whom their power is exercised. (author’s translation).
62
Berman 2010: 27
63
Percy Bysshe Shelley, Ozymandias, first published in 1818.
If efficiency and output (a Marxian production process if there ever was one) replace “living”
in its fullest sense, the relations between humanity and its artefacts are reversed. No longer
are artefacts serving humanity, but humanity must serve what it has produced in order for
the artificial world to function as intended. 64 The power of humanity to manipulate the
environment has increased, but only at the price of ubiquitous alienation. The world-picture
of modernity has become alive, irrevocably changing its authors. When looking on our own
works, we are the ones that must despair. The boundless desert that stretches towards the
horizon in Shelley’s poem has in the contemporary world been replaced by a vast plane of a
different, yet equally unforgiving character: the generic eternal with its ambition to be an allencompassing, neutral and regulated world.
The chilling irony of reading Shelley’s poem in this way is that the inscription reads: “look on
my Works, ye Mighty…” However, those that are called “Mighty” because they conceived the
world as it is today have been relegated to a subservient position by the very artefacts they
produced. The accomplishments which gave them a claim to be called “Mighty” is the very
cause of their servitude. Ozymandias’s instruction should maybe not be read as triumphant
boasting, but as a dire warning. The despair we should feel may have nothing to do with the
power of Ozymandias as ruler, but the power that the “works” exert over our lives.
The reversal of positions between humanity and their artificial world can be traced back to
the level on which the notion of “utility” is defined. In instructive spaces, everyone has to
partially relinquish one’s autonomy so that the structure as a whole continues to function as
intended. The norm for “utility” is no longer defined at the level of the individual, but instead
at the level of the infrastructure they use. The imperatives imposed on individuals are not for
their own good – they are in place to assure the proper functioning of the instructive space
itself. The normative image that results is therefore increasingly regulatory and oppressive,
as unpredictability and deviation must be reduced to a minimum. The existence of the user,
inhabitant, or passer-by must be tailored to the needs of the environment. Max Horkheimer
observed this tendency already in 1947, when he wrote:
Just as all life today tends increasingly to be subjected to rationalization and planning,
so the life of each individual, including his most hidden impulses, which formerly
constituted his private domain, must now take the demands of rationalization and
planning into account: the individual’s self-preservation presupposes his adjustment
to the requirements for the preservation of the system.65
Horkheimer convincingly connects two notions: the demands of instrumental rationality on
one hand and the corresponding diminishing of one’s individuality at the other. Selfpreservation is defined on the level of the social institute or social system, and utility is
consequently defined in terms that have little to do with individual well-being.
The idealized image underlying this relation between individual and social institute or system
is that of a technologically optimized world of eternal beauty and efficiency. This elevated,
eternal world of modernism would be an inhospitable place if it were fully realized – and
increasingly the built environment is becoming such a place. It would look like a sterile crossover between a monastery and a high-tech laboratory. This comparison is not as strange as
it seems: when the British minimalist architect John Pawson was commissioned to build a
monastery in Slovakia, one of the monks recalled that the aesthetic that inspired him to
64
65
Berman 2010: 27
Horkheimer 2013: 67
propose Pawson as architect was that of Apple. During a visit to the Apple store in New York,
the monk was so overcome by the strict, minimalist austerity of the store layout that it
inspired him to commission Pawson as designer in the hope that he could replicate those
minimalist qualities...66
As image of the eternal, minimalism and austerity serve well as artistic principles. To
constitute the whole inhabited and subjectively experienced world, the image falls terribly
short. Such a world would simply be too austere, too bland and too abstract to be a world at
all. Living in it would be nightmarish existence: stripped from one’s leeway to make individual
choices and condemned to a continuous encounter with the machine aesthetic of
technological austerity.
The idea of austerity as the highest of aesthetic ideals, and the idea of efficiency as the highest
of the functional ideals creates a world devoid of arbitrariness, deviation, inefficiency,
redundancy, randomness, and ultimately freedom. It would be generic in the sense that its
norms for aesthetic experience and efficiency are everywhere the same, realizing the
universal aspirations of modernism in all domains of life. It realizes a world in which the notion
of “place” would lose its meaning altogether. If the world is aesthetically and functionally
similar at every point of the globe, being here or somewhere else loses its relevance. The idea
of a “neutral public space” on which the emergent collective develops would be globalized.
Indeed, the development of the world as described above can be observed in the utilitarian
and infrastructural spaces of the 20th and 21st centuries. Airports, supermarkets, hotels,
parking garages, highways, shopping malls and residential areas all exhibit clear traces of
the double normativity of modernity: a normative logic of instrumental rationality and a
normative aesthetic of austerity. The first set of norms is enforced through instructive spaces;
the second through adhering to an aesthetical ideal derived ultimately from the ontological
world-picture of modernity itself.
The generic qualities of instructive spaces have been implemented across the globe, and its
universalizing logic has proved remarkably flexible and tenacious; although its aesthetic ideal
often has resulted in bland buildings and spaces, where austerity was not just an aesthetic
ideal but an economic given, it seemingly thrives. What melts into air into these bland spaces
is the very idea of place itself. If the properties of spaces become so exchangeable that they
function everywhere and look disconcertingly similar, the notion of a local identity dissipates
into an eternal world of sameness, austerity and perpetual efficiency.
66
Aureli 2013: 43
Figure 8: Relations between the two core assumptions of modernity, the dual rational images of
supermodernity and the resulting dual phenomena of instructive space and ubiquitous alienation.
(Figure by author).
However eternal, the need for contradictions, imperfections and unpredictability remains.
Today, this desire for redundancy is termed the “local”, “untarnished”, “original,” or
“authentic.” As I have discussed, the counterpart for the technological presence and prestige
must be some sort of local, pure and above all unspoiled Eden. In this imaginary place, the
ideas of an “Arcadian world” are projected. The idea of alienation only acquires its dramatic
sting only against the theatrical device of a despoiled Eden, an innocent condition of which
humanity is torn, and the return to which is upheld as an attainable ideal.
This idyllic representation is a fictional image, a fleeting mirage to cover up for the traumatic
loss of anthropological places. It is an attempt to come to grips with a world in which the
search for “roots” or “enchantment” continues between the oppressing grip of instructive
spaces.67 In these spaces, alienation is manifested spatially and procedurally. In order to
escape its grip, another type of place is needed in which the continuous injunctions of
modernity are not felt.
This leads to a second step in the dialectic, whereby the very notion of “authenticity” becomes
an integral part of the normative logic of modernity itself, in the mode of appearing authentic.
Apparent authenticity becomes a mode of “lived experience” that is seamlessly integrated
into the modernist logic of efficiency. Within instructive spaces, certain predefined places
such as the Irish pub or the Italian restaurant provide predefined possibilities of escapism.
Even escapism is regulated; even unpredictability and apparent authenticity are framed,
ordered and given a certain aesthetic that is an indistinguishable part of the broader, efficient
67
This line of thought is extensively worked out in Adorno and Horkheimer 2017
framework of instructions in which it is embedded. Again, dialectic reversals are at work here.
In these orchestrated forms of escapism, the characteristics of apparent authentic places are
relentlessly copied and multiplied, making them utterly generic in turn. If Italian restaurants
from China to Canada serve the same pizzas and pastas, and are decorated in similar ways,
the idea of an apparently authentic experience is used as an exchangeable commodity that
can be inserted in every context on the globe.
The “apparent authentic” or “faux-local” is, as it were, integrated in the logic of efficiency as
an exception or antidote: it provides a predictable escapism that nevertheless does not
interfere with the overall goals and aims of overall functionality as such. Lived reality or
“experience” itself is commodified and marketed as a product. Temporal escapist experiences
are offered as antidote to universal alienation but are an integral part of its structuring logic.
When fully developed, the modernist aesthetic ideal would be uninhabitable – and so it
integrates “contradictions” in its form that seem different but are merely different
mechanisms to counter the negative aspects of its own preconditions.
In instructive spaces, procedures determine behaviour. This is clearly visible in all highly
regulated settings, ranging from airports to operating rooms in hospitals and prisons. Such
places impose a regimen of actions and sequences upon individuals. Spoken messages not
to leave one’s baggage unattended, repeated injunctions to “mind your step” and pictograms
to illustrate the appropriate actions at the passport control are used to segment one’s time
and determine one’s actions.
The regimen of signs in instructive spaces is imposed on us: it is an order of injunctions that
determines both our physical actions and mental states. It deeply determines our mode of
existence on all levels. The instructions are not imposed on mere travellers, passers-by or
customers, but on us – essentially embodied human beings. Labels to describe and reduce
human beings are just abstractions made on instrumental-rationalist grounds. This makes
the generic eternal an aesthetic condition: since human beings are essentially embodied, any
regulative regimen that seeks to control and direct behaviour necessarily requires stimulation
of our bodily sensorium. This encompasses not just the five senses, but also one’s mental
states, one’s imagination, one’s self-image and how one experiences our own body and its
active potentials. Horkheimer noted that even the “private space” of the individual is
subjected to the demands of instructive spaces. This private space extends well beyond one’s
innermost desires. It fully includes the factors mentioned above. By imposing an identity on
someone, and by continually reinforcing one’s role through instructions, the lived body is
used and manipulated as a mere means to an end – or even worse – the core constituents
that make up a human being are manipulated and instrumentalized in service of efficiency.
This attitude is a total inversion of Kant’s injunction to treat human beings not merely as a
means but also always at the same time as an end. In instructive spaces, human beings are
not only utilized as mere means to ensure the efficiency of the infrastructure they use. On top
of being coerced into a given role, one is required to stop thinking of oneself as an end-initself. This is the most radical form of self-renunciation that is thinkable. It amounts to an
existence in which subjects are required not to view themselves as subjects anymore, but
merely as cogwheels in a greater scheme of things – a scheme moreover, that has been
determined over their heads and without consulting them. The justification for this demand
is presented as a practical and unavoidable necessity.
This very form of presentation might be one of the subtlest forms of coercion, as the
instructions are presented as either practically unavoidable and/or as offers to provide one
with a good, easy or even pleasurable experience. Either way, the situation is tacitly made
clear: the instructions cannot be ignored, and it is a gesture of good will of those providing
them that they take care to phrase them in terms that appear polite or that appeal to practical
necessity.
Such instructions demand – from those at whom they are directed – obedience to their preassigned role. They need to identify with the role imposed on them. One is not merely treated
as a passenger, patient, customer or prisoner – one is expected to actively internalize this
role and assume it as an integral part of one’s identity. Identities that are imposed on
individuals in instructive spaces are not only templates for behaviour, but simultaneously
blueprints to rethink one’s own subjectivity. We can cast this demand in terms of Peter
Strawson’s helpful distinction between objective (instrumental) and reactive
(considerate/participatory) attitudes:
To adopt the objective attitude to another human being is to see him, perhaps, as an
object of social policy; as a subject for what, in a wide range of sense, might be called
treatment; as something certainly to be taken account, perhaps precautionary
account, of; to be managed or handled or cured or trained; perhaps simply to be
avoided, though this gerundive is not peculiar to cases of objectivity of attitude. The
objective attitude may be emotionally toned in many ways, but not in all ways: it may
include repulsion or fear, it may include pity or even love, though not all kinds of love.68
By contrast, reactive attitudes are of a different order – they belong to a domain that extends
well beyond the realm of instrumental reason. Attitudes like platonic love, anger, resentment,
forgiveness, hospitality, gratitude or disappointment belong in this category.69 Systems and
instructions are not angered or disappointed by transgressive behaviour. They merely signal
and manage the transgression. In doing so, they display the objective attitude towards the
transgressor. In interpersonal relationships, the presence of reactive attitudes proves that
the relation is manifestly non-instrumental. A friend who surprises me in a positive way sparks
a feeling of delight that cannot be simply categorized as a “reward”, “consequence” or
“bonus”. The emotion itself is irreducibly valuable – and its value cannot be cast in just
instrumental terms. The reactive attitude is participatory or involved, as opposed to distanced
and directive.
Although Strawson acknowledges that objective and reactive attitudes sometimes overlap
and are not always mutually exclusive, he nevertheless succeeds in identifying a key
characteristic unique to objective attitudes: it takes the agency of a given subject as
something that must be manipulated for further ends. This manipulation can be a form of
training, treatment or managing. At any rate, shortcomings of a given subject manifest
themselves in how his or her agency is used. Therefore, someone – an overseer or monitoring
agent perhaps – has to manage, cure or treat the subject in order to avoid the dangerous and
disruptive potential of the autonomous exercise of agency.
Strawson notes that we cannot do this for long: in everyday human behaviour, one cannot
continuously adopt an objective attitude towards others – it would amount to a negation of
normal intersubjectivity.70 What individual human beings cannot do, however, systems and
regulations can. They persist over long periods of time and do not have to cope with the
limitations of the human attention span. The only prerequisite for its functioning is that the
68
Strawson 1993: 52
Strawson 1993: 51
70
Strawson 1993: 53
69
system as such adopts a singularly impoverished view of what a human being is. In the case
of the objective attitude, it is a subject whose autonomy must be bent, curbed, formed and
sculpted. And indeed, the imposition of a new identity on individuals in instructive spaces
does just that. A new role and associate behaviours are imprinted on individuals – and nonparticipation is not encouraged.
In this case, the instructive spaces of supermodernity elevate an exceptional situation
(temporarily viewing someone as an object of training, treatment or managing) to a
permanent state of being, a modus operandi.
This feature of instructive spaces extends further than instructing people to wait in line, to
check-in at the counter or to identify themselves at various control points. Strawson rightly
pointed out that objective attitudes may be emotionally toned. Some of the instructions
provided in instructive spaces take the form of explicit orders or commands; others are
guidelines that one is expected to obey; still others are only present as nudges or
suggestions. The emotions expressed by these types of instructions differ somewhat. Orders
are given from an almost disinterested, authoritarian point of view – again, the “cold sneer of
command”. Nudges and tacitly enforced expectations possess a different emotional hue: they
work on a different level of the psyche, silently encroaching on one’s self-image and selfnarration. This does not mean, however, that they are compassionate or friendly: underneath
the mask of social conformism hides the same instrumental logic. We can cast their insidious
potential in Strawson’s terms: nudges are objective attitudes that pretend to be reactive
attitudes. They are as it were regulations presented as personal duties. “For everyone’s
safety, please do not leave your luggage unattended” is the key vocalization of the nudge. In
one message, a cold and instrumental command is transformed into a personal duty for which
everyone is held individually responsible. It suggests that those who do not obey the
command are saboteurs, lacking in responsibility and refusing to be social beings.
In instructive spaces, such nudges and subliminal suggestions as well as direct, explicit
orders require individuals to adopt objective attitudes towards themselves. They are tacitly
compelled to abstain from regarding themselves as beings who deserve to be approached
through reactive attitudes. The objective attitude in instructive spaces casts a person as a
disruption, as an agent that is malformed by his very capacity for autonomous action.
Not only Strawson but also Horkheimer alludes to this feature of modern communication,
diagnosing its underlying goal:
Domination of nature involves domination of man. Each subject not only has to take
part in the subjugation of external nature, human and nonhuman, but in order to do
so must subjugate nature within himself. Domination becomes “internalized” for
domination’s sake. What is usually indicated as a goal – the happiness of the individual,
health and wealth – gains its significance exclusively from its functional potentiality.71
The internalization of domination can be equated with a certain belief: that adopting an
objective attitude towards oneself is necessary for one’s own good. The imposition of rules
and nudges must not be felt as the pressure of an external force but must be experienced as
natural, necessary and therefore justified. In believing so, personal autonomy becomes a risk
factor, an unpredictable enemy to be chained, controlled and managed, rather than the most
fundamental expression of one’s subjectivity. Once something becomes a risk factor in a given
71
Horkheimer 2013: 66
instructive space, it automatically falls under the jurisdiction of instrumental reason. The
normative logic of instrumental reason demands subjugation and devotion – even to the point
where self-renunciation is required.
Like the town planning official cited earlier, instructive spaces “discourage nonparticipation”. Adopting an autonomous position is discouraged if not outright forbidden, as
non-participation is not an option. Behaviour that does not comply with the projected
expectations of a given instructive space must be regulated and minimized, and for this
reason, procedures and orchestrated forms of escapism are offered side by side. The ultimate
goal of all instructions is to keep infrastructures running smoothly, a goal that again requires
self-renunciation:
[Therefore] self-renunciation of the individual in industrial society has no goal
transcending industrial society.72
Horkheimer repeats with these words the Kantian point introduced earlier: industrial society
(and this notion can be extended to the instructive spaces of supermodernity) knows no other
goal than sustaining itself. Utility is defined on the level of the infrastructural system in which
individuals move and live. As such, the moral bookkeeping is carried out over the heads of
individuals. The treatment of individuals in instructive spaces is carried out with a utilitarian
goal in mind – a goal for which individuals are mere means, social atoms to be directed. The
idea of individual value and personal humanity is overlooked in the instructive spaces of this
kind.
Self-renunciation can take many different forms: it ranges from the taxing daily routines of a
monk, to the sacrifice a soldier makes for a greater cause; or facing great adversity in
providing income for one’s family. Often, such cases involve a voluntary decision, and it is on
these grounds that such self-renunciation is praised and valued. Witnessing the ordeals of
others often creates sympathy for those undergoing them. There is an element of selfinflicted pain or suffering in such forms of self-renunciation, but it is a type of pain that is
frequently endured with determination and even satisfaction, since its goal is kept in view.
For the monk, the goal might be spiritual development; for the single mother the goal is
providing income for the survival of her children.
The self-renunciation demanded in the instructive spaces of supermodernity is of a different
kind: it is not based on a voluntary decision, nor does it have anything to do with personal
goals or circumstances. It exists as a tacit and continuous demand, a formative force that
shapes the existence of those it touches, but that does not justify its own presence, let alone
its claims on the experience and behaviour of individuals. Self-renunciation in this sense is a
necessary outcome of the logic of instrumental rationality. It demands selflessness from
those participating in it, in exchange for an “optimal” or “pleasant” experience. Notparticipating is not an option in instructive spaces. Everyone who uses them must partake in
its procedures. This feature of instructive spaces is coercive in the sense that it leaves no
other options open for those who pass through them. It is not merely coercive in the sense
that it demands obedience to its rules – although this is certainly one of its dimensions.
Worse, this type of coercion directly impacts the very substratum of what it means to be a
person. It demands a change in the way persons view themselves – a massive manipulation
of self-images in the interest of the normative logic of instrumental reason.
72
Horkheimer 2013: 66
Where, in all this, is the normative aesthetic of austerity located? As discussed, the
“aesthetic” is the domain of subjective experience of essentially embodied human beings.
Embodiment unites the input of the senses and mental dispositions. The “aesthetic” in the
sense of the built environment is its materialization, shape and organization – and the
instructions it imposed by way of its physical shape. From our discussion, it is clear that the
influence of the built environment on our (collective) subjective experience is far-reaching.
The built environment is the physical set of tools that represents the core assumptions of
modernism (natural mechanism and atomism) at its most clear, all the while presenting it as
“efficient”, “neutral”, “service-oriented” and “necessary”. The idea that a rational building
would clearly and distinctly represent the sublime is transformed in a regulative ideal:
rationality is phrased in functional terms, promising a pleasurable experience as long as the
rules imposed by the environment are followed. The very organization of instructive spaces
embodies and enforces this ideal.
In fact, the physical, machine-like shape of modernism is a direct representation of its
metaphysical underpinning: it presents itself as neutral or efficient and poses demands
justified by its efficacy. The purported neutrality in both its physical form and organization is
“more metaphysical than metaphysics itself.”73 It is an expressive ideal of a metaphysical
idea. Most importantly, it is a tool for internalizing the very features of a non-place itself. The
idea that there is no there there is exactly what Berman alludes to when he states that in
modernity “we are almost without being”. This situation can be directly traced back to the
metaphysical underpinning of modernism, its overly simplistic world-picture and
consequently its alienating potential.
V
Summary – a Question and a Reply
I have argued in the preceding sections that the “generic eternal” is an aesthetic condition –
it is experienced through the bodily sensorium and through the manipulation of our mental
dispositions. The normative logic of instrumental reason and the normative aesthetic of
austerity are tools to control and guide both individual subjectivity and intersubjective
exchanges. Even authentic moments are integrated in the normative images of
supermodernity – even escapism is regulated. This situation is a logical consequence of two
ontological notions on which modernism is based. First, the notion of natural mechanism;
second, the idea of atomism. Adherence to these two notions led to the elevation of
instrumental reason as the ultimate justification for creating the built environment. On the
aesthetic side, the two ontological notions led the ideals of austerity and exactitude to be
elevated as the closest expression of rationality within the built environment.
The acceleration of modernity (labelled “supermodernity”) witnessed the perfection of this
idea in the development of instructive spaces – namely spaces constituted by their forcible
imposition of fixed, reductive identities on individuals, aiming at directing their behaviour by
placing then in a predefined or narrowly defined role. These spaces were designed to
reinforce behaviour deemed appropriate by means of continuous instruction, coercion,
nudging and guidance. The widespread application of instructive spaces led to ubiquitous
alienation, due to their objectifying attitudes towards individuals. This feeling of alienation
led to a counter-reaction, namely escapism and a deeply existential search for authenticity.
However, even escapism is closely regulated as part of the instrumental rationality in
instructive spaces. They form mythical spaces, reminiscent of an imagined past in which
modernity has not taken place at all.
73
Adorno and Horkheimer 2013: 29
These instructive spaces, although more varied due the infusions of faux authenticity operate
still according to the two core notions of modernism. This is best explained by identifying two
normative images that structure these spaces: the first is the normative logic of instrumental
rationality; the second is the normative aesthetic of austerity. Superimposed on each other,
these normative images result in spaces that demand self-renunciation of each individual.
Such radical self-renunciation is demanded because individual agency is seen as a potential
disruption or risk for a smoothly functioning built environment.
At this point, one might ask whether there is anything good to be found in modernity at all. It
may seem from a superficial reading of this essay that modernity is an elaborate ploy or
scheme to subjugate humanity. To read it this way would be missing the main point, and in
order to prevent this some further clarification is required. First, and on functional grounds,
modernism has realized a great many of its initial promises. The 19th century city and its
disadvantages were often with breath-taking success addressed and reconceived. Second, in
this process, a totalizing feature of modernity comes to the fore. This is why Berman in his
excellent study on the experience of modernity draws a distinction between the 19th century
modernism that was regarded as a complex of paradoxes and tensions, and its 20th century
counterpart that rests on “flat totalizations”.74 The difference is that 19th century modernism
embraced the idea of open-ended futures, while the 20th century variation (under the
auspices of instrumental reason and a limitless trust in technology) veered towards closed
visions – a single highway towards paradise. The 20th century variation deserves criticism,
because its core tenets are very much alive in the 21st century. There is one difference,
however: in the 21st century, the technological means to enforce the closed future envisioned
by modernism can be implemented much more radically, efficiently and existentially. All the
criticism does not detract from the advantages and accomplishments of modern
developments. Instead, it serves to view the advantages against the background of the
alienating potential of modernity – a potential that has accompanied its most glorious
moments and accomplishments since its beginning.
74
Berman 2010: 24
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