10/21/15, 12:18 PM 36 of 54 DOCUMENTS Copyright (c) 2015 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College Harvard Journal on Racial and Ethnic Justice Spring, 2015 Harvard Journal on Racial and Ethnic Justice 31 Harv. J. Racial & Ethnic Just. 69 LENGTH: 18615 words ARTICLE: Whiteness as Property in Israel: Revival, Rehabilitation, and Removal NAME: Noura Erakat* BIO: * Assistant Professor, George Mason University; Abraham L. Freedman Fellow at Temple University, Beasley School of Law; Visiting Scholar, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University (2007/08); Visiting Scholar, Issam Fares Institute, American University in Beirut (Spring 2010); LLM, National Security, Georgetown University Law Center (2012); J.D., Berkeley Law School (2005); B.A., UC Berkeley (2002). Many thanks to UCLA Law School's Critical Race Theory Program, especially Asli Bali and Cheryl Harris, for inviting me to participate in the Twenty Year Appraisal of Harris's essay, Whiteness As Property, which inspired this article. Thanks also to the participants of the 2015 Law & Society panel where I was also able to present this work. Special gratitude for Max Ajl, Sherene Seikaly, Lisa Hajjar, Maya Mikdashi, and Sarah Ihmoud for reading drafts of this paper, engaging in illuminating conversations, and invaluable reading recommendations. Thank you to the editorial team of this Journal for their assistance and patience in preparing this for publication. Finally, this piece would not have been possible without the spectacular research assistance of Lewis Preston and Noor Barakat, who will both undoubtedly shine as attorneys and scholars. HIGHLIGHT: Abstract This essay seeks to read Whiteness as Property onto contemporary Israel by demonstrating that the value ascribed to Jewish nationality is not simply a matter of Jew versus non-Jew. Instead, Whiteness reflects a European order that reproduces and embodies the exclusionary and orientalist tropes that produced anti-Semitism in Europe. The State continues to apply those tropes to Mizrahim, Jews of Middle Eastern origin. Mizrahim are the objects of Zionism's modernization project, which necessitates a violent bifurcation of their Arab and Jewish identity on the one hand, and the imposition of a singular European history that effectively marginalizes them on the other. Once consolidated within an ethno-nationality mythology of a European Jewish national, the project of nation building completely excludes the Palestinian who, like the Eastern Jew, is uncivilized, but unlike her, is ineligible for rehabilitation. Instead, the Palestinian must be removed, diminished, and contained geographically, politically, and socially. Law facilitates this process as it dispossess and displaces the Palestinian and simultaneously imbues Jewish nationality with a coveted value, one that mirrors European Enlightenment ideals of civilization and the superiority of Whiteness. Settler-decolonization is necessary for Palestinian selfdetermination and has the potential to achieve Jewish emancipation beyond the state. TEXT: [*70] I. Introduction Cheryl Harris's seminal piece, Whiteness as Property, begins with an anecdotal story of her grandmother passing for white. n1 Her grandmother's ability to traverse legal demarcations allowed her to access employment opportunities, physical spaces, and social realms only available to Whites in Jim Crow United States in the 1930s. Her phenotype, however, was insufficient to qualify her for, http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 1 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM and catapult her into, Whiteness. By reifying Whiteness in law, political elite eager to protect their holdings made it impervious to these informal transgressions. In her pivotal piece, Reflections of an Arab Jew, Ella Shohat similarly invokes the story of her Iraqi Jewish grandmother to describe the construction of racial categories in Israel at the time of its establishment in 1948. Then, Zionist pioneers eagerly established a nation-state for Jews in an attempt to escape European persecution. However, rather than challenge the discriminatory and racist ethos that excluded them from meaningful integration within Europe, Zionists had internalized and reproduced that exclusionary ethos in an effort to finally become European and gain acceptance within Europe. In effect, well before and leading up to Israel's establishment, Zionists established an ethno-national mythology of a new and universal Jew who was white and European. Thus, as a matter of fact, Israel excluded and subordinated the Middle Eastern Jew who required cultural rehabilitation and development in order to become properly Israeli, namely white and European. Shohat describes this jarring episode for her grandmother, who upon first encountering Israeli society in the fifties was convinced that the people who looked, spoke and ate so differently--the European Jews--were actually European Christians. Jewishness for her generation was inextricably associated with Middle Easterness. My grandmother, who still lives in Israel and still communicates largely in Arabic, had to be taught to speak of "us" as Jews and "them" as Arabs. n2 In order to become Israeli, Shohat's grandmother and other Middle Eastern Jews were forced to purify themselves of their ethnic, linguistic, and cultural constitution, thus internalizing and entrenching the orientalist denigration of their Middle Easternness. For Middle Eastern Jews who immigrated to Israel, the cost of passing was no less than an exercise of "self-devastation." n3 The Palestinian native, however, who lacked Jewish nationality was not even eligible for this self-destructive process. Linguistically, culturally, and socially, the Palestinian native was nearly indistinguishable from her Arab Jewish counterpart. Therefore, like the Middle Eastern Jew, the Arab (Muslim, Druze, Christian and atheist) Palestinian was [*71] made inferior, denigrated, and pushed to the margins of modernity's framework. Unlike the Middle Eastern Jew, however, the Palestinian native was ineligible to become European, or approximate Whiteness, because law narrowly defined who was a Jewish national. Therefore, within a settlercolonial context that sought to supplant the indigenous population and recreate historical and symbolic significance to the land, the Palestinian native constituted an obstacle. The only remedy was to remove, obscure, and/or contain her. Zionism necessarily transformed many kinds of Jews and their varying markers of identification into a homogenized national category whereby civil law, and not religious doctrine, defined who was a Jew. Without this transformation, Judaism would have remained a religion whose membership was defined by lineage and/or adherence rather than a nationality that could be recognized and regulated by state bureaucracy. In order to ensure the value of Jewish nationality within a state framework, the law first bifurcated Israeli citizenship and Jewish nationality. Second, the law extended a series of rights and potential privileges to Jewish nationals irrespective of their geographic location, be it within or outside of the state. Simultaneously, the law disenfranchised and disadvantaged Palestinians irrespective of their geographic location, be it within the State, in the Territories to be subsequently occupied, or in exile where Israel banished the native considered to be an excessive population. In so doing, Israel both achieved the supremacy of Jewish nationality as refracted through a lens of European white supremacy and facilitated the dispossession, displacement, and containment of Palestinian natives. The logic of European enlightenment ideals facilitated both the rehabilitation of Arab Jews as well as the ongoing erasure of Palestinians. Based on concepts of science and reason, Enlightenment ideals constructed a universal prototype marked by particular features of Western European Christians. As a matter of natural order demonstrated by scientific knowledge, the Western European Christian, white and wealthy, reigned as the supreme manifestation of humanity. Whereas science displaced religion as an explanation for Christian and white superiority, it replaced it with orientalist discourse justified by natural order. Simultaneously, secularized enlightenment made Jews eligible for assimilation through a process of social engineering. Inclusion necessitated the obliteration of difference. While Zionists forewent assimilationist aspirations within Europe, they internalized and reproduced these enlightenment ideals in their pursuit of a nation-state in the British Mandate of Palestine; the territory administered by the British as part of the League of Nations trusteeship system that sought to shepherd colonial holdings to independence. Those ideals guided a social http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 2 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM engineering process aimed at culturally cleansing Arab and Eastern European Jews and justified the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. As explained by Edward Said in his essay, Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims, Zionism collaborated with those aspects of the dominant Western culture (in which Zionism exclusively and institutionally lived) making it [*72] possible for Europeans to view non-Europeans as inferior, marginal, and irrelevant ... the link between an outright imperialist attitude towards distant lands in the Orient and a scientific attitude to the 'inequalities' of race was that both attitudes depended on the European will, on the determining force necessary to change the confusing realities into an orderly, disciplined, set of new classifications useful to Europe. n4 Harris's work, which theorizes the values of property and applies them to Whiteness, as a tangible good and not simply an aesthetic attribute, helps guide the reading of the value of Jewish nationality and its differentiation through white supremacy in Israel today. It does so in at least three ways. First, her work reveals the coded and explicit violence of liberal democracies. Indeed such violence is embedded in liberal democracies' rule of law, due process, equality, and pluralism that together regulate settler-colonialism, exclusion, and erasure. This exposure undermines legal reasoning as the source of legitimacy by putting into question the naturalness, or rather unnaturalness, of the law. Second, by examining the property value of Whiteness, Harris's work helps transform both the study and definition of race. Beyond colorism and its dimensions, race in law is a scientifically measurable unit, subject to test and verification in the service of the state and, in particular, its political and economic elite. For that reason, it is also malleable and functions as a gateway to other forms of ownership, privileges, and access. Finally, Whiteness increases in value relative to something that is not white. It necessitates a putative other that can be easily identified, defined, and captured in legal categories. These three elements together--the violence of liberal democracies, the codification of race, and the necessity of "other"--inform this particular reading of Whiteness as property onto Israel's legal system today. Tracing the genealogy of white supremacy and its edification in Israel to its origins in Europe helps complicate a settler-native binary among Jewish-Israelis and Palestinians. It reveals a reinforcing relationship between Palestinian deprivation and Israel's racial logics. Namely, white supremacy in Israel justifies and drives Palestinian deprivation. Conversely, Palestinian deprivation is constitutive of white supremacy and thus reifies Israel's social stratification whereby Western European Jews and African Jews straddle the extreme ends of that racial regime. Several other Jewish social groups span the length of that spectrum, including Middle Eastern Jews, Eastern European Jews, Spanish Jews, as well as Russian Jews and non-Jews. Palestinians do not sit on that last rung of this spectrum, they are outside of it altogether. They constitute a baseline equivalent with social death because of the extreme institutional deprivation they endure that denies them access to opportunities, movement, family, nationhood, land, livelihood, and security in the physical and metaphysical sense. While this relationship to Palestinians imbues Jewish nationality with value, it simultaneously reinforces the exclusionary [*73] tropes that gave rise to the Jewish Question in Europe. Settler-decolonization is necessary for Palestinian emancipation and has the potential for Jewish emancipation beyond the state by resisting the disfiguring and Orientalizing tropes that underwrote Jewish exclusion from Europe. This approach stands in stark contrast to dominant approaches of the conflict that situate Israel as a battlefront combatting religious and irrational non-state actors from moving westward. n5 Israel increases the cache of this framework by drawing on Islamophobic tropes aimed at deliberately collapsing Palestinian groups, like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, with Al-Qaeda and more recently the Islamic State. n6 Popular understandings [*74] of the conflict have thus been framed as religious, civilizational, and primordial, when in fact it is colonial, political, and contemporary. By framing the conflict as civilizational, Israel and its Western patrons attempt to naturalize the existence of a Jewish state and obfuscate an ongoing legacy of settler-colonialism. They do so by framing Israel's presence as timeless and its Jewish polity, within and without its borders, as homogenous. This is plainly harmful to Palestinians whose very existence is denied and negated. n7 It is also harmful to Jews, on whose behalf Israel purportedly speaks regardless of their own prerogative. This arbitrary relationship thus presupposes that nationalization of Judaism and its embodiment within a state is the proper remedy to systematic anti-Semitism in Europe. In doing so, it also embodies and reproduces the racist and exclusionary logics that precipitated the structural violence against http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 3 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM Europe's Jewish population. It then projects it onto a global Jewry regardless of the details of their respective, and often optimal, experiences beyond Europe's shores. To demonstrate the value of Jewish nationality as refracted through white supremacy derived from Enlightenment Europe, this essay begins by exploring how Enlightenment ideals accentuated the Jewish Question in Europe. Part III explores how Zionism, a national revival movement and direct derivative of Enlightenment ideals, came to embody Europe's edification of superiority and violent rejection of difference, thus necessitating the violent bifurcation of Arab and Jewish identity among Middle Eastern Jews. Part IV explores those fundamental Israeli laws that have ascribed a tiered value onto Jewish nationality and have facilitated the ongoing removal, dispossession, and containment of Palestinian natives. This includes a case study of the Bedouin Palestinians in the Negev today. The essay concludes with queries about the potential of settler decolonization to achieve Palestinian and Jewish emancipation beyond the state. II. European Enlightenment Entrenches Exclusion and Subjugation of Jews Enlightenment in Europe is associated with the rise of liberal democracies, the separation of church and state, as well as the triumph of reason and science over emotion and mysticism. n8 Enlightenment thinkers insisted that these concepts, namely reason, universality, and secularism, underpinned modernity. n9 Rather than approximate tolerance and inclusion, [*75] however, Enlightenment concepts reified and entrenched distinctions with consequential difference. Scientific knowledge, marked by a demonstrable truth, did not challenge divine orders of racial hierarchy but instead provided rational explanations for them. n10 Universalism, rather than accept the scope of humanity's diversity, violently imposed a singular and hegemonic norm as the universal subject. n11 European Jews ultimately bore the brunt of modernity's triumph. The secularizing Enlightenment interrupted traditional social relations built around religious doctrine and, through ethnographic science, produced ethnically and racially ordered hierarchies of humans. n12 Zygmunt Bauman explains how science merely supplanted the dogma of divinity whereby Nature became the new deity: the legitimation of science as its only orthodox cult, and of scientists as its prophets and priests. Everything, in principle, had been opened to objective inquiry; everything could, in principle, be known--reliably and truly ... . Human temperament, character ... even political inclinations, were seen as determined by Nature ... . Phrenology and physiognomy captured most fully the confidence, strategy, and ambition of the new scientific age. n13 These theories that justified racial hierarchy based on assertions of immutable biological differences were foundational to modern antiSemitism and racism. n14 While the Enlightenment removed the debate about Jews's status in society from Christian and Jewish polemics, it reformulated it in orientalist terms. n15 These terms had emerged with the expulsion of Jews and Muslims from Spain and informed ongoing debates about the status of European Jews and asked whether the oriental attributes of Jewish people were inherent to them. n16 [*76] Simultaneously, the Enlightenment's displacement of God's truth with reason served as a new basis for establishing equality and made Jews eligible for assimilation. Because all humans have the same capacity for reason, it became thinkable to reform Jews through integration from their low status and perceived cultural inferiority into a more productive social situation. n17 The Enlightenment's universal pronouncement of humans as bearers of reason opened the doors for Jews and their neighbors to pursue assimilation. n18 While the primacy of reason made Jews eligible for assimilation, the rise of science made that assimilation possible by way of social engineering. The project to understand nature inevitably led the modern world to take an active approach in shaping, ordering, and designing a more perfect world. Throughout Europe, because Jews had long been outside of society and had an uneasy relation with the new societies being promoted by the Enlightenment, they became the objects of social engineering practices. The aim of those practices, which varied among nation-states, was to erase difference by enforcing a generic form of the http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 4 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM universal citizen. The irony was that this universal and indistinctive citizen was in fact quite particular. n19 There are many hidden particularities within the "universal." n20 Broadly, the universal ideal was to be a rational individual, to be one capable of dominating the natural world, and to belong to a sovereign nation. The Jew, however, was a member of a geographically diffuse community that had failed to carve out its own nation and, supposedly, could not pledge allegiance to another, thus precluding her from joining modernity. n21 The Jewish Question asked: how was the Jew to be accepted in Europe? In detailing the exclusionary process that worked against European Jews, Aziza Khazzoom notes that "Christians demanded that Jews ... reform their lifestyle, values, and social, economic, and educational [*77] structures." n22 The process of assimilation was an effort to de-orientalize the Jew, who was thought to have Asiatic origins. This discourse espoused revulsion at "Jewish poverty ... their dark, disorderly ghettos," and by their Yiddish language, which was "too under-developed to support high-powered thoughts." n23 In their work on Derrida and Zionism, Sherene Seikaly and Max Ajl explain, "Jewish belonging in Europe was conditional on the cleansing and reform of otherness, on the erasure of the particular. In the worst cases, the European 'we' required the very annihilation of the Jew." n24 European Jews internalized this orientalist discourse. n25 In their pursuit of assimilation, they sought reform from their supposed oriental features and reproduced these negative images against one another. A 'second wave' of Jewish assimilationists who sought to totally assimilate "denied their own history and regarded everything particular about themselves as an impediment to their integration, to their becoming full human beings." n26 Khazzoum explains that: As they moved into the Western European world, German and French Jews began organizing their identities around the east/west dichotomy, evaluating themselves and others according to conformity with the western cultural model. Their discomfort with their Oriental past became particularly important when they were placed in direct contact with other, unwesternized, Jewish populations. n27 Jews gained emancipation, or the removal of formal legal barriers to social, economic, and political participation, in Western Europe through service to the absolutist states forming in early modern Europe. A relationship between the state and the Jews emerged that would become a focal point for anti-Semitism. Monarchs needed help financing wars abroad and it became expedient to use Jews, a few of whom had amassed wealth through lending and tax collecting, as financiers. They would eventually become the state's primary creditors. n28 Those who accumulated [*78] wealth could live in Berlin or provincial capitals, but the poor majority remained in Posen. This dichotomy of rich and poor, of those who lived in ghettos and those lived outside them, came to define the binary of Eastern and Western Jews within the borders of Western Europe. n29 According to this dichotomy Western Jews managed to overcome their history and reform themselves, whereas Eastern Jews simply continued their isolated medieval existence. Germany, which had one of the largest populations of Jews in Europe, is an appropriate case for discussing the larger European Jewry because, as Hannah Arendt points out, "every liberation and every catastrophe that has befallen the Jews of Europe has been able to borrow its theoretical foundation and its pathos from Germany." n30 Before the emancipation in 1869, the state granted statutory protection to prosperous (Western) Jews. They were, however, a select few to whom the state granted "general privileges," the same legal status as Christians. n31 These rights were not altruistic gifts, but sought to protect the Jews's contributions to the state. The acquisition of similar rights, leading to emancipation, by impoverished (Eastern) Jews advanced at a significantly slower rate. Notwithstanding their efforts, socio-economic and religious motivations rebuffed Jewish desire for assimilation. In the decade after Jewish emancipation in Germany, anti-Semitism began to gain momentum as a political movement, and by 1944 it had reached its violent climax. n32 III. Zionism and Middle Eastern Jews: Violent Bifurcations In response to the Jewish Question and decades before this momentous climax, Zionism emerged as a national revival movement. The founder of Zionism, Theodore Herzl, became convinced that assimilation into European society had failed when he witnessed the http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 5 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM violent unfolding of the Dreyfus affair in France. n33 Rather than challenge the disfiguring orientalist tropes that excluded and subjugated Jews in Europe, however, Zionism internalized and reproduced them. Herzl believed that the process of emigration would transform the exilic Jew and ultimately lead to [*79] the creation of "a Europe in the Middle East." n34 By establishing a Jewish state away from Europe's shores, Jews would finally earn acceptance within it. n35 Whereas Israel had been a site of pilgrimage for Jews, Zionism secularized and nationalized Judaism. n36 Zionist pioneers used nationalism as a tool for achieving modernization, superiority, and freedom from past Jewish conditions of inferiority and oppression. n37 Within this modernist framework, the religious was relegated to a pre-modern category embodied by Eastern Jews, while the secular, embodied by European Jews, was ascribed to the modern sphere. n38 In so doing, Zionism spoke in two contradicting voices: "primordial/religious" and "modern/secular." The primordial voice mixes (i.e., hybridizes) the old and the new. It attempts to ensure the legitimacy of Zionism, particularly outwardly, by emphasizing its historical continuity with its religious past. The "modern voice" speaks inwardly, addressing the members of the nation and trying "to modernize" them by turning its back on the past (i.e., purifying). Modern Zionism seeks to distinguish the "new Jew" from the old, unproductive religious Jew. n39 Zionism modeled the "new Jew" on white European values and culture in purposeful opposition to Eastern cultural markers carried by Middle Eastern Jews and certainly by Muslim and Christian Arabs. n40 As a derivative of Enlightenment Europe, Zionism reproduced the polarized [*80] binaries of the superior, enlightened West and the inferior, primitive East. n41 It claimed that Jews as a national entity belonged to the superior, enlightened West despite their geographical origins in the East and sought to enlighten (read: colonize) its primitive peoples. Accordingly, Zionist ideology inferiorized the Eastern, or Kurdish, Arab, Indian, and Turkish Jew, and aimed to civilize her by erasing her difference just as Enlightenment Europe had sought to do with its Jewish population. n42 As explained by Israeli diplomat and politician, Abba Abban, "the object should be to infuse all non-Ashkenazi Jews with an Occidental spirit rather than allow them to drag us into an unnatural Orientalism." n43 The denigration of Eastern Jews was so endemic, that revisionist leaders like Vladimir Jabotinsky opposed integration in order to preserve a majority of European Jews and to avoid the possibility of a "dull race." n44 The movement thus set out to purify and rehabilitate the oriental Jew by making her European. Nationhood not only promised Jews an opportunity for revival, but functioned as a civilizing mission as well. Early Zionist pioneers marketed the movement to the Ottoman and British Empires as advancing their imperial and civilizing schemes for Palestine as a land as well as for Arab Jews as a people. n45 It would revive the Western Jew and make her, finally, European and rehabilitate the Eastern Jew who suffered from oriental qualities. n46 [*81] These stark categorizations created a conflict for the Mizrahi, or the Middle Eastern, Israeli who could not coherently embrace her Arab identity. "Arab-Israeli" as an identity is used to mark the Palestinian other in order to negate her indigeneity or status as a national minority. Arab Jews had more in common with Arab Muslims and Arab Christians than European Jews. This posed a threat to Zionism since the nationalist revival movement sought to create a homogenous nation epitomized by the European Jew. n47 For Zionists, this affinity necessitated the erasure of the Arab dimension of Arab-Jews ... [who] for the first time in their history, faced the imposed dilemma of choosing between Jewishness and Arabness, in a geopolitical context that perpetuated the equation between Arabness, Middle Easterners and Islam, on the one hand, and between Jewishness, Europeanness and Westernness on the other. n48 This binary system that synonymized "Israeli" with "(Western) European Jew" forced Arab Jews to choose between cultural/ethnic/linguistic ties and their religion. n49 Rehabilitation of the Mizrahi Jew thus necessitated the violent bifurcation of her Arab and Jewish identity. Using a modernization framework, the nascent Israeli state achieved this bifurcation by removing Middle http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 6 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM Eastern Jewish children from their families, n50 supplanting Arabic with Hebrew, and replacing varied histories with a singular European one. Moreover, only the European Jew, or white Jew, was eligible for societal benefits providing an incentive to approximate Whiteness n51 and engage in what Ella Shohat describes as an "exercise in self-devastation." n52 To "make it" in Israeli society, Mizrahis, "at least [*82] publicly, had to adopt the Israeli-European perceptions of the Arabs and Muslims as primitive and backward." n53 As part of the modernization schema, Mizrahi immigrants were sent to Development Towns located in largely rural and frontier areas where they could be "developed," or made European. European Jews escaped this process because their residence in Europe had adequately developed them. n54 Israel obscured the Judeo-Islamic cultural geography of Middle Eastern Jews and supplanted it with the "European-Jewish chronicle of shtetl and pogrom." n55 Elementary and high school curricula instilled this ethno-national mythology by teaching Ashkenazi history as the only true history of the new, or universal, Jew. n56 Even the cultural signifiers of Diaspora Jews, Ashkenazi and Mizrahi, are imbued a normative quality. n57 Ashkenazi, which literally meant European Jews, represented a "silent, unmarked norm" which was synonymous with Israeli or hegemonic white elite. In contrast, Mizrahi existed only as an ethnicity relative to its universal signifier: white, European Jew. n58 In 1967 the fate of Mizrahim in Israel fundamentally shifted as a result of the Six-Day War and the military occupation that followed. n59 Military occupation of Arab lands necessitated familiarity with Arab culture and the Arabic language. Suddenly the signifiers of inferiority and impurity embodied by Mizrahim became a "social and economic resource" and they became "experts" on Arab affairs." n60 The domination of Palestinians and control of their lands in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip provided the prospect of integration for (some) Mizrahim, however bleak, thus heightening their commitment to Jewish nationality and the value it inhered. In 1977, Mizrahi Jews would come to constitute a pillar in Israel's right-wing polity. n61 Elite liberal Israelis attributed this rightward shift not to Zionism but to the Mizrahi Jew's Middle Eastern background. [*83] Intellectuals across Israel's elite strata attributed the religiosity among Mizrahim to their states of origin that had not benefitted from secularization and democratization, thus reinforcing the impermeable divide between the enlightened West and the uncivilized East. n62 Moreover, the political ascendance of Mizrahim threatened to diminish Israel's cultural distinction from "the corrupt, lazy, retarded environment of the Middle East." n63 Without cultural rehabilitation and cleansing of their Arabness, Mizrahim undermined Israel's identity as white, European, and Jewish. The nationalization of Judaism nevertheless ascribed significant value to Mizrahi identity. Though designated as inferior, in need of rehabilitation, and linguistically and historically marginalized, the Mizrahi remained Jewish and thus superior to the Palestinian native. Zionism consecrated Jewish nationality in law and strictly regulated its acquisition and the myriad entitlements that flow therefrom. Therefore, in contrast to their Arab Jewish counterparts, Palestinians who lacked Jewish nationality were not eligible for rehabilitation at all. Instead, they had to be removed, dispossessed, and/or contained. Israel achieved this in a matrix of laws that simultaneously diminished the value of being Palestinian while enhancing the value of being Jewish. Centering Middle Eastern Jews in relation to Zionism complicates the reading of Whiteness as property onto Israel because the property is not simply Jewish nationality but a Jewish nationality that enshrines European superiority. It thus increases the value of Jewish nationality for Mizrahi Jews who may be otherwise indistinguishable culturally, and in some cases, socioeconomically, from their Palestinian counterparts. Nevertheless, because they lacked Jewish nationality, Palestinians were ineligible for Whiteness. Instead, Israel's legal regime set out to remove, dispossess, and/or contain Palestinians. IV. Zionism and Palestinians: Removal, Dispossession, and Containment The Palestinian native was beyond the legal category of Jewish national, as legislated by the Law of Return (1950) n64 and the Citizenship Law (1952) n65 and therefore ineligible for rehabilitation. Instead, she had to be [*84] removed, dispossessed, and/or contained. Israeli historian Ilan Pappe explains that Palestinians were "seen as part of nature's hardship and as such were to be conquered or removed. Nothing, neither rocks nor Palestinians, was to stand in the way of the national redemption of the land the Zionist movement coveted." n66 British Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour, who authored the 1917 Balfour declaration, echoed this sentiment when he explained that "Zionism, be it right or wrong ... is of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land." n67 Neither Israel's founders nor their European colonial interlocutors denied the presence of Palestinians. Rather they denied their legal categorization as a people eligible for national self-determination. n68 Enlightenment ideals did the work of marginalizing http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 7 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM Palestinians to the condition of irrelevance. In his reading of Herzl, Edward Said observes that that could not have been done unless there was a prior European inclination to view the natives as irrelevant to begin with. That is, those natives already fit a more or less acceptable classificatory grid, which made them sui generis inferior to Western or white men-and it is this grid that a Zionist like Herzl appropriated, domesticating it from the general culture of his time to the unique needs of a developing Jewish nationalism. n69 Together with Zionism's exclusionary mandate, the removal of Palestinians was meticulously designed, systematically executed, and facilitated by European collusion. n70 Palestinians regard this episode of forced removal, dispersion, and dispossession as the Nakba, or catastrophe. n71 In the establishment of the Israeli state, its European founders both reified European supremacy and ascribed new value onto Jewish nationality relative to the Arab other. It consecrated the value of Jewish nationality in a series of laws that continue to serve as a gateway to basic services, land, housing, education, and employment. In particular, it bifurcated Israeli citizenship from Jewish nationality in order to privilege the Jewish person both within and beyond the State. This distinction and the laws and institutions that flow therefrom continue to work on the basis of the functional [*85] absence of the native to ensure that they would "remain in their 'non-place,' Jews in theirs, and so on." n72 The edification of this distinction in law furthered a settler-colonial project that seeks to remove in order to replace. n73 Zionist forces sought to remove Palestinians, physically and metaphysically, and to replace them with Jewish settlers as well as a revisionist history of the land. A set of twin axioms has driven Zionist ambitions from its inception through the present: to acquire the greatest amount of land with the smallest number of Palestinians and to concentrate the greatest number of Palestinians onto the smallest amount of land. While Israel's treatment of Palestinians differs depending on their territorial jurisdiction (i.e., the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Israel, and the Gaza Strip), the State's policy towards Palestinians is the same irrespective of location. Israel achieves these twin goals by martial law in the West Bank, by a mix of martial and administrative law in East Jerusalem, by civil law in Israel, and by counterinsurgency in the Gaza Strip. For the sake of greater coherence with Harris's work, this article will focus solely on Israel, where civil law is deployed to remove the Palestinian while increasing the value of Jewish nationality. Narrowing this analysis to Israel also helps demonstrate that Jewish supremacy is not simply an outlier in the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, but is central to the character of the State. The following sections will show how Israel has leveraged the law in order to remove, dispossess, and/or geographically concentrate Palestinians that remained within the State's jurisdictional scope after 1948. Moreover, as demonstrated by the case of Palestinian Bedouins in the Negev, in some cases, Israel has pursued all three policies at once. A. Legislating Jewish Supremacy: Bifurcating Jewish Nationality and Israeli Citizenship Together, the Law of Return (1950) and the Citizenship Law (1952) bifurcated Jewish nationality from Israeli citizenship. There is no such thing as Israeli nationality or an Israeli nation. Instead, nationality is based on religion while citizenship is a juridical category within the State. As a matter of law, national-citizens are accorded greater rights than citizens-only, thus enshrining a stratified hierarchy based on religion. The Law of Return of 1950 provides that every Jewish person in the world is automatically entitled to "Jewish nationality" in Israel. n74 It also defines with specificity a Jewish national as someone who is "born of a Jewish mother or has become converted to Judaism and who is not a member of another religion." n75 Article 4(a) provides that the rights of acquiring nationality and citizenship are also vested in "a child and a grandchild of a Jew, the spouse of a Jew, the spouse of a child of a Jew [*86] and the spouse of a grandchild of a Jew, except for a person who has been a Jew and has voluntarily changed his religion." n76 Palestinians could not and cannot become "nationals" of Israel because they are not Jewish and because "Israeli nationality" is not recognized by Israeli law. In 2012, a group of Jewish-Israelis concerned with this structural discrimination filed a petition to the Israeli High Court of Justice seeking recognition of an Israeli people rather than a Jewish one. The petition sought to diminish discrimination towards Israel's Christian and Muslim Palestinian population as well as to separate religion and the State. Despite the law's http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 8 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM discriminatory implications, the court rejected the petition, explaining that the issue of whether there is a "peoplehood ... common to all its residents and citizens, called 'Israeli' ... is a national-political-social question and it is not the court's place to decide it." n77 In an earlier decision by the Tel Aviv District Court, Judge Yitzhak Shilo explained "I can fully declare that there is no Israeli nation that exists separately from a Jewish nation." n78 Thus there is a reciprocal relationship that exists between Israel and Jews the world over, who, by virtue of the Citizenship law and the Law of Return, are recognized as Jewish nationals by the State irrespective of their personal prerogative. n79 This relationship supersedes the one between Israel and its non-Jewish citizens who have resided there for centuries preceding the State's establishment in 1948. Palestinians can be juridical citizens of the State but never members of the nation. Thus, they are excluded from the class of beneficiaries of national interests as a matter of law. In effect, a Jewish national (as defined by Israeli law) residing in London with no relationship to the State is entitled to more state benefits and protection than a Palestinian-Israeli citizen in Nazareth whose family lineage in the area dates back centuries. The status of "citizen of Israel," or "citizen-only" is a second-class citizenship status with limited protection even within the State. Approximately [*87] 150,000 native Palestinians who remained in their homes or became internally displaced and their descendants, hold this second-class citizenship status in Israel today. They comprise approximately twenty percent of Israel's population. This distinction between citizens-only and national-citizens aims to privilege the rights of Jewish-nationals wherever they may reside and/or abridge the rights of non-nationals (Palestinian Arabs), regardless of their legal status or geographic location. This bifurcation underpins Israel's discriminatory land, residency, housing, employment policy, and freedom of movement, including the right to leave and return to one's country. n80 Within Israel, there are at least fifty laws that prima facie privilege Israel's Jewish citizennationals and/or abridge the rights of its Christian and Muslim citizens-only. n81 As a result, Palestinian citizens of Israel are relegated to second-class citizenship, have a lower socio-economic status, receive less, or no, benefits from the State, n82 including electricity and water in some cases, n83 and are excluded from gainful employment, n84 housing, n85 and educational opportunities. n86 [*88] Perhaps, most fundamentally, this distinction works to maintain a Jewish majority and facilitates forced population transfer of Palestinians throughout Mandatory Palestine. n87 Population transfer seeks to alter the demographic composition of an area by moving people into and/or out of the area. n88 In the case of Israel, such transfer furthers Israel's hegemonic control of the land in pursuance of its settler-colonial ambitions to remove Palestinians and replace them with Jewish settlers. Israel accomplishes this by removing Palestinians in order to diminish their population; dispossessing them of their lands to enhance the possessory interest of the State on behalf of its Jewish nationals; and geographically containing them to mitigate their nationalist aspirations and simultaneously making the presence of Jewish nationals ubiquitous and uninterrupted. 1. Systematic Removal of Palestinians The establishment of a Jewish state in Mandatory Palestine, necessitated the systematic removal and forced exclusion of approximately eighty-eight percent of native Palestinians. n89 Subsequently, the Citizenship Law of 1952, inaccurately termed "Nationality Law," repealed the Palestinian Citizenship Order of July 24, 1925 under which the native Palestinians were granted the status of citizens and nationals in their country; it resulted in the de facto "denationalization" of this entire population. n90 Palestinians who met the criteria of the 1952 Citizenship Law were accorded the status of "citizens of Israel." Citizenship was only available to them and their descendants if they were present in Israel between 1948 and 1952, which effectively excluded all the refugees who were forced out during the 1948 War. n91 Palestinians who did not meet the criteria of the 1952 Citizenship Law, because they were outside the country or in territory controlled by Israeli-defined "enemy forces" at certain cut-off dates, were excluded from Israeli citizenship and consequently made stateless by the law. n92 At least [*89] 750,000 Palestinians and their descendants (approximately 6.6 million persons) suffer from statelessness and/or a lack of nationality today. Israel consecrated Palestinians's forced exile by denying them the right to return, compensation, and rehabilitation as legislated by the UN General Assembly in 1949. n93 The nascent State simultaneously legislated a Law of Return (1950) for Jewish nationals who were entitled to citizenship and financial benefits without preconditions upon immigration. n94 Israel removed Palestinians by force and entrenched their exclusion by law. It continues its policy of removal and exclusion into the present-day. http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 9 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM Israel considers its Palestinian population--twenty percent of its polity--a demographic threat. It explicitly discusses the dangers of their natural population growth n95 as well as the possibility of their outright and forcible transfer. n96 Among Israel's most recent legal initiatives aimed at reducing the population of its Palestinian citizens is The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (2003), better known as the Ban on Family Reunification. n97 This law suspends the possibility of Palestinian citizens of Israel and Jerusalem ID-holders gaining permission, through family reunification, to legally live in Israel or occupied East Jerusalem with their spouses from the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) or from purported "enemy states." n98 In May 2002, Israel issued decision 1813, which froze the applications for all Israeli citizens or East Jerusalem residents that involved [*90] Palestinian spouses from the OPT, to prevent the possibility of a "creeping right of return" through the unification process. The Knesset institutionalized this policy through law in 2003 when it passed the Temporary Law. n99 Although drafted to apply to all Israeli citizens without regard to nationality, in practice it disproportionately discriminates against Palestinians as a national minority since they are the overwhelming majority seeking to marry Palestinians. n100 Moreover, the 2003 amendment does not change the situation for Israeli citizen spouses applying to be joined either by foreign spouses or Israeli settler spouses living in the OPT, further highlighting the law's discriminatory impact. n101 On 11 January 2012, Israel's High Court rejected a legal challenge to the law, holding that "human rights are not a prescription for national suicide." n102 Although the Court held that the law furthers Israel's national security, Israel applies the prohibition on family reunification as a blanket policy without the opportunity for due process. n103 Moreover, litigation [*91] showed that of the 130,000 naturalized citizens between 1994 and 2002, only seven have been indicted on security charges, and of those, only two have been convicted. n104 Significantly, both convicted persons had already completed their sentences by the time of litigation, indicating the relatively small security risk they posed. n105 While the law prohibits the entry of Palestinians into Israel for family reunification, it permits them entry for purposes of work further undermining the State's security argument. n106 The purpose of the law is to both prevent a rise in the Palestinian population in Israel as well as to reduce the one that already exists. Israeli Knesset Member Otniel Schneller explained the legislation's discriminatory intent when he said that "the decision articulates the rationale of separation between the (two) peoples and the need to maintain a Jewish majority ... and character of the State." n107 Yaakov Katz, Israeli Knesset Member, explained that "the state of Israel was saved from being flooded by 2-3 million Arab refugees." n108 The Ban on Family Reunifications furthers a specific demographic policy. It continues a rich legacy within Israel of deploying the law in the service of removing and excluding Palestinians from their original homes, thus diminishing the value of their nationality while enhancing that of Jewish nationality. 2. Entrenching Removal: Dispossession by Law A matrix of laws works to entrench Palestinian exclusion from the land and to ensure that its primary benefit and enjoyment belongs to Jewish nationals. n109 The Absentees' Property Law (1950) n110 was the primary instrument, among a myriad of similar laws, used to expropriate Palestinian land. n111 In particular, it targeted the lands of Palestinians who had fled across the border and become refugees as well as those who were internally displaced within the newly established State. The law established four categories of circumstance that would render private land eligible for confiscation and possession by a custodian of state land. n112 These categories are as follows: (1) any land held between November 29, 1947 and the time of legislation by a national or citizen of Lebanon, Egypt, [*92] Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq or Yemen; or (2) was in one of these countries or in any part of Palestine outside the area of Israel; or (3) was a Palestinian citizen and left his ordinary place of residence in Palestine for a place outside of Palestine before September 1948; or (4) was a Palestinian citizen and left his ordinary place of residence in Palestine for a place in Palestine held by enemy forces would be confiscated. n113 The Absentees' Property Law provides a broad definition of who is an "absentee." It includes approximately 800,000 Palestinians who fled the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 and were subsequently denied reentry and return by Israel. n114 It also includes those who remained within the State as internally displaced persons, often only miles from their original homes and lands, but barred from reclaiming them. The new state effectively legislated this latter group as "present-absentees." n115 The law naturalized the removal of the native population and confiscated the land without compensation to its Palestinian owners. Theoretically, the State holds these lands in perpetuity. In practice, however, the lands exchange hands between several State and quasi-State agencies for the exclusive benefit of Jewish nationals. The Absentees' Property Law established that the Custodian of http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 10 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM Absentees' Property acquires all rights previously vested with the owner and has the duty to preserve these properties. n116 The same law authorized the sale of the land, or its long-term lease, to the Development Authority, established only months later by the Knesset. n117 The Development Authority, which owns thirteen percent of State Lands, became "a principle mechanism to transfer Palestinian lands to Jewish (state) ownership." n118 In 1953, the Israeli Knesset passed the Jewish National Fund Law, which brought the UK-based organization within the fold of the State. The Jewish National Fund (JNF), which has a mandate "to purchase, take on lease, or in exchange, or otherwise acquire any lands ... rights of possession and other rights ... for the purpose of settling Jews on such lands," has the authority to develop but not sell the land it possesses. n119 The JNF explicitly discriminates against non-Jews within Israel. n120 In response to a petition filed on behalf of Palestinian citizens of the State before the Israeli High Court, the JNF explained The JNF is not the trustee of the general public in Israel. Its loyalty is given to the Jewish people in the Diaspora and in the state of [*93] Israel ... The JNF, in relation to being an owner of land, is not a public body that works for the benefit of all citizens of the state. The loyalty of the JNF is given to the Jewish people and only to them is the JNF obligated. The JNF, as the owner of the JNF land, does not have a duty to practice equality towards all citizens of the state. n121 Following its establishment, Israel transferred nearly 2 million dunums of Absentee Property to the JNF, increasing its land holdings from 600,000 before 1948 to nearly 2.5 million afterwards, or thirteen percent of all State land today. That means that nearly seventy percent of the JNF's land is confiscated from Palestinian refugees and IDPs and slated for the exclusive benefit of Jewish nationals. n122 The Basic Law: Israel Lands (1960) further entrenched the dispossession of Palestinian refugees and IDPs by prohibiting the sale of State land to private owners, effectively preempting its transfer to non-Jews. n123 The laws discussed herein are only a sample of Israel's complex legal regime aimed at expropriating Palestinian lands. Other laws include the Abandoned Property Ordinance (1948), the Emergency Regulations (Security Zones) Law (1949), the Emergency Regulations (Cultivation of Waste Lands) Law (1949), the Prevention of Infiltration Law (1954), the Plant Protection Law (1956), and the Prescription Law (1958). n124 The Absentees' Property Law and its progeny have ensured that, today, ninety-three percent of the land is held by the State for the effective benefit of its Jewish nationals. The value of that possessory interest directly correlates to the disadvantage and dispossession of its native Palestinian inhabitants. 3. Concentration of the Palestinian Population that Remains The State sought to geographically concentrate the remaining Palestinian population within its borders in order to prevent national cohesion and the threat of rebellion. Between its establishment and the eve of the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Israel imposed martial law exclusively upon its Palestinian citizens, explicitly marking them as enemies within the State. n125 Israeli planning laws also ensured the ubiquitous and uninterrupted presence of Jewish nationals. These laws have worked to geographically concentrate and separate Palestinians from one another, forcing them to live in non-contiguous ghettos throughout the State. Almost half, or forty-six percent, of all of Israel's Palestinian citizens live in the Northern districts. Seventy-one percent of all Palestinians live in 116 localities where they comprise nearly the entire population. [*94] Twenty-four percent live in eight mixed localities, one percent live in Jewish locations, while four percent, namely the Bedouin populations, live in unrecognized villages. n126 Israel ensures the continued ghettoization of Palestinians through law. For example, in Nazareth, home to 80,000 Palestinian citizens of Israel, bidding rights for public building opportunities are reserved for citizens who have completed military service. n127 This excludes nearly all of Nazareth's Palestinians, who do not serve in the Israeli military for historical and political reasons. n128 Palestinians in Nazareth are effectively rendered ineligible for urban development designated within the municipality's borders. Only Jewish nationals are able to live in those areas designated for public building opportunities, further entrenching the concentration of Palestinians while separating them from one another. In 695 agricultural communities and towns, amounting to eighty-one percent of total land area in the State, "Admissions Committees" can legally exclude Palestinians from their residential communities for being "socially unsuitable" based on their race or http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 11 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM national origin alone. n129 In 2011, the Knesset passed the Law to Amend the Cooperative Societies Ordinance, or the Admissions Committees Law, which authorizes Admissions Committees to exclude residents based on social suitability. n130 The 2011 Amendment, which legalized race-and nationality-based discrimination, was a legislative response to the Supreme Court's 2000 decision prohibiting the exclusion of Palestinian-Israelis from living in communities built for Jews only. n131 In response to the decision, Salai Meridor, the Jewish Agency Chairman at the time, explained the security rationale underpinning the concentration and segregation of Palestinian-Israelis: The main issue is not equality ... We're all for equality. The question is how we ensure equality while also making sure that areas with a massive Arab majority near the territory of an emerging Palestinian entity will remain part of the state of Israel. Along [*95] with equality, Israel must safeguard its national and security interests. n132 The criteria for suitability as well as the selection process lack transparency, thus denying applicants from due process to challenge their exclusion. Committees in several communities and towns have approved bylaws to make "loyalty to the Zionist vision" a condition for admission in an effort to exclude Palestinian-Israelis based on their beliefs. n133 By law, one of the five members of the Committee must include a representative of the Jewish Agency or the World Zionist Organization, organizations whose explicit purpose is to discriminate on behalf of Jewish nationals or against non-Jewish nationals. n134 The Israel Land Administration (ILA), which stewards State Lands, created the Committees themselves, belying a distinction between State-sanctioned discrimination and the practices of non-governmental organizations. n135 Significantly, Admissions Committees have also excluded other marginalized groups within Israel including Middle Eastern Jews and gays. n136 As part of its legal matrix aimed at concentrating the Palestinian-Israeli population, the State also systematically underfunds Arab towns and villages relative to their Jewish counterparts. n137 Municipal funding directly affects physical infrastructure, including roads, sewage, water, and electricity, thus suspending the inhabitants of Arab towns in a state of impoverishment. n138 In fact, the State allocates less money for development to Arab towns within the State than it does to Jewish settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory demonstrating the uniform treatment of Palestinians irrespective of their legal status. n139 B. Removal, Dispossession, and Containment: Case Study of Bedouins in the Negev The removal of native Palestinians is an ongoing and contemporary policy that reflects the State's commitment to Jewish national supremacy. The case of Palestinian Bedouins in the Negev, or the South of Israel, is [*96] particularly illustrative of Israel's tripartite policy towards Palestinians as beginning with the State's establishment into the present-day. Bedouin Palestinians are an indigenous population living in the Negev Desert since the seventh century and practicing an agricultural lifestyle. n140 In 1947, predating Israel's establishment, they numbered 95,000 and owned land within a sophisticated tribal system. n141 In 1948, the majority of this population was forced to flee outside of the newly established Israeli state. n142 In 1953, the State forcibly concentrated the remaining 11,000 Bedouin Palestinians into a northeastern plot of land known as the Siyag (Arabic for "fence"), located between Be'er Sheva, Arada, and Dimona. n143 The Siyag, approximately 900 kilometers squared, is a mere seven percent of the Be'er Sheva district from which the State displaced the Palestinians. n144 To prevent their return to their original lands and homes, Israel declared the surrounding area an enclosed military zone. n145 As a result of the Absentees' Property Law, the State confiscated ninety percent of the lands and property belonging to the pre-1948 Bedouins. Since the 1950s, Israel has explicitly attempted to further dispossess the Palestinian Bedouins of their ancestral lands, to dissociate them from their agricultural livelihoods, and to concentrate them into urban townships. Simultaneously, the State has overseen a Judaization of the Negev region marked by exclusive Jewish settlements with disproportionate access to State benefits, including national development funds. The National Planning and Building Law (1965) excluded Bedouins from official recognition and reclassified the native Bedouin population as "trespassers on State land" despite its existence predating Israel's establishment n146 and whom the State had hitherto recognized. n147 Moreover, [*97] the Law retroactively classified dozens of Bedouin villages as "unrecognized" and therefore ineligible for basic services like electricity, water, sewage systems, roads, and health care otherwise provided by the State. n148 http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 12 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM Approximately 70,000 Bedouin Palestinians live in thirty-five such "unrecognized" villages today. n149 Residents of unrecognized villages cannot obtain building permits or plans for housing thus subjecting them to systematic home demolitions. In 2013, the State demolished 321 structures in Bedouin villages and compelled residents to demolish 376 of their own homes and structures in a process known as "self-demolition." n150 In contrast, Israel "retroactively legalizes homes and towns built by Israeli Jewish citizens in the [Negev] and continues to allow the construction of homes without punishment, even those built without permits or plans." n151 In 2004, the Israeli Government decided to recognize thirteen Bedouin unrecognized villages. As of 2014, the State has recognized eleven of these designated villages. n152 While the policy aimed to integrate the villages into the State's grid of basic service provisions, they remain severely underserved, if not completely excluded. n153 They continue to be denied access to adequate electricity, running water, paved roads, schools, and sewage disposal systems. n154 During this same period, the State has established three new Jewish settlements while four new settlements are in an advanced planning stage. n155 Though sparsely populated, the Jewish nationals resident in these settlements "enjoy a variety of services allocated by the government, and also receive building permits for new structures and extensions to existing ones. In addition, plans for at least twelve more settlements are now on the agenda, most, if not all, are designated for the Jewish population." n156 On May 6, 2013, the Ministerial Committee on Legislation approved the Law for the Regulation of Bedouin Settlement in the Negev, better known as the Prawer-Begin Plan for its authors. n157 The bill reflects several earlier versions and incorporates the provisions of the 2012 Regional Master Plan for the Be'er Sheva Metropolitan Area, indicating the continuity, rather than the ingenuity, of the policy. n158 The Plan aims to forcibly displace the seventy-thousand Bedouins resident in thirty-five unrecognized villages into overcrowded townships characterized by urbanization. n159 [*98] To coerce their displacement, the State has sprayed the Bedouins's lands with toxic chemicals, n160 repeatedly demolished their homes at cost to the residents, n161 and continued to deny them access to basic services including "minimal access" to water. n162 In response to global protest by, and on behalf of, the Bedouin residents at risk of displacement, the Plan was apparently halted in December 2013. n163 Four days after the announcement, however, the military general responsible for overseeing the forced removal of the Bedouin Palestinians said that he did not receive any instructions to halt the Plan, explaining that the bill remained in the legislative process. n164 The Prime Minister's Office explained that it preferred to amend the existing bill rather than start anew indicating that the late 2013 announcement may only be a delay in the otherwise inevitable forced displacement of the Bedouin Palestinian population. n165 V. Conclusion The value of Jewish nationality, and by extension Israeli Whiteness, directly correlates to the deprivation of Palestinian land, presence, and nationhood. In furtherance of its settler-colonial goals, Israel will continue to diminish the Palestinian population by removal, dispossession, and concentration, while its Jewish nationals will continue to take their temporal and spatial place. Despite the State's deliberate elisions that construct Palestinians as socio-legal present absentees, settler-colonization remains central to Israeli identity. It consolidates antagonistic differences amongst its stratified society against the Palestinian body. Whatever Jewish-Israelis are, Palestinians are not and whatever Palestinians are, Jewish-Israelis are not. The State justifies its structural violence meted against Palestinians, irrespective of geographic residence or legal jurisdiction, upon this consequential orientalist framework. [*99] These disfiguring and exclusionary tropes are not just externally deployed. From its inception, Zionist thought has internalized them in its efforts to reproduce, and gain acceptance within, Whiteness in Europe. The State's violent practices aimed at rehabilitating Middle Eastern Jews by cleansing them of their oriental qualities so as to bring them closer to Whiteness, stems from the same logic that presupposes the dispensable nature of the Palestinian body. That body lacks material value: it does not have access to capital, its land claims are retroactively delegitimized, its standing before the law is truncated and diminished, it lacks meaningful security from the State or otherwise, and its presence is always tenuous. Proximity to Palestinian-ness thus signals social death. Conversely, proximity to North American and European Whiteness signals the condition of possibility. Structurally, therefore, the approximation of Whiteness within Israel necessitates the ongoing deprivation of Palestinians. And the deprivation of Palestinians reproduces and reifies the logic constitutive of Israel's racial hierarchal regime. The imperative to set apart and distinguish Palestinians is most urgent among those social groups who bear the greatest resemblance to them either http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 13 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM culturally/linguistically and/or in the degree of material deprivation. Middle Eastern Jews possibly have the greatest urgency among these social groups. Not only do they possess the same cultural/linguistic affinities but their socio-political and economic ascent is historically contingent upon the structure of the military occupation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Moreover, due to critical junctures in the Middle East's recent history, the Mizrahim are effectively excluded from their places of origin. Though the stakes for Middle Eastern Jewish-Israelis in maintaining Palestinian deprivation are quite high, such deprivation perpetuates their own institutionalized marginalization. Settler decolonization offers an opportunity for Palestinian as well as Jewish emancipation beyond the confines of the State. In his work, The Vel of Slavery: Tracking the Figure of the Unsovereign, Jared Sexton explicates the distinctions between colonialism and settler-colonialism in order to conceptualize their relationship to one another and to an anti-racist framework, respectively. n166 Sexton explains that while decolonization seeks to remove the colonizer and "destroy the positions of colonizer and colonized," settler decolonization "entails articulating the colonial relation, revealing the encounter, and transforming the elementary terms of cohabitation." n167 In the latter scenario, the colonizer remains physically but transforms her relationship to the land and the population. This means dispensing with a "desire to rule" and asserting "the sovereignty of the indigenous people ... ." n168 Thus settlerdecolonization does not simply seek to remove the colonizer, nor to disrupt racial hierarchy in an effort to democratize the settlercolony. Instead, it seeks to restore indigenous sovereignty in ways that exceed the possibilities of State reformation. [*100] Competing notions of belonging may complicate the meanings of indigenous sovereignty in Israel and the Occupied Territories. I disagree that it is controversial. Without exhausting this discussion on indigeneity, here it is important to highlight the regional context. In particular, Zionists sought to establish a Jewish homeland in the Middle East upon the premise that Israel is exogenous to it and closer to, if not an extension of, Europe. Far from an ingathering of diasporic Jews seeking to restore and continue their presence in the Middle East, the nationalist, revival movement secularized Judaism, arrived as a colonial master to the region, and sought a place within Europe away from its shores. Rather than embrace everything indigenous to the region--from language to livelihood and peoples--Zionism rejected them as exemplified by its violent disdain for Palestinians. As put by Gabriel Ash in his essay, The Meaning of Yair Lapid, there is a real but deeply flawed Jewish national collective in Israel, which suffers from a congenital inability to belong to the land it claims as its homeland. The implication is that its only hope to overcome that inability is the mediation of Palestinians. Palestinian nationalism is not the enemy of Jewish-Israeli nationalism, but in fact, through decolonization, the condition of its becoming." n169 Ash rightly suggests that there is a possibility for "an Israeliness that is at home in the Middle East-no longer colonial, no longer based on domination of European culture, less pompous, and crucially, no longer illegitimate." n170 A settler-decolonization movement aimed at ceasing Palestinian deprivation has the potential to subvert Israel's racial hierarchal regime more broadly. The colonial relation between Israel and Palestinians turns on supremacist notions. Destruction of the colonial relation should thus subvert those disfiguring oriental tropes that positioned Jews as outsiders in Europe and, later, as colonial masters in the Middle East. Such a movement aims not only to unsettle a native-settler relationship but to unsettle the system of stratified value measured against it. Under such a framework, Jews are able to resist, rather than embody, the racial logics that produced their exclusion within Europe. It gives rise to critical questions including: what is the place of Jews in the Middle East given that historical junctures have effectively excluded them from their places of origin? If the nation-state is not the proper response to the Jewish Question, then in a state-based outcome that emerges from Israel and the OPT, what rights should Jews be afforded? Addressing these questions helps transcend the settler-native binary that would otherwise fail to examine "how 'settlers' are differentiated through white supremacy," thus risking leaving it intact. n171 As put by Ella Shohat, "as much as it is impossible to [*101] imagine peace between Israel and the Arabs without recognizing and affirming the historical rights of the Palestinian people, so a real peace must not overlook the collective rights of Oriental Jews." n172 Though this essay explicates the condition of the Oriental Jew, it should not be limited to her condition. To the contrary, all Jews, Eastern European, Spanish, African, and even Western European, have suffered from the racialized exclusion and subordination and thus stand to benefit from settler-decolonization. In particular, to shed themselves of their role as colonial-settlers constitutive of a http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 14 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM racial logic that presupposes their inferiority relative to a European Whiteness and which has effectively, shaped and/or disfigured and/or usurped their histories, language, and cultural symbols. Settler-decolonization thus affords an opportunity for emancipation from the fundamental assumptions of white supremacy. While the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement (BDS), is not a robust settler-decolonization movement, its terms work to destabilize the normalcy of Israeli settler-colonialism. n173 It thus possesses the germ for much greater possibilities necessary for meaningful emancipation for both Jews and Palestinians. The 2005 BDS Call is based on human rights norms and international law that calls for the right of return for all refugees, the end of Israeli occupation of Arab lands, and equality for Israel's Palestinian citizens. n174 It is a tool of redistribution articulated in the language of rights and law that seeks to equalize treatment among groups who have been illegitimately privileged. n175 The movement seeks incremental reform aimed at full equality within the state for citizens and exiled refugees as well as the cessation of military occupation. It is deliberately silent as to how and whether Palestinians should assume a form of indigenous governance or whether they should be absorbed into a single state with Jewish nationals. It aims to create a rights-based platform for Palestinians without supplanting a national liberation platform and struggle, formerly offered by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). n176 Ultimately, the BDS Call is a tactic and not a strategy, let alone a national liberation movement. Even as a tactic, the three-pronged demands of the Call explicitly put into question the race-based distribution of fundamental rights such as those to family, water, land, livelihood, culture, and nationhood. It effectively highlights the abnormality of Israel's racially stratified regime of rights and privileges. By representing Palestinian interests as a holistic national body, the Call shatters the imaginary partitions that fragment Palestinians. It insists that Israel maintains a uniform policy towards all Palestinians regardless of legal jurisdiction and geographic residence. [*102] The movement also upends a narrative of peacemaking between two counterparts. Instead, it highlights the power disparity inherent in a settler-colonial relationship between colonial power and colonial subject. In fact, the BDS movement explicitly draws upon the example of the movement aimed at dismantling Apartheid in South Africa. The highest echelons of the Israeli State have maligned the BDS Call as bigotry towards Jews and declared the non-violent global solidarity movement the second most significant threat to Israel following a nuclear-capable Iran. n177 The anxieties engendered by BDS reflect an anxiety around the normalization of Jewish national supremacy and the loss of its attendant distribution of goods and rights. The Israeli Government has expressed these anxieties in several legislative initiatives. In 2011, the Knesset passed an amendment to its Budget Foundations Law, which authorizes the Finance Minister to revoke funding for organizations that challenge Israel's Jewish character and/or that commemorate its Independence Day as a day of mourning for Palestinians. n178 Better known as the "Nakba Law," the legislation aims to chill free speech in order to consecrate revisionist narratives of the State's establishment. In 2011, the Knesset also passed the "Anti-Boycott Law" authorizing the Finance Minister to revoke funding or remove tax breaks from Israeli NGOs that support boycott of any Israeli products even if limited to the OPT. n179 Whereas previous laws have enshrined the exclusion, dispossession, and concentration of Palestinians, these reactionary measures seek to prevent protest to them. In doing so, the State is protecting value of Jewish national supremacy. Moreover, it is protecting the eligibility of Jews to acquire European Whiteness. This eligibility, however is premised on an exclusionary logic that meted structural and physical violence onto Europe's Jewry. Rather than subvert it, Israel and its defenders are entrenching this logic and equating the destruction of Israel's colonial arrangement with existential violence against Jews, writ large. It should appear ironic that rather than combat the racist frameworks constitutive of Zionist thought, the Israeli Government is combating the movement that seeks to unsettle them. This point has not been lost on all. The BDS movement has been a deeply politicizing space committed to anti-subordination principles across race, class, and gender axes. The movement has engendered spaces for discussions otherwise foreclosed by the looming threat of being labeled anti-Semitic. Though there exists a countermovement to frame BDS itself as a form of anti-Semitism, it continues to challenge Israel's distorting national security and civilizational [*103] narratives. n180 It has the potential to engender still more discussions that illuminate the relationship between Jewish exclusion in Europe, Zionism's internalization of anti-Semitism, its violent deployment against Middle Eastern Jews, and its genocidal commitment towards Palestinians as raised here in this essay. What is the relationship between these (ongoing) violent episodes? What is at stake if we do not examine them? What is to be gained if we do? BDS's greatest contribution is that it has created the space to ask precisely these questions. Legal Topics: http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 15 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM For related research and practice materials, see the following legal topics: GovernmentsNative AmericansProperty RightsLabor & Employment LawDiscriminationRacial DiscriminationCoverage & DefinitionsMilitary & Veterans LawMilitary JusticeJurisdictionAssimilation FOOTNOTES: n1. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1709 (1993). n2. Ella Shohat, Reflections by an Arab Jew, Bint Jbeil, http://www.bintjbeil.com/E/occu pation/arab jew.html (last visited June 8, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/RB48-WNQL. n3. Id. n4. Edward Said, Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims, Social Text No. 1 (Winter, 1979) at 24-26. n5. See, e.g., George Bush Keynote Address Saban Forum 2008, The Brookings Institution (Dec. 5, 2008), http://www.brookings.edu//media/events/2008/12/05mid dleeast/1205 middle east bush keynote.pdf%5C, archived at http://perma.cc/SU 2S-8ZQG; Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,, Opening Statements for Subcommittee Hearing: The Palestinian Authority, Israel and the Peace Process: What's Next?, House Committee on Foreign Affairs - Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa (May 8, 2014), available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-palestinian-authority-israel-and-peace-process-what-s-next, archived at http://perma.cc/KY42-77NT [begin at 2:15]; Menendez Statement on Senate Passage of Resolution Supporting Israel during Operation Protective Edge, United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (July 17, 2014), http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/menendez-statementon-senate-passage-of-resolution-support ing-israel-during-operation-protective-edge, archived at http://perma.cc/2TD2-AB G4; Chairman Menendez Delivers Remarks to AIPAC Policy Conference (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/chairman-menendez-delivers remarks-to-aipac-policy-conference, archived at http://perma.cc/AVJ3-JMC8; Michelle Nichols, U.S. blocks U.N. Security Council action Israel, Gaza conflict (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/20/us-palestinians-israel-un-id USBRE8AJ0YL20121120, archived at http://perma.cc/CQ3Z-WUNV. n6. See, e.g., Prime Minister's Office, Full text of Prime Minister Netanyahu's UN Speech, Jerusalem Post (Sep. 29, 2014), http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Full-text-of-Prime-Minister-Netanyahus-UN-speech-376626, archived at http://perma.cc /TY9E-AS5W; Philip Weiss, Democratic Party leader echoes Netanyahu's new theme: Hamas equals ISIS Mondoweiss, Mondoweiss (Aug. 21, 2013), http://mondoweiss .net/2014/08/democratic-netanyahus-equals, archived at http://perma.cc/KAX5-94NX; Naftali Bennett, Hamas, ISIS and the nature of terrorism, Chicago Tribune (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-isis-target-europe-middle-east-conflicthamas-i-20140824-story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/37LX-ZF4M; Naftali Bennett, Bennett on BBC: "Hamas & ISIS want to create a global Chaliphite from Bagdad, Tel Aviv, to London," Youtube (Aug. 20, 2014), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T1fcAPaf42Y [begin at 2:49]; Philip Weiss, Hamas is ISIS for dummies, Mondoweiss (Sep. 4, 2014), http://mondoweiss.net/2014/09/hamas-isis-dummies; Dimi Rider, Netanyahu tweets Foley execution shot to score points against Hamas, +972 Magazine (Aug. 22, 2014), http://972mag.com/netanyahu-tweets-foleyexecution-video-to-score-points-against-ha mas/95820/, archived at http://perma.cc/X6KM-54U8; Alan M. Dershowitz, ISIS is to America as Hamas is to Israel, Gatestone Institute Online (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4637/isis-is-to-america-as-hamas-is-to-israel#.VBKi0rc Kugt.twitter, archived at http://perma.cc/95UP-RNC3; Jennifer C. Braceras, Prez doesn't get Islamic terrorism, Boston Herald (Aug. 26, 2014), available at http://www.bostonherald.com/news opinion/opinion/op ed/2014/08/braceras prez doesn t get islamic terrorism, archived at http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 16 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM http://perma.cc/K9ET-LEXG; Brigitte Gabriel, Brigitte Gabriel gives fantastic answer to Muslim woman claiming all Muslims are portrayed badly, Youtube (June 18, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= Ry3NzkAOo3s&featureyoutu.be [begin at 1:22]; Brigitte Gabriel keynote speaker at United Nations, Youtube (Sep. 9, 2014), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9oK7lcu2iqY [begins at 6:24]; Rich Lowry, Of Course It is Islam, Politico (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/charlie-hebdo-of-course-it-is-islam-114277.html; archived at http://perma.cc/FEJ4-LHMU. n7. See, e.g., David Margolis, Who Are the Palestinians, My Jewish Learning, http://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/who-are-the-palestinians/ (last visited May 31, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ZNM6-QBRV. n8. Annelien de Dijn, The Politics of Enlightenment: From Peter Gay To Jonathan Israel, 55 Hist. J. 785, 786 (2012) (noting that Enlightenment was "a revolutionary force that contributed to the making of modern, political culture" and resulted in the eventual triumph of liberal democracies). n9. Id. n10. George M. Fredrickson, Racism: A Short History (2002) (noting that the "eighteenth-century ethnologists opened the way to a secular or scientific racism by considering human beings part of the animal kingdom rather than viewing them in biblical terms as children of God endowed with spiritual capacities denied to other creatures."). Id. at 57. n11. Hannah Arendt, The Jewish Writings 84 (Jerome Kohn & Ron H. Feldman eds., 2007). n12. Fredrickson, supra note 10, at 56 ("The scientific thought of the Enlightenment was a precondition for the growth of modern racism based on physical typology."). n13. Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust 68-69 (1989). n14. Id. at 18 (Bauman notes: "The bureaucratic culture which prompts us to view society as an object of administration, as a collection of so many 'problems' to be solved, as 'nature' to be 'controlled', 'mastered' and 'improved' or 'remade', as a legitimate target for 'social engineering', and in general a garden to be designed and kept in the planned shape by force (the gardening posture divides vegetation into 'cultured plants' to be taken care of, and weeds to be exterminated), was the very atmosphere in which the idea of the holocaust could be conceived, slowly yet consistently developed, and brought to its conclusion."). http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 17 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM n15. Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, The Zionist Return to the West and the Mizrahi Jewish Perspective, in Orientalism and the Jews 162 (Ivan Davidson Kalmar & Derek Jonathan Penslar eds., 2005). n16. Id. at 163. n17. Arendt, supra note 11, at 46; see also Christian Wilhelm Von Dohm, Concerning the Amelioration of the Civil Status of the Jews, in The Jew In The Modern World 32 (Paul R. Mendes-Flohr & Jehuda Reinharz eds., 1980), available at https://web.duke.edu/secmod/primarytexts/JewishEmancipation.pdf. In his argument for Jewish emancipation, Von Dohm suggests that Christians would have preferential status in certain matters, "at least until the Jews by wiser treatment are changed into entirely equal citizens and all differences polished off." n18. Id. at 4. The triumph of reason made the Jew eligible for assimilation but only by the obliteration of any markers of distinction. n19. Sherene Seikaly & Max Ajl, Of Europe: Zionism and the Jewish Other, in Europe after Derrida: Crisis and Potentiality 120-133 (2013). n20. Bauman, through his mention of phrenology, acknowledges an aesthetic ideal, see Bauman, supra note 13, at 69. Fredrickson proposes European notions of beauty, favoring paleness and certain features, were constructed by discoveries of Greek and Roman statuary. Fredrickson, supra note 10, at 59. n21. Adam Sutcliffe, Can a Jew Be a Philosophe? Isaac de Pinto, Voltaire, and Jewish Participation in the European Enlightenment, 6 Jewish Soc. Stud. Hist. Cult. Soc. 37 (2000). In Voltaire's response to Isaac De Pinto, for example, Voltaire subtly mocks the Jewish philosophe by inviting him to reject his Jewishness, a task Voltaire considers impossible. n22. Aziza Khazzoom, The Great Chain of Orientalism: Jewish Identity, Stigma Management, and Ethnic Exclusion in Israel, 68 Am. Sociol. Rev. 490-91 (2003). n23. Id. at 491 (quoting Dan Miron, A Traveler Disguised: A Study in the Rise of Modern Jewish Fiction in the Nineteenth Century (1973)). http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 18 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM n24. Seikaly & Ajl, supra note 19, at 120. n25. Khazzoom, supra note 22 at 493. Using Goffman's concept of stigmatization, Khazzoom explains how Jews internationalized the negative description: "As they increasingly adopted the east/west dichotomy and its hierarchy of cultures, a number of concepts became fused in the Jewish worldview. These included: enlightenment, progress, modernity, secularism, rationality, reason, and non-Jewish Western European culture. As in the larger, non-Jewish European community, these concepts were translated into binary, oppositional categories, under the umbrella of the east/west dichotomy, and given a moral connotation. But, since Jews initially placed themselves on the non-progressive, ignorant end of the east/west dichotomy, it was their own origins that became the central symbols of degeneracy and backwardness." Id. n26. Arendt, supra note 11, at 9. n27. Khazzoom, supra note 22, at 494. n28. Arendt, supra note 11, at 84. n29. Id. n30. Id. at 61. n31. Id. at 84. n32. Id. at 46. n33. Adam Gopnik, Trial of the Century: Revisiting the Dreyfus affair, The New Yorker (Sep. 8, 2009), available at: http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/09/28/trial-of-the-century, archived at http://perma.cc/423A-MQWU. Albert Dreyfus, an Alsatian Jew living in Paris and serving in the French army, was accused and wrongfully convicted of treason in a controversial trial during which the scant evidence against him was kept secret and after which subsequent media coverage and public commentary set off anti-semitic riots around France and Algiers. For assimilated European Jews, including Herzl, who was covering the Dreyfus affair as a reporter for a Vienna newspaper, the miscarriage of justice and outburst of anti-semitic rhetoric against Dreyfus, whose life had been dedicated to military service to the nation, and his supporters http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 19 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM represented the failure and impossibility of Jewish assimilation in France, which had been its most promising setting, and by extension throughout the rest of Europe. n34. Raz-Krakotzkin, supra note 15, at 170. n35. Seikaly & Ajl, supra note 19. n36. Yehouda Shenhav, The Arab Jews: A Postcolonial Reading of Nationalism, Religion, and Ethnicity 79 ("Jews came to Palestine as a result of the activity of European secular Zionist functionaries who engaged in the 'engineering of nationalism'; they also manipulated Jewish religious sentiments by imbuing them with national (secular and universal) colors."). n37. Ivan Davidson Kalmar and Derek Jonathan Penslar note: Zionism galvanized the energies of portions of modernizing Jewry because it promised a national rejuvenation and political independence for an oppressed minority. Indeed, the culture of Zionist and other modernizing Jewish intellectuals closely resembled that of colonial intelligentsias. Both Jewish and colonial elites recast their history to speak of past glories that were lost in part because of the shackles of tradition that destroyed their people's potential for technical and scientific progress. Both imagined themselves, too, as emasculated and feminized, and presented their national movements as capable of instilling vigorous masculine character into the body politic. Ivan Davidson Kalmar & Derek Jonathan Penslar, Orientalism and the Jews xxxvi (2005). n38. Shenhav, supra note 36, at 80. n39. Id. at 81. n40. Joseph Massad, The Persistence of the Palestinian Question: Essays on Zionism and the Palestinians 56 (2006) ("The New Jew, in fact, would share nothing with diaspora Jews except their common pre-Israel history. Zionism's commitment to cosmopolitan European gentile culture as the identitarian basis for the New Jew led Georges Friedmann to assert that Israel in fact 'constitutes a new kind of assimilation liable to produce generations of Hebrew-speaking Gentiles.'") (internal quotation marks omitted); Georges Friedmann, The End of the Jewish People? 243-45 (1967). http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 20 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM n41. Raz-Krakotzkin, supra note 15, at 165 ("Jews did not necessarily challenge the dichotomies (or the classification itself) and in fact often reproduced them through an identification with the images and ideals attributed to the 'West,' distancing themselves from the negative characteristics attributed to the 'East.' ... . Jewish orientalist discourse was established as an attempt to distinguish between the Western Jew and the oriental Muslim. The process of assimilation was associated with an attempt to de-orientalize the Jew, or else to adopt the image of the East as a source of ancient Jewish wisdom and noble origins."). n42. Kalmar & Penslar, supra note 37, at xxxviii ("Hegemonic Zionist sensibility feminized the oriental Jew as irrational, sensual, inconstant, and weak, just as European discourse had feminized the Jew (and the oriental in general) for centuries before."), n43. Seikaly & Ajl, supra note 19, at 124 (quoting Ammiel Alcalay After Jews and Arabs: Remaking Levantine Culture 31 (1993)). n44. Massad, supra note 40, at 58. Jabotinsky also noted in 1926 that the "Jews, thank God, have nothing in common with the East. We must put an end to any trace of the Oriental spirit in the [native] Jews of Palestine." In an earlier article entitled "Jews of the East," he opposed mixed marriages with non-European Jews and the creation of a single Jewish people. He added that he was opposed to any integration because he did not know whether this would result in "a brilliant people or a dull race. Ashkenazi Jews had to preserve their majority status in Jewish society in Palestine." (internal citations omitted). n45. Said, supra note 4, at 12; see also Kalmar & Penslar, supra note 37, at xxxvi (noting that "the Jew becomes simultaneously colonized and colonizer, throwing off the yoke of gentile domination while assuming a mission civilisatrice to revivify an allegedly barren land as a means to regenerating the Jewish people) (emphasis in original). n46. See Ella Shohat, Rupture and Return: Zionist Discourse and the Study of Arab Jews, 21 Social Text 49, 64-65 (2003) [hereinafter Shohat, Rupture and Return]; see also Massad, supra note 40, at 168 ("In the new settler colony, Jews would no longer be 'dirty,' 'cunning,' 'parasitical,' 'lazy,' 'superstitious,' 'weak,' 'effeminate,' as anti-Semitism and Zionism posited them, but would become hardworking, scientifically minded, strong, rational, clean, and civilized--in short, European."). n47. Shohat, Rupture and Return, supra note 46, at 62. n48. Id. n49. Shohat, Reflections by an Arab Jew, supra note 2 ("When my grandmother first encountered Israeli society in the '50s, she was convinced that http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 21 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM the people who looked, spoke and ate so differently--the European Jews--were actually European Christians. Jewishness for her generation was inextricably associated with Middle Easterness. My grandmother, who still lives in Israel and still communicates largely in Arabic, had to be taught to speak of 'us' as Jews and 'them' as Arabs."). n50. Ctr. for Religious Tolerance, Shlomit Lir on Mizrahi Jews in Israel: Interviewed by Andrea Blanch, PhD 3 (Mar. 10, 2009), available at http://www.c-r-t.org/content/research/shlomit.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HVF5-DZZB ("At the beginning of Israel, the government radiated healthy Mizrahi children as part of an experiment on Tinea captitis (a skin disease). There are hundreds of Yemenite and Mizrahi babies who disappeared and the claims are that they were kidnapped from parents and turned over for adoption. There is a movie that documents cases of women whose babies were taken from them the moment they stepped off the plane."). n51. Shohat, Reflections by an Arab Jew, supra note 2 ("our uprootedness or ambiguous positioning within Israel itself, where we have been systematically discriminated against by institutions that deployed their energies and material to the consistent advantage of European Jews and to the consistent disadvantage of Oriental Jews."). n52. Id. n53. Henriette Dahan Kalev, Tensions in Israeli Feminism: The Mizrahi-Ashkenazi Rift (2001), available at http://www.hakeshet.org.il/english/Tensions.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/T5Y3-7XUC. n54. Massad, supra note 40, at 62. n55. Shohat, Rupture and Return, supra note 46, at 59. ("The word 'pogrom' itself, it must be noted, derives from and is reflective of the EasternEuropean Jewish experience."). Shtetl is also derived from Eastern-Europe where Jews lived in small villages and adhered to Jewish religious norms. Here, Shohat is describing how these Eastern-European references were used to describe the lives of Middle Eastern Jews supplanting the specificities of their experiences. n56. Ctr. for Religious Tolerance, supra note 50. n57. Shohat, Rupture and Return, supra note 46, at 71. http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 22 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM n58. Id. n59. Yehouda Shenhav, Beyond the Two State Solution: A Jewish Political Essay, 49-52. (2012). n60. Id. at 50. Job prospects included "Arabic teachers, translators, the military officers and Civil Administration employees, the security organization officers--especially the Intelligene Corp or the Mossad--the curriculum inspectors in the Education Ministry, the bankers, the lawyers, the agricultural advisers and the Arabic-speaking workers of the Broadcasting Authority and Israeli Radio." n61. Id. In 1977, the Likud Party won elections for the first time in three decades. This marked the ascendance of the right, constituted of Mizrahim and religious elements, in Israeli politics. n62. Id. at 48. n63. Id. at 49. During a campaign speech for the Knesset in 2002, Yosef Lapid said, "[I am concerned because] we reside in the corrupt, lazy, retarded environment of the Midddle East ... what holds us above the water is our cultural difference. The fact we are a forepost of Western civilization. But if our Westernness is eroded, we won't have a chance ... if we let the East-European ghetto [of religious Zionism] and the northAfrican ghetto [the Shas Sephardic Party] take over, we won't have anything to float on. We will merge into the Semitic region and will be lost in a horrific Levantine mess."). Id. n64. Law of Return 5710-1950, passed by the Knesset on July 5, 1950 and published in Sefer HaChukkim (Book of Laws), no. 51, p. 159; see also English translation: http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfa-archive/1950-1959/pages/law%20of%20return%20 5710-1950.aspx [Hereinafter "Law of Return"]. n65. Citizenship Law, 5712-1952, passed by the Knesset on April 1 1952; see also English translation: http://www.israellawresourcecenter.org/israellaws/fulltext/nationalitylaw.htm [Hereinafter "Citizenship Law"]. n66. Ilan Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine 21 (2007). n67. Walid Khalidi, One Century After World War I and the Balfour Declaration: Palestine and Palestine Studies, Jadaliyya (Aug. 31, 2014), http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 23 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/in dex/19048/one-century-after-world-war-i-and-the-balfour-decl. n68. See, e.g., Golda Meir Scorns Soviets: Israeli Premier Explains Stand on Big-4 Talks, Security, Wash. Post, (June 16, 1969) ("There were no such thing as Palestinians. When was there an independent Palestinian people with a Palestinian state? It was either southern Syria before the First World War, and then it was a Palestine including Jordan. It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist."). n69. Said, supra note 4, at 25-26. n70. Pappe, supra note 66, at Chapter 4, Finalising a Master Plan, and Chapter 5, The Blueprint for Ethnic Cleansing: Plan Dalet. n71. See Institute for Middle East Understanding (June 27, 2012), http://imeu.org/article/faq-on-the-nakba-the-nakba-and-palestinian-refugees-today, archived at http: //perma.cc/U7HW-CJLY. n72. Said, supra note 4, at 29. n73. Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native, J. of Genocide Res. (2006) 387-409, available at http://www.kooriweb.org/foley/resources/pdfs/89. pdf. n74. Law of Return, supra note 64. n75. Id. n76. Id. http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 24 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM n77. Jonathan Cook, Court nixes push for "Israeli nationality," Al Jazeera (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/10/courtnixes-push-israeli-nationality-20131017115755321289.html, archived at http://perma.cc/43MD-RK36. n78. Moshe Gorali, So this Jew, Arab, Georgian and Samaritan go to court ... , Haaretz (Dec. 28, 2013), http://www.haaretz.com/printedition/features/so-this-jew-arab-georgian-and-samaritan-go-to-court-1.109982, archived at http://perma.cc/QR9L-LJP9. n79. See Elizabeth Grieco, Defining 'Foreign Born' and 'Foreigner' in International Migration Statistics, Migration Policy Institute (July 1, 2002), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/defining-foreign-born-and-foreigner-international-migration-statis tics, archived at http://perma.cc/5JGULVQA. This is similar to the distinction between jus sanguinis and jus soli but with significant distinctions. The rights to citizenship belong to Jewish nationals regardless of whether or not they are descendants of citizens of the State. In contrast, Palestinian descendants of, even Israeli citizens, cannot claim citizenship in the same way. Palestinian citizens of Israel can also pass along their Israeli citizenship if they were born in Israel because the principle of jus sanguinis is only available to one generation born outside of Israel. This hurdle poses no impediment to descendants of Jewish Israelis because they can automatically acquire Israeli citizenship by the Law of Return. In contrast, the second generation of Palestinian citizens of Israel born abroad are ineligible for such citizenship and therefore excluded as a matter of law. n80. The Discriminatory Laws Database, Adalah (May 30, 2012), http://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/7771, archived at http://perma.cc/CZ3CJBMK. n81. Id. n82. A report commissioned by Adalah notes that: A range of public spending policies initiated by Israel privilege the Jewish majority, compounding the inequitable allocation of state resources. One of the main tools employed by the state to channel public funds towards Jewish citizens is conditioning eligibility for public services and economic benefits on the performance of 'military service.' The vast majority of Palestinian citizens of Israel are exempted from military service and do not serve in the Israeli army, for political and historical reasons. Thus the use of this criterion as a condition for awarding economic benefits discriminates against them on the basis of their national belonging and violates their right to equal enjoyment of various public services. By employing this criterion, the state is violating its duty to serve as a trustee for the entire public on an equal basis. Significantly, individuals who have served in the Israeli military already receive substantial compensation under The Absorption of Discharged Soldiers Law (1994), which enumerates the broad range of social and economic benefits to which discharged soldiers are entitled, including housing and educational grants. Katie Hesketh et al., Adalah, The Inequality Report: The Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel 24 (2011), available at http://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/upfiles/2011/Adalah The Inequality Report March 2011.pdf. n83. Illan Peleg & Dov Waxman, Israel's Palestinians: The Conflict Within 43 (2011) ("Year after year, numerous Israeli non-governmental organizations have demonstrated that Arab municipalities received significantly less money from the government for the development of their physical infrastructure (that is, roads, electricity, sewage, water, etc.) than their Jewish counterparts. In fact, Arab towns in Israel even receive less http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 25 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM money for development than Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories."). n84. U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2008 Human Rights Report: Israel and the Occupied Territories (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119117.htm, archived at http://perma. cc/GD65-BEDV ("Arab Israelis were underrepresented in most fields of employment, including government, despite a five-year-old affirmative action program to promote hiring Arab Israelis (including Druze and Bedouin) in the civil service. According to the government, 6.2 percent of government employees in 2007 were Arab."). n85. Peleg & Waxman, supra note 83. n86. Id. at 44 ("Persistent inequality in government funding has particularly affected the Arab educational system. Public spending on education per child in Arab localities is about one-third lower than in predominantly Jewish municipalities.") (internal citations omitted). n87. See infra sections IV(a)(i)-(iii). n88. Specific components of the policy of population transfer amount to war crimes under the Rome Statute (arts. 7 and 8) and the Geneva Convention IV (arts. 49 and 147). The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the former Commission on Human Rights has clearly defined population transfer as: the movement of people as a consequence of political and/or economic processes in which the State Government or State-authorized agencies participate. These processes have a number of intended or unintended results that affect the human rights of the transferred population, as well as the inhabitants of an area into which settlers are transferred. (...) The State's role may involve financial subsidies, planning, public information, military action, recruitment of settlers, legislation or other judicial action, and even the administration of justice. n89. Law of Return, supra note 64. n90. Citizenship Law, supra note 65 at 2(c)(1). n91. Id. http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 26 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM n92. Id. n93. U.N. Comm. on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, The Right of Return of the Palestinian People (1978), http://unispal. un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/805C731452035912852569D1005C1201, archived at http://perma.cc/BJG9-VSZR. n94. Hesketh et al., supra note 82, at 14, 16. n95. See Sergio Dellapergola, The Jewish People Policy Institute, Jewish Demographic Policies: Population Trends and Options in Israel and in the Diaspora (2011), available at http://jppi.org.il/uploads/Jewish Demographic Policies.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/P2X6-A96P. Zionism envisioned that Israel's Jewish population would be 80%. Given the natural population growth of Palestinians, this is clearly untenable. The anxiety around this reality has become part of Israel's mainstream discourse. As Dellapergola notes: Today the growth rates of Palestinian Arabs in the State of Israel and in the west Bank and Gaza are nearly double those of the Jewish population. Were the same demographic trends to continue, by 2020 the percent of Jews (including all the non-Jewish members of their nuclear families) in Israel's total population would decline to 77%, that of Jews out of the total population of Israel plus the West Bank (without Gaza) would decline to 56%, and that of Jews out of the total population between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan river would approach 47%. Id. at 17. n96. Amnon Barzilai, More Israeli Jews favor transfer of Palestinians, Israeli Arabs - poll finds, Haaretz (Mar. 12, 2002), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/more-israeli-jews-favor-transfer-of-palestinians-israeli-arabs-poll-finds-1.50646, archived at http://perma.cc/U3JG-ANP7 (noting that 46% of Israelis polled support the forcible transfer of Palestinian citizens out of the country). n97. The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (temporary provision) 5763 - 2003. English translation: http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/citizenship law.htm. n98. Id. Significantly, the listed enemy states are those home to a significant Palestinian population including the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Syria as well as Iran and Iraq. n99. The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (temporary provision) 5763-2003 (Unofficial Translation), available at http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 27 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM http://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/Public/files /Discriminatory-Laws-Database/English/41-Citizenship-and-Entry-into-Israel-Law-TemporaryOrder-2003.pdf. n100. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of Israel, para. 21, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4/2014 (Nov. 21, 2014), available at http://unispal.un.org.mutex.gmu.edu/UNISPAL.NSF/0/724DA0C48E837F0A85257D9A 0070D766, archived at http://perma.cc/3TBB-9G7T ("The Committee reiterates its concern (CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3, para. 15) regarding the disproportionate and adverse restrictions imposed by the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Provision) which suspends the possibility, with certain rare exceptions, of family reunification of Israeli citizens with Palestinian spouses living in the West Bank, East Jerusalem or Gaza Strip or with spouses living in several States classified by the State party as 'enemy States.' It also expresses concern at the decision of the High Court of Justice of 11 January 2012 upholding the constitutionality of this Law (arts. 17, 23, 24 and 26)"). n101. Adalah Case Review: The Israeli Supreme Court's Decision in the Citizenship and Family Unification Law Case, 91 Adalah's Newsletter at 3, 7 (Adalah, Haifa, Isr.) (Mar. 2012) ("Citizenship Law is explicitly directed against Arab citizens of Israel solely on the basis of their national belonging. It creates a third track to naturalization in the State of Israel. The first and highest track is for Jewish people, who can gain citizenship immediately and automatically under the Law of Return (1950). The second track is for foreigners, to whom the graduated naturalization procedure applies, allowing them to obtain Israeli residency or citizenship status over a years-long period from the date of submitting the application. The third and lowest track is for the spouses of Arabs citizens who are from the OPT, Iran, Iraq, Syria or Lebanon."). n102. Noam Sheizaf, Court Okays Citizenship Law, Legalizing Discrimination of Arabs, 972 Mag. (Jan. 12, 2012), http://972mag.com/high-courtokays-citizenship-law-legaliz ing-racial-discrimination-of-arabs/32802/, archived at http://perma.cc/Q8VX-KW4J. n103. Israel: High Court Rulings Undermine Human Rights, Human Rights Watch (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/30/israel-highcourt-rulings-under mine-human-rights (In 2007, the Committee that oversees compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination recommended that Israel "reconsider its policy with a view to facilitating family reunification on a non-discriminatory basis," and "ensure that restrictions on family reunification are strictly necessary and limited in scope, and are not applied on the basis of nationality, residency or membership of a particular community."). n104. Id. n105. Id. n106. Adalah Case Review, supra note 101, at 1, 7. n107. Israel's High Court Exposes Israeli Apartheid Regime, BADIL Res. Ctr. for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 28 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM http://www.badil.org/en/press-re leases/142-2012/3399-press-eng-01. n108. Id. n109. Ctr. on Hous. Rights and Evictions (COHRE) & BADIL Res. Ctr. for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, Ruling Palestine: A History of the Legally Sanctioned Jewish-Israeli Seizure of Land and Housing in Palestine (May 2005), available at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/opt prot cohre seizure of land and housing in palestine may 2005.pdf. n110. Absentees' Property Law, 5710-1950, 4 LSI 68 (1948-1987) (Isr.). n111. The Absentees' Property Law together with the Development Authority Law, the JNF Law, and the Basic Law: Israel Lands is only a component of the laws that dispossess native Palestinians. For a more robust discussion of Israel's discriminatory land laws, see supra note 84. n112. Id. n113. Id. n114. Adalah to Attorney General and Custodian of Absentee Property: Israel's Sale of Palestinian Refugee Property Violates Israeli and International Law, Adalah (June 22, 2009), http://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/7003. n115. Id. n116. Usama Halabi, Israel's Absentees' Property Law: A Tool for Taking Control of Palestinian Land The Application of the Law in Occupied East Jerusalem, Prospects of Judicial and Political Struggle 5-6 (Civic Coal. for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem ed., 2013). http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 29 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM n117. Id. at 6. n118. Id. n119. Walter Lehn & Uri Davis, The Jewish National Fund 24, 26, 70 (1988). n120. See BADIL Staff, The Jewish National Fund (JNF), al-majdal, Summer 2007, at 48. n121. Id. at 51. Response of the JNF, dated December 2004, to a petition filed by Adalah to the Supreme Court of Israel - HC 9205/04. n122. See Alaa Mahajneh, Situating the JNF in Israel's Land Laws, al-majdal, Winter-Spring 2010, at 30-32. n123. Israel Lands Law, 5720-1960, 14 LSI 49 (1948-1987). n124. U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, supra note 84. n125. Discrimination Against Palestinian Citizens of Israel, Inst. for Middle East Understanding (Sept. 28, 2011), http://imeu.org/article/discrimination-against-palestin ian-citizens-of-israel. n126. Nurit Yaffe & Dorith Tal, The Arab Population in Israel 3 (State of Isr. Cent. Bureau of Statistics ed., 2002). n127. See Administrative Petition 21030-11-12 Municipality of Nazareth vs. Israel Land Administration, available at http://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/Public/files/Arabic /Legal Advocacy/Nazareth Court Decision.pdf; See also District Court Refuses to Cancel "Security Forces" Condition as Prerequisite for Bidding for Plots of Land in Arab Nazareth, Adalah (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 30 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM http://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/7915. n128. Id. n129. Hesketh et al., supra note 82, at 32. n130. Law to Amend the Cooperative Societies Ordinance (No. 8), 5771-2011, Book of Laws 2286 (Isr.). An English translation of the law is available at: http://www. adalah.org/upfiles/2011/discriminatory laws 2011/Admissions Committees Law 2011 English.pdf. The original Hebrew version of the law can be found at: http://www.knesset.gov.il/Laws/Data/law/2286/2286.pdf (pp. 683-686). n131. H.C. 6698/95 Aadel Ka'adan v. Israel Lands Administration 54(1) PD 258 [2000] (Isr.); See also Joel Greenberg, Israeli Court Rules Arab Couple Can Live in Jewish Area, N.Y. Times (Mar. 9, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/09/world/israeli-court-rules-arab-couple-can-live-injewish-area.html. n132. Id. n133. Jack Khoury & Jonathan Lis, Israeli Towns Continue to Rewrite Bylaws to Keep Arabs Out, Haaretz (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israeli -towns-continue-to-rewrite-bylaws-to-keep-arabs-out-1.330844. n134. Hesketh et al., supra note 82, at 32. n135. See Israel Land Administration (ILA) Decision No. 1015, of Aug. 1, 2004. n136. Hesketh et al., supra note 82, at 32. http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 31 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM n137. Sawsan Zaher, Adalah, On the Israeli Government's New Decision Classifying Communities as National Priority Areas 7 (2010), http://www.ampalestine.org/Resources/NationalPriorityAreas.pdf. n138. See Peleg & Waxman, supra note 83, at 43-44. n139. Id. at 43 ("The Adva Center reported that in 2004 the Israeli government spent much more money on development in Jewish settlements in the West Bank than it did on Arab towns in Israel. The average per capita infrastructure grant from the government in 2004 was 1,241 shekels (NIS) in West Bank settlements, compared to only NIS 738 in Arab towns; the per capita grant for social, educational, health, and welfare services was NIS 1,949 in settlements, compared to NIS 1,346 in Arab towns."). n140. Adalah and the Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality, The Prawer-Begin Bill and the Forced Displacement of the Bedouin 5 (2013), http://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/Public/files/English/Publications/Articles/2013/Prawer-Begin-Plan-Background-Adalah.pdf. n141. Id. n142. Ben Hattem, The Negev Desert's Vanishing Bedouin, The Daily Beast (June 16, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/16/thenegev-desert-s-vanishing -bedouin.html. n143. Id. n144. Suhad Bishara et al., Adalah, Nomads Against Their Will the Attempted Expulsion of the Arab Bedouin in the Naqab: The Example of AtirUmm Al-Hieran 8 (2011), http://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/eng/publications/No mads%20Against%20their%20Will%20English%20pdf%20final.pdf. n145. Id. n146. Adalah and the Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality, Joint NGO Response to the State of Israel's Replies to the UN HRC's List of Issues (2014), http://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/Public/files/English/International Ad vocacy/UN/HRC-ICCPR/Adalah-NCF%20Report-HRCBedouin-Sep-2014.pdf. http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 32 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM n147. Adalah, supra note 140, at 2, 5 ("The Goldberg Committee report, an antecedent to the Prawer Plan, concedes this history, concluding, 'We cannot ignore the forced move of some of [the Bedouin tribes] to the Siyag after the establishment of the state, and that others possessed land in the Siyag for many years. It cannot be said about the tribes that have been there and about those who were moved that they are trespassers in the Siyag.'") (internal citations omitted). Report of the Goldberg Commission for policy proposals to regulate Bedouin settlement in the Negev, headed by retired Judge Eliezer Goldberg 27 (2008) [in Hebrew], available at http://www.moch.gov.il/SiteCollectionDocuments/odot/doch goldberg/Doch Vaada Shofet Goldberg.pdf. n148. Adalah, supra note 146. n149. Id. n150. Id. n151. Id. at 2. n152. Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality, Between Discrimination and Abandonment: The Bedouin Recognized Villages and the Jewish Settlements in the Negev (2014), http://www.dukium.org/eng/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/IDERD English.pdf. n153. Id. at 5-10. n154. Id. n155. Id. n156. Id. at 2. http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 33 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM n157. Adalah, supra note 140, at 1. n158. Id. at 2. n159. Id. n160. Challenging the ILA's Spraying of Crops Cultivated by Arab Bedouin in the Naqab, Adalah, http://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/6646 (last visited June 4, 2015). n161. Yolande Knell, Israel Sues Beduoin for $ 500,000 in Eviction Costs, BBC (July 27, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east14314883. n162. Adalah, supra note 146, at 6-7 ("In February 2013, the [Israeli Supreme Court] rejected a petition to connect the village of Umm el-Hieran to the national water network, ruling that the village's current source of water - bought from a private citizen 4 kilometers away and at exorbitantly high prices - constituted 'sufficient access'. The decision contradicted a 2011 landmark ruling that all citizens of Israel, regardless of their legal status, possess the right to 'minimal access' to water, though it did not clarify what constituted minimal access. In effect, the court did not acknowledge Arab Bedouin citizens' right to be provided with water by the state, due to their residence in unrecognized villages, thereby sanctioning the inequality of their basic right."). n163. Mairav Zonszein, Bill to Displace Israel's Bedouin to be Scrapped, Prawer Architect Says, 972 Mag. (Dec. 12, 2013), http://972mag.com/billto-displace-israels-bedouin-to-be-scrapped-laws-drafter-says/83525/. n164. Mairav Zonszein, Prawer Plan May Not be Shelved After All, 972 Mag. (Dec. 16, 2013), http://972mag.com/prawer-plan-may-not-be-shelvedafter-all/83792/. n165. Id. http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 34 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM n166. Jared Sexton, The Vel of Slavery: Tracking the Figure of the Unsovereign, Critical Soc. (2014). n167. Id. at 3-4. n168. Id. at 4. n169. Gabriel Ash, The Meaning of Yair Lapid, Jadaliyya (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/9855/the-meaning-of-yair-lapid. n170. Id. n171. Andrea Smith, Indigeneity, Settler-Colonialism, and White Supremecy, 12 Global Dialogue 2, 7 (2010), available at http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=488. n172. Ella Shohat, Sephardim in Israel: Zionism from the Perspective of its Jewish Victims, Social Text 19/20, 34 (Autumn 1988), available at http://www.jstor.org.mutex.gmu.edu/stable/466176?origin=JSTOR-pdf&seq=1#page scan tab contents. n173. Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS, PACBI (July 9, 2005), http://www.bdsmove ment.net/call. n174. Id. n175. Id. http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 35 of 36 10/21/15, 12:18 PM n176. Noura Erakat, Beyond Sterile Negotiations: In Search for a Leadership with a Strategy, Al-Shabaka (Feb. 1, 2012), http://alshabaka.org/briefs/beyond-sterile-negotia tions-looking-leadership-strategy/. n177. Adam Horowitz, AIPAC ED fears the growing movement to sanction Israel could fundamentally change US policy towards Israel. He's right., Mondoweiss (May 7, 2009), available at http://mondoweiss.net/2009/05/howard-kohr bds#sthash.19Vbdqjk.dpuf. n178. Roni Schoken, Chilling effect of the Nakba Law on Israel's human rights, Haaretz (May 17, 2012), available at http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/chilling-effect-of-the-nakba-law-on-israel-s-human-rights-1.430942. n179. Yonah Jeremy Bob, How will the latest anti-boycott ruling effect BDS?, The Jerusalem Post (Apr. 17, 2015), available at http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/How-will-High-Courts-ruling-on-anti-boycott-law-affect-BDS-398401. n180. Sean Savage, Pro-Israel effort to combat BDS on U.S. state level gains steam, JNS.org (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.jns.org/latestarticles/2015/4/23/pro-israel-effort-to-combat-bds-on-us-state-level-gains-steam#.VVa bty4nFI=. http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/Print…4149850%2Fformatted_doc&fromCart=false&jobHandle=1826%3A534149850 Page 36 of 36