Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising: Filling the Protection Gap during Secondary Forced Displacement

N. Erakat

Palestinian refugees in the Middle East constitute a protracted refugee situation. In response to political considerations by multiple state actors, they are denied return to their homes of habitual residence and are refused meaningful legal protection in their host countries. As such Palestinians are suspended between their political objectification in a prolonged conflict on the one hand and the vulnerability of their humanitarian condition, like all other refugees, on the other. Unlike their refugee counterparts who are persons of concern to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Statute, Palestinian refugees endure an uneven legal regime. Since the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) fell into abeyance, no international agency has searched for durable solutions on behalf of Palestinian refugees, thus exposing them to a protection gap. Instead, the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA), established to furnish Palestinian refugees aid and relief, has provided them with incremental protection, which, however significant, has been insufficient to close the gap. The extent of this protection gap endured by Palestinian refugees has been vividly demonstrated during several episodes of secondary forced displacement in the Middle East. In response to their mass expulsion from Kuwait in 1991, Libya in 1996, and Iraq in 2003, UNRWA and UNHCR have closely collaborated in order to bridge this gap and provide Palestinian refugees with adequate protection. These incidents of inter-agency collaboration constitute de facto policies between the two agencies, which demonstrate the flexibility of otherwise rigid delineations between their existing mandates. In particular, past practice makes clear that UNRWA and UNCHR can have overlapping geographic and operational mandates. During the most recent crisis in Syria, these de facto policies have proven inadequate to protect Palestinian refugees. To overcome this challenge, UNHCR and UNRWA should formalize their inter-agency collaboration on behalf of Palestinian refugees during times of calm as well as crisis in conformity with the spirit of the UNHCR Statute and the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as with past practice. Beyond crisis, the agencies should consider innovative approaches to definitively close the protection gap.

International Journal of Refugee Law, 2014, Vol. 26, No. 4, 581–621 doi:10.1093/ijrl/eeu047 Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising: Filling the Protection Gap during Secondary Forced Displacement Noura Erakat* * Assistant Professor, George Mason University; Adjunct Assistant Professor of International Human Rights Law in the Middle East, Georgetown University. his article beneits from the invaluable feedback of Andrew Schoenholtz, Elizabeth Campbell, Susan Akram, Francesca Albanese, Lex Takkenberg, Lance Bartholomeusz, Mark Brailsford, Lisa Gilliam, Catherine Richards, Leila Hilal, Roger Hearn, and Ahmed Ghappour. It would not have been possible without the many people who took the time to complete interviews with the author, including Kahin Ismail, Adam Shapiro, Kathryn Abu Zayd, Vincent Cochetel, Dominique Tohme, and Emily Krehm. Very special thanks, for research assistance, to Nishana Weerasooriya, Nusayba Hammad, and Nour Joudah. © he Author (2015). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions please email: journals. permissions@oup.com r Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 A B ST R A C T Palestinian refugees in the Middle East constitute a protracted refugee situation. In response to political considerations by multiple state actors, they are denied return to their homes of habitual residence and are refused meaningful legal protection in their host countries. Palestinians are therefore suspended between their political objectiication in a prolonged conlict on the one hand, and the vulnerability of their humanitarian condition, like all other refugees, on the other. Unlike their refugee counterparts who are persons of concern to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Palestinian refugees endure an uneven legal regime. Since the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) fell into abeyance, no international agency has searched for durable solutions on behalf of Palestinian refugees, thus exposing them to a protection gap. Instead, the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA), established to furnish Palestinian refugees with aid and relief, has provided them with incremental protection, which, however signiicant, has been insuicient to close the gap. he extent of this protection gap has been vividly demonstrated during several episodes of secondary forced displacement in the Middle East. In response to their mass expulsion from Kuwait in 1991, Libya in 1996, and Iraq in 2003, UNRWA and UNHCR have closely collaborated in order to bridge this gap and provide Palestinian refugees with adequate protection. hese incidents of inter-agency collaboration constitute de facto policies between the two agencies, which demonstrate the lexibility of otherwise rigid delineations between their existing mandates. In particular, past practice makes clear that UNRWA and UNCHR can have overlapping geographic and operational mandates. During the most recent crisis in Syria, these de facto policies have proven inadequate to protect Palestinian refugees. To overcome this challenge, UNHCR and UNRWA should formalize their inter-agency collaboration on behalf of Palestinian refugees during times of calm as well as crisis, in conformity with the spirit of the UNHCR Statute and the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as with past practice. Beyond crisis, the agencies should consider innovative approaches to deinitively close the protection gap. r Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising 1. I N T RO D U CT I O N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Syria: ‘A Full-Scale Displacement and Humanitarian Crisis with No Solutions in Sight’ (2013) <htp://www.internal-displacement.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/syria/2012/a-full-scaledisplacement-and-humanitarian-crisis-with-no-solutions-in-sight> accessed 15 Dec 2013. UNHCR, ‘Syria Regional Refugee Response: Regional Overview’ (2013) <htp://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional. php> accessed 15 Dec 2013. UNRWA, ‘Syria Crisis Situation Update: Issue 62’ (29 Oct 2013) <htp://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/emergency-reports/ syria-crisis-response-update-issue-no-62-0> accessed 31 Oct 2013. Michael Dumper, ‘he Palestinians’ in G Loescher, J Milner, E Newman, G Troeller (eds), Protracted Refugee Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security Implications (1st edn, United Nations University Press, 2010) 189. UNHCR Executive Commitee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, ‘Protracted Refugee Situations’, UN doc EC/54/ SC/CRP.14, 10 June 2004. ibid. IDMC, above n 1, 191. he Palestinian situation, in part, is: ‘… derived from a transformation of the country of origin (Palestine) into a state based upon ethnicity (Israel)’); see Ruth Lapidoth, ‘Do Palestinian Refugees Have a Right to Return to Israel?’ (Israel Ministry of Foreign Afairs, 15 Jan 2001) <htp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/ Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Do+Palestinian+Refugees+Have+a+Right+to+Return+to.htm> accessed 10 Mar 2012. See, eg, Jaber Suleiman, ‘Marginalised Community: he Case of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon’ (Development Research Center on Migration, Globalisation, and Poverty, Apr 2006) <htp://www.migrationdrc.org/publications/research_ reports/JaberEdited.pdf> accessed 10 Mar 2012; see ‘Lebanon: End illegal discrimination against Palestinians, says Amnesty’ IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis (17 Oct 2007) <htp://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=74831> accessed 10 Mar 2012 (Palestinians are considered foreigners living temporarily in Lebanon). Inter-Agency Standing Commitee, ‘Growing the Sheltering Tree: Protecting Rights through Humanitarian Action’ (International Council of Voluntary Agencies 2002) <htps://icvanetwork.org/doc00000717.html> accessed 1 May 2013. UNHCR, ‘International Protection’ in ‘Note Submited by the High Commissioner to the 45th Session of the EXCOM’, UN doc A/AC.96/830, 7 Sept 1994. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 he Syrian crisis, which began in March 2011 and is ongoing at the time of writing, has forced one-third of Syria’s residents to leave their homes.1 More than two million of them have become refugees in surrounding countries.2 Approximately 68,000 of these asylum seekers are Palestinian refugees who led to Syria during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and are currently enduring secondary forced displacement.3 While the humanitarian needs of Palestinian refugees are generally indistinguishable from their Syrian counterparts, surrounding countries have treated them disparately at, and within, their respective borders. he inferior treatment of Palestinian refugees is largely atributed to their status as a protracted refugee situation (PRS).4 Like other PRS populations, Palestinian refugees are stuck ‘in a long-standing and intractable state of limbo’5 as a result of action or inaction within their country of origin as well as within their respective countries of asylum.6 heir country of origin, Palestine, has been transformed into an ethnically based state, Israel,7 and, with few exceptions, their host countries do not aford them meaningful legal protection.8 he result is an undesirable condition of forced exile from their country of origin coupled with a lack of meaningful integration in surrounding Arab host states. his intractable limbo suspends Palestinian refugees between their status as a political object in a prolonged conlict on the one hand, and a humanitarian condition, like all other refugees, on the other. he lack of a robust protection mandate on behalf of Palestinian refugees exacerbates this condition. International protection refers to ‘all activities aimed at obtaining the full respect for the rights of the individuals in accordance with the leter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law (that is, human rights law, international humanitarian law, refugee law)’.9 his consists of legal, diplomatic, human development, and humanitarian support.10 Upon their displacement, the United Nations created the Conciliation Commission on Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising r 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 UNGA res 194, UN doc A/RES/194 (III), 11 Dec 1948 (the resolution instructed the UNCCP to ‘facilitate the repatriation, resetlement, and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees’); Dumper above n 4, 194 (the UNCCP’s stated purpose is ‘to act as a mediator between Israel, the Arab states and the Palestinians, and to provide protection and facilitate durable solutions for persons displaced as a result of the 1947–48 conlict in Palestine’). See, eg, ‘Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine’, UN doc A/66/296, 12 Aug 2011 (‘he sixtyith report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, covering the period from 1 September 2010 to 31 August 2011 … he Commission notes its report of 5 August 2010 (A/65/225, annex) and observes that it has nothing new to report since that submission’). See, eg, Lance Bartholomeusz, ‘he Mandate of UNRWA at Sixty’ (2010) 28 RSQ 452, 474. Bartholomeusz, ibid; Mark Brailsford, ‘Incorporating Protection into UNRWA Operations’, conference paper, ‘Relief and Works to Human Development: UNRWA and Palestinian Refugees Ater 60 Years’ (8 and 9 Oct 2010), <htp://www.aub. edu.lb/ii/public_policy/pal_camps/pc_events/Documents/20101008ii_unrwa60_conference/conference_papers/ day1/ii_unrwa_conf_day1panel2_paper1_brailsford.pdf>. Brailsford, ibid. ibid. Lex Takkenberg, he Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law (1st edn, OUP USA, 1998) 307. Interview with Karyn AbuZayd (by telephone), Deputy Commissioner-General and Commissioner-General 2000–2010, UNRWA (20 Feb 2012). Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 Palestine (UNCCP) to provide diplomatic and legal protection to Palestinian refugees, including facilitating durable solutions on their behalf.11 Due to a lack of political support for its work, the Agency fell into abeyance by 1950 and, since then, has provided litle more than an annual report to the UN General Assembly noting that it has ‘nothing new to report’.12 No agency has been established to ill the protection gap let by the UNCCP’s suspension. Instead, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) has incrementally expanded the mandate of the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA), established one year ater the UNCCP, to bridge this gap.13 he General Assembly intended UNRWA to sustain Palestinian life in its ive areas of operation by providing aid and relief. UNRWA was meant to complement the diplomatic and legal work of the UNCCP and, together, to provide the full range of international protection needed by Palestinian refugees.14 By fulilling a humanitarian and human development function, UNRWA has arguably provided material and humanitarian protection to Palestinian refugees since its inception.15 Moreover, in response to emergencies, armed conlict, and humanitarian crises, UNGA has authorized UNRWA to provide incremental legal and diplomatic protection to Palestinian refugees in lieu of the UNCCP.16 Although signiicant, this authority has been insuicient to close the protection gap endured by Palestinian refugees. Not only does it function on an ad hoc basis but, even at its most robust, UNRWA lacks the authority to search for durable solutions on their behalf. As demonstrated by crises in Kuwait in 1991, Libya in 1996, and most recently in Iraq in 2003, this protection gap has let Palestinian refugees particularly vulnerable during secondary forced displacement in the Middle East. he United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which possesses a robust protection mandate, has supplemented UNRWA’s eforts during these incidents since the early nineties.17 Although long-standing policy holds that ‘UNRWA protects Palestinians in its areas of operation, while UNHCR protects them while they are outside of those areas’,18 the conditions wrought by forced displacement in the Middle East has necessitated a more luid policy in order to ensure adequate protection to all Palestinian refugees. Together, UNHCR and UNRWA have developed a de facto policy that captures that luidity and r Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising 2. I N T E R N AT I O N A L P ROT E C T I O N, PA L E ST I N I A N R E F U G E E S, A N D E N D U R I N G P ROT E C T I O N G A P S Unlike citizens and aliens, refugees lack any governmental protection. his leaves them particularly vulnerable to abuse and heightens their need for international protection.20 he Inter-Agency Standing Commitee (IASC), comprised of a broad range of 19 20 he Syrian civil war is ongoing and continues to produce a low of refugees. he research herein traces this low through Nov 2013. he author suggests that the indings remain salient as they relect initial and developing conditions not withstanding changing circumstances and conditions on the ground. UNHCR, ‘International Protection’, above n 10 (‘Let unprotected by their own Government, refugees must seek the protection that every human being requires from the authorities of a country of refuge and from the international community. It is this vital need for international protection that most clearly distinguishes refugees from other aliens’). Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 helps to bridge the protection gap endured by Palestinian refugees during humanitarian emergencies. As national unrest produces a steady exodus of refugees from Syria today, the adequacy of these de facto policies has been tested once again. Unlike in the cases before it, these policies have proven inadequate in response to the Syrian crisis. Internal armed conlict in Syria, characterized by mass killings, aerial bombardment, and use of heavy military artillery, has forced Syrians and Palestinian refugees alike to lee to neighbouring countries. Unlike their Syrian counterparts, however, Palestinian refugees have not been welcomed into all neighbouring countries since the start of the Syrian conlict in March 2011 and November 2013.19 If permited entry, they have not enjoyed the temporary protection regime available to Syrian refugees. Instead, Jordan and Egypt have excluded, detained, and refouled Palestinian refugees to Syria. Egypt has prevented UNHCR from registering and providing humanitarian aid to Palestinian refugees who have been admited entry. While Palestinian refugees have faced less signiicant hurdles entering and remaining in Lebanon, the aid they receive there is inferior to that of their Syrian counterparts. Palestinians and Syrian refugees only enjoy equal treatment in Turkey and, presumably, as internally displaced persons within Syria. Despite their best eforts, UNRWA and UNHCR have been unable to close this protection gap. To assess the adequacy of the legal regime available to Palestinian refugees, as well as to suggest how the UN refugee agencies and the international community should beter respond to secondary forced displacement of Palestinian refugees in the Middle East, this article is divided into four parts. Part 2 examines the extent of the protection gap endured by Palestinian refugees, as well as the respective mandates delineating UNHCR and UNRWA responsibility for them. his historical examination reveals that inter-agency collaboration on behalf of Palestinian refugees is legally justiied. Part 3 explores four cases of Palestinian refugee secondary forced displacement in Kuwait, Iraq, and Libya, and, internally, within Lebanon. he article pays particular atention to UNHCR and UNRWA collaboration developed to manage these crises, and argues that this collaboration constitutes a de facto policy between the two agencies that supplants the more rigid policies established by their respective mandates. Parts 4 and 5 turn their atention to Syria and examine the protection gaps sufered by Palestinian refugees during their ongoing forced displacement to neighbouring countries. In particular, these sections highlight the insuiciency of, and regression from, the established de facto policies that UNRWA and UNHCR had developed to date. In the inal Part, the article makes recommendations to the two refugee agencies, as well as to the international community, on how to further close the protection gap alicting Palestinian refugees during secondary forced displacement. Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising r UN and non-UN humanitarian partners, broadly deines protection for refugees as ‘all [the] activities aimed at obtaining the full respect for the rights of the individuals in accordance with the leter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law’.21 UNRWA similarly deines protection broadly as what the agency does to ‘safeguard and advance the rights of Palestine refugees’.22 During armed conlict, emergency situations, and humanitarian crises, the relevant scope of international protection is externally focused.23 It thus refers to an agency’s capacity to intervene, monitor, and advocate on behalf of refugees with external entities, like states, other agencies, and non-governmental bodies. It also refers to the search for durable solutions on behalf of refugee populations.24 To explore the extent of the protection gap endured by Palestinian refugees during secondary forced displacement, this section examines the establishment and function of the UNCCP, UNRWA and UNHCR. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Inter-Agency Standing Commitee, above n 9. UNRWA, ‘UNRWA Medium Term Strategy 2010–2015’ <htp://www.unrwa.org/useriles/201003317746.pdf> accessed 1 May 2013; see also Nicholas Morris, ‘What Protection Means to UNRWA in Concept and Practice’, consultancy report, as discussed in Brailsford, above n 14. UNHCR, ‘International Protection’, above n 10, para 17 (Protection during armed conlict includes: ‘… humanitarian diplomacy at both the national and local level, closer coordination with the political organs of the United Nations as well as regional organizations, closer working relationships with the military both in the context of peace-keeping or peacemaking operations, logistical support for humanitarian assistance, and the physical protection of refugees and displaced persons, and intensiied cooperation with the International Commitee of the Red Cross and with human rights monitoring teams. In conlict situations the1949 Geneva Protocol relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and the Additional Protocols of 1977 assume particular importance among the legal tools available. Where the Oice is involved in protection and assistance activities on behalf of people in their own countries, refugee law does not apply. National law and international human rights and humanitarian law are the basic legal tools of protection’). UNHCR, ibid. UNGA res 302, UN doc A/RES/302 (IV), 8 Dec 1949. UNRWA & UNHCR, ‘he United Nations and Palestinian Refugees’ (UNRWA Jan 2007) <htp://www.unrwa.org/ useriles/2010011791015.pdf> accessed 10 Mar 2012. See, eg, Bartholomeusz, above n 13. ibid 459 (the Six-Day War catalyzed one of the mandate’s most signiicant expansions. Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula in 1967, resulted in the displacement of over 300,000 persons, including 120,000 registered Palestine refugees. In response, UNRWA provided humanitarian assistance to all persons in the area who in need of emergency assistance regardless of their registration with UNRWA. In July 1967, UNGA endorsed this activity and restated UNRWA’s mandate to include assistance to the ‘1967 displaced’. UNRWA has responded in similar manner to other emergencies in subsequent years and, by 2008, UNGA had expanded UNRWA’s mandate to assist persons displaced by the ‘1967 and subsequent hostilities’). Bartholomeusz, ibid 471 (It does not have a mandate to search for durable solutions. It did, however, have a mandate to engage in activities that promoted the integration of Palestinian refugees into their host countries although that was suspended in 1960). Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 2.1 A regime of their own: Palestinian refugees under UNRWA and UNCCP he UN General Assembly established UNRWA as a subsidiary organ of the international organization pursuant to UNGA Resolution 302(IV) (8 December 1949) to provide relief and works programmes to Palestine refugees.25 Its mandate is limited to ive areas of operation: Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, namely, the West Bank and Gaza.26 Since it commenced its operations in 1950, UNRWA’s mandate, derived from General Assembly resolutions and requests from other organs, including the UN General Assembly Secretary General, has evolved and expanded in response to events in the Middle East.27 While UNRWA today indeed provides international protection to Palestinian refugees, that protection remains geographically truncated28 and insuicient.29 r Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 Brailsford, above n 14, 15 (‘… Article I common to the Geneva Conventions, also enjoins State Parties to “respect and ensure respect” for the provisions of international humanitarian law’). See, eg, Brailsford, ibid; see also Bartholomeusz, above n 13. Brailsford, ibid 15–18 (emergency response during armed conlict in Gaza, and forced displacement in the West Bank, the right to work for Palestinians in Lebanon, increased access to hospital care for 1967 displaced ex-Gazans in Jordan, collaboration with community-based women’s organizations in Syria to respond to gender based violence). Brailsford, ibid. ibid 17. ibid 5. UNGA res 194, above n 11; Brenda Goddard, ‘UNHCR and the International Protection of Palestinian Refugees’ (2009) 28 RSQ 475, 480. Goddard, ibid. Dumper, above n 4, 194. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 he responsibility of international protection for Palestinian refugees is not borne by UNRWA alone but also by the host governments, as well as the international community.30 Still, as the international agency responsible for them, UNRWA is expected to monitor, report, and intervene on behalf of Palestinian refugees to improve their well-being. In general, this includes persuading concerned authorities to behave in a certain way; mobilizing stakeholders to exert inluence; and engaging in public advocacy on behalf of Palestinian refugees.31 UNRWA does this, albeit to a diferent degree in each of its areas of operation, depending on the conditions particular to each host state.32 Moreover, due to UNRWA’s role as a humanitarian and human development agency, it has arguably provided protection to Palestinians in the form of assistance since its inception.33 he claim is not that UNRWA does not provide international protection at all but, rather, that its provisions are insuicient to close a protection gap. Identifying the precise scope of this protection gap requires thorough scrutiny of UNRWA’s operations in each of its ive areas of operation. While that inquiry is beyond the scope of this article, the search for a just and durable solution is an absolute gap alicting the Palestinian refugees for which an individualized inquiry is not required. his right is ‘the key to enjoyment of the national protection and the realization of other rights’.34 here is no disagreement that UNRWA does not have a mandate to search for such a solution, including rehabilitation, resetlement, and integration, on behalf of Palestinian refugees. he Agency explains that such a solution for the Palestinian refugee problem is the responsibility of the parties to the conlict and its role is to ‘address the humanitarian and human development needs of Palestine refugees in the interim’.35 he mandate to search for a durable solution was given to the UNCCP. he General Assembly empowered the UNCCP to reconcile Israel and the Palestinians and to facilitate the return, reparation, rehabilitation, compensation, or resetlement of Palestinian refugees.36 Within two years of its establishment, the UNCCP reported to the General Assembly that conditions in Palestine ‘have made it impossible for the Commission to carry out its mandate’.37 he General Assembly extended the UNCCP’s mandate annually without result until it was inally declared obsolete in 1966.38 Since the UNCCP became defunct, the legal regime covering Palestinian refugees no longer includes the provision of durable solutions at all. Leila Hilal, former Consultant at the Commissioner-General’s Oice in its Jordan headquarters, explains that unless UNGA provides a mandate that UNRWA be responsible for achieving durable solutions for Palestinian refugees, UNRWA cannot expand Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising r its mandate to do so.39 he most that UNRWA has been able to do in this regard is to ‘highlight the urgent need for a solution and to help ensure that in its elaboration, the rights, views, and interests of the refugees are heard and safeguarded’.40 he lack of a more robust international protection mandate for Palestinians leaves them invariably at risk during armed conlict, humanitarian emergencies, and political crises. 2.2.1 Distinct mandates: article 1(D) of the 1951 Refugee Convention and paragraph7(c) of the UNHCR Statute he UNCCP and UNRWA had been in existence for three and two years, respectively, at the time of UNHCR’s establishment. he draters of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the UNHCR Statute were therefore well aware of the condition of Palestinian refugees and explicitly deliberated whether or not to include them within the scope of the new refugee legal regime.44 he deinition of refugee and the scope of the beneiciaries of the new legal regime, more broadly, was the subject of extensive debate amongst the plenipotentiaries.45 hey discussed Palestinian refugees in this context. he Arab states lobbied to maintain Palestinians under a distinct scheme, namely the UNCCP and UNRWA, which they believed would confer greater political relevance and superior protection to them than could the newly established refugee agency.46 he thrust of these concerns, shared by nearly all draters, was to ensure that 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 Interview with Leila Hilal (by telephone), Former Legal Adviser, UNRWA (31 Mar 2012). Brailsford, above n 14, 18. UNGA res 428, 14 Dec 1950 (‘he United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, acting under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assume the function of providing international protection, under the auspices of the United Nations, to refugees who fall within the scope of the present Statute …’); see also ‘he UN & Palestinian Refugees’, above n 26. UNHCR ‘International Protection’, above n 10. UNGA res 428, above n 41. Takkenberg, above n 17, 56. ibid (he state plenipotentiaries intended that the new regime would cover only those persons who led their countries as a result of the Second World War. Others saw it more narrowly applied as well, so that it would be limited to refugees from Europe. hese concerns were thoroughly debated and ultimately captured in article 1B of the 1951 Refugee Convention). Goddard, above n 36. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 2.2 UNHCR and UNRWA: distinct legal mandates, shared responsibilities In contrast, UNHCR has a robust protection mandate that it considers to be the cornerstone of its work.41 Established in 1951, UNCHR’s mandate has grown to include internally displaced persons, returnees, and stateless people. he international protection that it provides includes protecting against refoulement, building and maintaining quality asylum systems, conducting refugee status determination, upholding the prohibition of arbitrary detention, ensuring safe residence, expanding educational opportunities, and preventing and responding to sexual and genderbased violence.42 Like the UNCCP, UNHCR also has the capacity to achieve durable solutions, namely ‘[v]oluntary repatriation to and reintegration in their homeland in safety and dignity; integration in their countries of asylum; and resetlement in third countries’.43 heoretically, UNHCR could provide international protection to all Palestinian refugees. his is not the case, however, because the respective mandates of UNRWA and UNHCR rigidly demarcate the responsibility owed to Palestinian refugees. r Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising contains an inclusion clause ensuring the ipso facto entitlement to the protection of the 1951 Convention of those refugees who, without having their position 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 Takkenberg, above n 17, 62 (the representative from Lebanon explained, ‘In all other cases, persons had become refugees as a result of action taken contrary to the principles of the United Nations and the obligation of the Organization was a moral one only. he existence of the Palestinian refugees, on the other hand, was the direct result of a decision taken by the United Nations itself, with full knowledge of the consequences. he Palestine refugees were therefore a direct responsibility on the part of the United Nations and could not be placed in the general category of refugees without betrayal of that responsibility’). ibid 56. See, eg, Susan M Akram and T Rempel, ‘Temporary Protection as an Instrument for Implementing the Right of Return for Palestinian Refugees’ (Spring 2004) 22 BUILJ 1, 2–162; Goddard, above n 36; BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Refugee and Residency Rights, Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, 2008–2009 (2009); Michael Kagan, ‘he (Relative) Decline of Palestinian Exceptionalism and its Consequences for Refugee Studies in the Middle East’ (2009) 22 JORS, 417–38. UNGA res 428 (V), above n 41. See, eg, Akram and Rempel, above n 49 (various scholars, practitioners, and advocates have disagreed about the precise meaning of Article 1(D) and have suggested that UNHCR’s mandate should extend to Palestinian refugees within UNRWA’s areas of operation, to all Palestinians beyond UNRWA’s areas of operation; and/or to Palestinian refugees once eligible for UNRWA beneits who are now beyond its areas of operation). Takkenberg, above n 17, 65. ibid 66–67 (‘As the French representative put it, the proposed text provided for “deferred inclusion” rather than exclusion of these refugees’). See also Goddard, above n 36. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 Palestinian refugees were not subsumed into the new legal regime where they would not enjoy heightened atention.47 Ultimately, the draters incorporated these concerns into both the 1951 Refugee Convention, as Article 1(D), and the UNHCR Statute, as paragraph 7(c).48 Examination of Article 1(D) of the Refugee Convention helps to shed light on both the intent of its draters and the present-day understanding of the status of Palestinian refugees who seek asylum in states that have ratiied the Convention.49 Paragraph 7(c) of the UNHCR Statute, which deines UNHCR’s mandate and its beneiciaries, is central to understanding the relationship between the refugee agency and UNRWA. It states that the competence of the High Commissioner shall not extend to a person ‘[w]ho continues to receive from other organs or agencies of the United Nations protection or assistance’.50 On its face, this paragraph appears like an exclusion clause and, together with its counterpart in the Refugee Convention, has created considerable debate about the status of Palestinian refugees beyond UNRWA’s areas of operation.51 Speciically, it raises questions about whether and/or when Palestinian refugees come within the scope of UNHCR’s mandate and whether and/or when they are eligible for asylum under the Refugee Convention. According to Takkenberg, the travaux préparatoires of paragraph 7(c) relects that, ‘among the draters of the UNHCR Statute and the 1951 Refugee Convention there was almost general consensus that the Palestine refugees were genuine refugees in need of assistance and protection’.52 Moreover, this drating history reveals that the intention was not to exclude Palestine refugees from the general legal regime for the protection of refugees. he intention was to exclude them temporarily in an efort to prioritize achieving a resolution to their condition.53 he UNCHR’s 2009 Revised Note on the Applicability of Article 1(D) airms this understanding. he Note acknowledges that, while the irst paragraph of Article 1(D) is an exclusion clause, its second paragraph: Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising r deinitively setled in accordance with the relevant UN General Assembly resolutions, have ceased to receive protection and assistance from UNRWA for any reason.54 he purpose of both paragraph 7(c) and Article 1(D) was to avoid overlapping legal regimes between the two agencies while not compromising the continuity of protection and assistance to Palestinian refugees. I consider that the responsibility of UNRWA extends to Palestinians in all parts of the Middle East [including Kuwait]. If ambivalence is allowed to persist in this respect, this can only delay ad hoc UN protection and humanitarian activities.60 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 UNHCR, ‘Revised Note on the Applicability of Article 1D of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees to Palestinian Refugees’ (October 2009) <www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4add77d42.html> accessed 10 Mar, 2012. UNDP, ‘Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challenge for Development’ (2004) as cited by Brailsford, above n 14, 5 (UNDP deines vulnerability as ‘A human condition or process resulting from physical, social, economic, and environmental factors, which determine the likelihood and scale of damage from the impact of a given [threat]’). Press Release No 4–22/54 (29 Jan 1954) on ile with Lex Takkenberg, as quoted in Takkenberg, above n 17, 305 (‘he mandate of the High Commissioner does not extend to them’). Takkenberg, ibid 305. ibid 306. ibid 300. Former Commissioner-General, I Turkmen, ‘Address to the Donors’ Meeting’ (5–6 June 1991), quoted in Schif, 1995, 268, as quoted in Takkenberg, ibid 300. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 2.2.2 Shared responsibilities: UNHCR and UNRWA collaboration during crisis Secondary forced displacement in the Middle East places the continuity of protection and assistance for Palestinian refugees at acute risk. In those cases, the stark responsibilities delineated by the agencies’ mandates are complicated by the low of Palestinian refugees, with diferent statuses, into and out of UNRWA areas of operation. Within less than two decades, the two agencies discovered that strict adherence to their respective mandates threatened such continuity and exposed Palestinian refugees to heightened vulnerability.55 In 1954, the High Commissioner for Refugees clariied that the material welfare of the Palestine Refugees is the ‘exclusive responsibility’ of UNRWA, whereas the protection interests of those refugees as concerns compensation and repatriation is the concern of the UNCCP.56 hus, he continued, UNHCR’s mandate does not extend to them.57 he refugee lows resulting from the 1967 Six-Day War prompted UNHCR to shit its policy. In the face of considerable forced migration lows, UNHCR declared, ‘Palestinians outside UNRWA’s area of operations, not failing under any other exclusion or cessation clauses, were prima facie to be considered as fulilling the inclusion provisions of the Statute (para. 6 B) and were therefore of concern to UNHCR’.58 he events of the 1991 Gulf War further shaped the delineation between UNRWA and UNCHR mandates and their shared responsibilities to Palestinian refugees. In response to the conditions faced by Palestinians leaving Kuwait in the atermath of the irst Gulf War, the then UNRWA Commissioner-General airmed that the agency had a responsibility towards Palestinians enduring discrimination, abuse, and harassment, even beyond its areas of operation.59 he Commissioner-General continued that, notwithstanding UNRWA’s truncated geographical jurisdiction, the agency should pursue a pragmatic course: r Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising As a result, UNRWA sent a mission to collaborate with UNHCR to assess the condition of Palestinian refugees in Kuwait.61 As a result of this policy the agencies cooperated again in 1995/96 to deal with the Palestinian refugees stranded at the Libyan and Egyptian border, and again during the exodus of Palestinians leeing Iraq in the atermath of the 2003 invasion by the United States. hose cases help trace the development of a de facto policy of cooperation between the two agencies. hey are examined in greater detail in the following section. And as I care about the Palestinian cause, and in order to achieve the best interest of Palestinians, I will expel the thirty thousand Palestinians who currently live in my land, and try to secure their return to Gaza and Jericho. If Israel would not let them in, while Egypt does not allow them to pass through its territories, then I shall set a great camp for them on the Egyptian-Libyan borders. Qaddai added that: all of what I will be doing is for their best interest. No mater how they sufer, and even if they remain in the camp for years to come, this would still be for their national interest. And the whole world would come to the conclusion that the setlement is a big lie, and that Palestinians are still refugees. I hereby call on all Arab states hosting Palestinian refugees to act likewise.62 Indeed, registration with UNRWA or with UNHCR does not signify an end to their forced displacement. Instead, like other vulnerable refugees, Palestinian refugees can experience ‘overlapping refugeedoms’ or multiple experiences of displacement.63 During these instances, UNHCR and UNRWA have stepped in to protect and aid Palestinian refugees in ways that have challenged and shaped their respective mandates. In particular, they have demonstrated their legal and operational capacity to extend overlapping legal regimes and the practical expedience of doing so. hese experiences also help deine the measures necessary to protect Palestinian refugees forcibly displaced in the 61 62 63 Takkenberg, ibid 300. BADIL Staf, ‘he Palestinian Crisis in Libya 1994–1996 (Interview with Professor Bassem Sirhan)’ (BADIL Resource Center: Al Majdal, 2010) <htp://www.badil.org/en/al-majdal/item/1571-art-02> accessed 5 Feb 2012. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, ‘Invisible Refugees: Protecting Sahrawis and Palestinians Displaced by the 2011 Libyan Uprising’ (University of Oxford Refugee Studies Centre Research Paper 225, 2011) 10; (Antonio Guiterres, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, has argued that Somali, Ertirean, and Ivorian asylum seekers formerly based in Libya who have sought safety in Europe ‘were refugees twice’). Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 3. S E CO N DA RY F O RC E D D I S P L A C E M E N T I N T H E M I D D L E E A ST As has been the case in Kuwait, Libya, and Iraq, Palestinian refugees endure greater vulnerability because of their symbolic value to the Palestine Question and its resolution. Accordingly, states, agencies, and national polities oten treat them as politicized collective bodies at the expense of the humanitarian treatment their condition requires. Libya’s former head of state, Muammar Qaddai, poignantly captured this dual character of Palestinian refugees during his address as he forcibly displaced approximately 30,000 refugees to the Libyan-Egyptian border. hen, he said: Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising r Middle East. he section below examines those de facto policies developed in forced secondary displacement from Kuwait, Libya, and Iraq, and within Lebanon. 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 Rozenn Hommery Al-Qudat and Yann Le Troquer, ‘From Kuwait to Jordan: he Palestinians’ hird Exodus’ (1999) 28 JPS 37–51. ibid 67. ibid 68. Goddard, above n 36, 501. UN doc A/48.13, 7, as discussed in Takkenberg, above n 17, 300. Takkenberg, ibid. Interview with Kahin Ismail (by Skype), responsible for Palestinian portfolio, MENA Bureau of UNHCR (1 Apr 2012). Goddard, above n 36, 501. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 3.1 Kuwait Following the First Gulf War in 1991, Kuwait expelled nearly 400,000 Palestinians in retaliation for its leadership’s support of Saddam Hussein’s occupation.64 Palestinians came to Kuwait in two waves of migration. First, men came seeking economic opportunities in the late forties and ities, followed by their families during the sixties.65 Initially, Kuwait welcomed Palestinians as it lacked a robust work force. Kuwait tightened its immigration restrictions and reversed these trends in 1969 when the number of Palestinian refugees had grown signiicantly. his, coupled with other political events in the region, led to increasing tensions in the eighties ‘when economic, social, and political factors combined to make the future of Palestinians in Kuwait increasingly uncertain in the face of rising public costs and unemployment among the young’.66 he end of the Iran-Iraq War, coupled with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, came on the heels of this changing landscape. Oicially, the Kuwaiti government did not expel Palestinians but ‘invited’ them to leave. With the exception of 32,000 people, namely, those who had been granted citizenship, been given personal exception, or who could not return to their host countries, like Palestinians from Gaza, all other Palestinians were forcibly expelled. Most Palestinians in Kuwait either had Jordanian passports, travel documents from Syria and Lebanon, or residency in other host countries. UNHCR and UNRWA worked together to facilitate their return to their countries of asylum.67 Notwithstanding its geographical mandate, UNRWA sent a special mission to Kuwait between July and September 1992.68 Together with UNHCR, the agencies completed a detailed survey of the Palestinians remaining in the country.69 While most host countries accepted the return of Palestinians, Egypt refused their re-entry. his population of approximately 2,000 people ended up in Iraq where they were integrated with the rest of the Palestinian population without diferentiation.70 Additionally, UNHCR stepped in to actively improve the protection of Palestinians in Kuwait. his included securing their release from detention, issuance or extension of residence documents, or permission to remain in the country while UNHCR and UNRWA explored the possibilities of their resetlement.71 As should be expected, UNHCR played a signiicant role in the resetlement and protection of Palestinians in Kuwait, since those Palestinians fall squarely within UNHCR’s mandate. Signiicantly, however, although Kuwait is not within UNRWA’s areas of operation, UNRWA assisted UNHCR in facilitating the resetlement of r Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising Palestinians, thus marking a unique collaboration not dictated by the strict geographical divides of their respective mandates. 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, above n 63, 10. BADIL Staf, above n 62. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, above n 63, 7; Goddard, above n 36, 501–02. Goddard, above n 36, 502. BADIL Staf, above n 62. ibid. Goddard, above n 36, 502. BADIL Staf, above n 62. Ismail interview, above n 70. BADIL Staf, above n 62. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 3.2 Libya Unlike in the case of Kuwait, host countries were less receptive to accepting Palestinian refugees expelled from Libya in 1995. In protest at the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s entry into a peace agreement with Israel, Libya’s former leader announced that all Palestinians would be forced to leave Libya. he newly established Palestinian Authority submited a memo to the League of Arab States, requesting that the Palestinians not pay the price for Libya’s oicial position on the peace accords with Israel, and called on Libya to respect the Casablanca Protocol.72 Qaddai’s relentless position for nearly two years reairmed the non-existence of Palestinian national protection, even ater the establishment of an interim government, as well as the ineficacy of the regional instrument intended to protect Palestinian refugees. Libya’s treatment of Palestinians as political objects rather than refugees relects their acute vulnerability in the Middle East. Sirhan, who taught at Libya’s Western Mountain University, explains, ‘Libya is not a host country for Palestinians (that is, Palestinians are not refugees there), as is the case with Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan; it is rather one which imports skilled labor’.73 Indeed, Libya treated its Palestinian refugees as a migrant labour population.74 UNHCR and UNRWA set new precedents in their coordinated response to the crisis in Libya. While UNHCR provided assistance and monitoring, they issued a joint statement on forced displacement of Palestinians, marking the irst joint statement from the two agencies.75 UNRWA also issued its own press release, despite the fact that the Salloum border clearly falls outside its areas of operation.76 he agencies emphasized the humanitarian condition of this population and, in response, several countries imposed restrictions to limit Palestinian re-entry.77 Egypt restricted entry and passage, Israel restricted entry into Gaza, and Lebanon passed a new law that imposed bureaucratic hurdles to Palestinian re-entry. he Lebanese policy amounted to a nulliication of these Palestinians’ residence and travel rights. In efect, 900 Palestinians languished at the Salloum border for nine months.78 Six hundred Palestinians returned to Syria and thirteen returned to Jordan.79 In addition to lobbying neighbouring countries to allow Palestinians holding valid documentation to enter their former-host states, UNHCR and UNRWA urged Libya to allow them to return.80 Later, Palestinians who returned to Libya registered with UNHCR as asylum seekers.81 Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising r 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘Nowhere to Flee: he Perilous Situation of Palestinians in Iraq’ (Sept 2006). ibid. Sheila M Dabu, ‘Jordanian-Iraqi Border Closed Indeinitely’ World News Connection (22 Mar 2006) (real beneits included free housing, state stipends, and government jobs, while other Iraqis were coping with UN sanctions). HRW, ‘Nowhere to Flee’, above n 82. ibid. Khaled Yacoub-Oweis, ‘Plight of Iraq’s Palestinian Refugees Worsens - UN’ Reuters (14 May 2007). Ismail interview, above n 70. Interview with Elizabeth Campbell, Former Senior Advocate, Refugees International (Washington DC, 21 Feb 2012); see also KUNA, ‘Iraq’s Kurdistan ready to Receive Palestinian Refugees’ (16 Apr 2009) (Iraqi Kurdistan region accepted Palestinian Iraqis in 2009). See also Elizabeth Roche, ‘Ater Iraq, Palestinian Refugees Find Peace Amid Indian Squalor’, Agence France Press (20 June 2007) (100 Palestinian-Iraqis ended up in India since May 2007). Dabu, above n 84. (Nasser Judeh, Jordanian Government spokesman, explained that Jordan ‘is not a country with open borders. You need to go through proper procedures’). Interview with Adam Shapiro (by Skype), human rights advocate and ilmmaker (20 Feb 2012). Ismail interview, above n 70. Roberta Cohen, ‘Iraq’s Displaced: Where to Turn?’ (2008) 24 AUILR 301, 308. Shapiro interview, above n 91. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 3.3 Iraq Whereas the governments expelled Palestinian refugees from Kuwait and Libya, Iraqi nationals initially displaced them by force from Iraq following the US invasion. Ater the fall of Baghdad, in April 2003, the security of Palestinian refugees steadily deteriorated.82 Militant groups targeted Palestinians, evicted them from their homes, and subjected them to torture, and oten death.83 Iraqi communities resented Palestinian refugees because of the real and imagined privileges they enjoyed under Saddam Hussein’s rule, as well as their perceived support for the Sunni insurgency.84 Atacks signiicantly increased ater the bombing of a Shi’a shrine and mosque in Sammarra in February 2006.85 Rather than protect them, subsequent Iraqi governments made conditions more onerous for Palestinians. In some cases, the Ministry itself arbitrarily arrested, beat, tortured and forcibly disappeared Palestinian refugees.86 he atacks caused an exodus of Palestinian refugees from Iraq to neighbouring countries. Before the 2003 invasion, approximately 34,000 Palestinian refugees lived in Iraq.87 UNHCR reports that, by 2010, only half that number remained in the country.88 A litle less than 6,000 of said refugees ended up in four refugee camps: Al Hol in northern Syria; Al Tanf on the Syrian side of the Iraqi-Syrian border; Walid on the Iraqi side of the Iraqi-Syrian border; and Ruweished on the Iraqi side of the Iraqi-Jordanian border.89 In March 2006, Jordan closed its border with Iraq to limit the entry of Palestinian refugees indeinitely.90 As a result, approximately 500 Palestinian refugees remained stranded in Ruweished camp, 350 kilometres east of Amman. Jordan eased its policy in 2003 and allowed women with Jordanian passports entry without their husbands and children. In 2005, King Abdallah allowed their families entry by Royal Decree.91 Approximately 200 Palestinian refugees lacked any documentation and were not eligible for entry into Jordan. UNHCR ultimately resetled them to Brazil and Chile.92 Syria permited Palestinian refugees entry ater considerable lobbying. It granted entry to those stuck on the Iraqi-Jordanian border into Al Hol in its northern territory.93 he Syrian regime initially built Al Hol in 1991 when it expected to receive millions of Iraqis leeing Iraq.94 he camp fell within UNHCR’s jurisdiction and UNRWA r Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 ibid. Interview with Roger Hearn (by telephone), Former Director, UNRWA Afairs Syria from October 2009-December 2011 (21 Feb 2012). ibid. AbuZayd interview, above n 18. Hearn interview, above n 96. Shapiro interview, above n 91. Miret El-Naggar, ‘Palestinians Stranded in Desert’ McClatchy News Service (20 Dec 2007). Campbell interview, above n 89. Ismail interview, above n 70. ibid. Yacoub-Oweis, above n 87. Shapiro interview, above n 91. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 coordinated with it to provide social services, psychosocial support, and other forms of humanitarian relief.95 UNRWA would have preferred to integrate the Palestinian refugees at Al Hol within its existing scheme in Syria, but the camp and its residents remained within UNHCR’s jurisdiction.96 As the Syrian Uprising began, in 2011, which would later become a civil war, the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Afairs approved the transfer of the remaining Al Hol residents to UNRWA camps in Damascus, but it is not clear that this ever happened as the situation quickly became a crisis.97 Palestinians leeing Iraq were not registered under UNRWA but led to Syria, an UNRWA area of operation. Strict adherence to the geographical mandates that demarcate UNRWA and UNHCR’s responsibility would have brought these refugees under UNRWA control. Instead, their status in Iraq, as being outside UNRWA’s areas of operation, was a controlling factor. hus, Palestinians from Iraq taking refuge within Al Hol became persons of concern to UNHCR. UNHCR’s mandate also extended to Palestinians who went to Jordan. In those instances, UNRWA remained an implementing partner.98 UNHCR explored durable solutions, mainly resetlement options, on behalf of those refugees in the camps, as well as for those in Damascus. Together, UNRWA and UNHCR provided assistance to all refugees. Notably, UNRWA took the lead in urban areas, where it had developed considerable experience in Syria.99 A 2006 visit by Antonio Guterres, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, to the Syria camps butressed UNHCR’s advocacy on behalf of Palestinian refugees. In political standofs, for example, Guterres’s support for resetlement worked to resolve the issue in favour of resetlement.100 hose denied entry into Syria remained stuck in Al Tanf, in no-man’s land between Syria and Iraq on the Syrian side of the border. UN oicials described horrendous conditions in the desert stretch, including children sufering from lice, elderly sufering from diabetes and high blood pressure, contaminated water, and skin alictions.101 he population ‘lived in a ditch alongside the road for three years and UNHCR did an impressive job on behalf of this population highlighting why they needed protection’.102 UNCHR reports that Al Tanf closed in 2009 and the majority of Palestinians have been resetled, while a small minority moved to Al Hol.103 By March 2012, about 260 Palestinian refugees remained in Al Hol and were in the pipeline for resetlement.104 When Syria sealed its border to Palestinian refugees, 1,000 Palestinians remained stranded in Walid on the Iraqi side of the Syrian-Iraqi border.105 he Walid camp was in a border area that the US military considered a liability to its military advantage.106 Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising r I think the situation of the ex-Iraq Palestinians is an important landmark because of the engagement on the issue of Palestinian refugees. here was a huge caseload because of those who were targeted and led the country. heir arrival in Syria and Jordan prompted more cooperation between the two agencies. here was a heightened contact and coordination on these speciic issues. Coordination spans back to Libya but events in Iraq increased contacts and coordination. hey were stuck in these camps and it was very visible as a vulnerable population.114 Since 2007, the two agencies have met annually at the highest levels. Additionally, in 2010, the agencies established a joint expert working group to coordinate on issues related to overlapping legal regimes in the region.115 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 ibid. Campbell interview, above n 89 (A group of NGOs organized by Refugees International that visited the camps and then joined Refugees International in its lobbying eforts in Washington and Geneva). Shapiro interview, above n 91. ibid. ibid. Campbell interview, above n 89. ibid. Ismail interview, above n 70. ibid. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 he military therefore agreed to provide security for anyone from the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to conduct interviews in the camp.107 Due to intense lobbying by civil society partners of UNHCR,108 the Department of State began to conduct its own lobbying within the US government. Ultimately, DHS conducted interviews in the camp and agreed to take 1,053 people from Walid camp for resetlement in the US, marking the irst time that the US has given asylum to a group of Palestinians.109 Civil society partners led UNHCR advocacy on behalf of Palestinian refugees.110 Between 2007 and 2008, independent human rights activists and ilmmakers documented the plight of stranded Palestinian refugees. hey met directly with Government oicials in the US, Chile, Brazil, Greece, and Yemen, among others, to screen their ilm and urge the Governments to resetle the refugees within their borders.111 Similarly, a senior advocate with a US NGO showed the thirteen-minute ilm throughout Washington and Geneva, and placed the issue on the agenda of a resetlement group in Geneva, as well as with other traditional refugee organizations in the US who normally did not address issues related to Palestinian refugees.112 he heightened awareness and the stark images caught by the ilm evoked a strong emotional response that manifested in strong policy. Iceland, for example, used its entire quota for asylum cases in 2007, to ofer twenty-seven Palestinian refugees asylum.113 he lack of a regional solution, together with the miserable humanitarian conditions to which the refugee population was subject, as well as their small numbers relative to the larger Iraqi population eligible for resetlement, made resetlement an available durable solution for the Palestinian refugee population. In addition to establishing new precedents for solutions available to Palestinian refugees, their exodus from Iraq also prompted a more collaborative relationship between UNRWA and UNHCR. Ismail Kahin, of the MENA Bureau of UNHCR responsible for the Palestinian portfolio, explains: r Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising [T]hose who were displaced from their habitual residence, regardless of any other consideration. hat included the Lebanese but also the Palestinian and non-Palestinian refugees. We mainly targeted those who were in collective shelters such as schools, but we also provided reintegration/rehabilitation assistance during the return process.121 UNRWA also assisted all displaced persons without distinction.122 Roger Hearn, former Director of UNRWA Afairs, Syria, adds that there were some movements among Palestinian refugees to Syria and Jordan and UNRWA was responsible for them.123 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 UN OCHA, ‘Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’ (Brookings Institute Sept 2004) <htp://www.brookings.edu/ fp/projects/idp/resources/GPEnglish.pdf > accessed 20 Mar 2012 (according to the working deinition in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, IDPs are ‘persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to lee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular, as a result of or in order to avoid the efects of armed conlict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural disasters, and who have not crossed any internationally recognized State border’). Elizabeth Ferris, Erin Mooney and Chareen Stark, ‘From National Responsibility to Response: Part I: General Conclusions on IDP Protection’ (Brookings Institute, LSE Project on Internal Displacement’s Study, 21 Feb 2012) <htp://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/02/21-idp-responsibility-ferris> accessed 20 Mar 2012. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), ‘Lebanon: No New Displacement But Causes of Past Conlicts Unresolved’ (30 Dec 2010) (Lebanon has witnessed four episodes of internal displacement before that: the war of the camps, in the mid-1980s, in which Amal forces besieged Beirut-based refugee camps; the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon; the destruction of Tel el Zaatar refugees camp, in 1976, due to clashes between Christian and PLO forces; and the massacre at Sabra and Shatila camp in 1982). BADIL survey, above n 49. IDMC, above n 118, 5. Interview with Dominique Tohme (by email), Legal Adviser, UNHCR-Lebanon (27 Mar 2012). See UNGA res 61/114 (14 Dec 2006), para 6 (‘Endorses, meanwhile, the eforts of the Commissioner-General to continue to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis, and as a temporary measure, to persons in the area who are internally displaced and in serious need of continued assistance as a result of recent incursions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and hostilities in Lebanon’). Hearn interview, above n 96. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 3.4 Internal displacement in Lebanon While Palestinian refugees dealt with forced displacement beyond state borders, in Kuwait, Libya, and Iraq, in 2006 and later in 2007, they also endured forced displacement within Lebanon’s borders. hose persons constituted internally displaced persons (IDPs).116 he primary distinction between a refugee and an IDP is that the later does not cross a state border but instead remains internally displaced. Protection for IDPs is contingent upon the pressure placed upon a state and the willingness of international organizations to intervene on behalf of vulnerable communities.117 Lebanon is a good case study in which to examine internal displacement because, like Syria, it is governed by UNRWA’s mandate and Palestinian refugees therein have endured several waves of internal displacement. he 33-Day War on Lebanon, in August 2006, caused the displacement of more than 25 per cent of the country’s population, or one million people.118 Sixteen thousand of them were Palestinian refugees.119 Within four days of the ceaseire ending the conlict between Israel and Lebanon, 90 per cent of the displaced populations had returned to their homes of habitual residence. By November 2010, no IDPs remained within Lebanon.120 Dominique Tohme, a Legal Adviser to UNHCR in Lebanon, explains that the Agency assisted all: Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising r international actors are valuable resources for eforts aiming to improve government response to IDPs. his includes pressure being placed by the Representative of the UN Secretary-General mandated to study internal displacement. It also includes drawing the sustained atention of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons.132 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 IDMC, above n 118. ibid 8. ibid. UNRWA Lebanon Field Oice, ‘Naher el-Bared Refugee Camp: UNRWA Relief, Recovery, and Reconstruction Framework 2008–2011’ (May 2008), 14 <htp://www.unrwa.org/useriles/201001193045.pdf> accessed 12 Mar 2012. ibid. ibid. ibid. Ferris, Mooney, and Stark, above n 117, 2 (‘Internal displacement due to conlict derives from political issues, and all aspects of a government’s response to it therefore are afected by political considerations, including, for example, acknowledgment of displacement, registration and collection of data on IDPs, ensuring the participation of IDPs in decision-making, assistance and protection ofered to diferent (temporal) caseloads of IDPs, support for durable solutions, which durable solutions are supported, and the facilitation of eforts by international organizations to provide protection and assistance to IDPs’). ibid 3. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 In contrast, since 2007, and the destruction of Naher el-Bared refugee camp in Tripoli, which caused the displacement of 31,000 Palestinian refugees, UNHCR has played no part in the protection of IDPs. he main distinction is that, whereas the 33-Day War displaced both Palestinian refugees and non-refugees, in the Naher el-Bared conlict only Palestinian refugees were displaced, thereby not necessitating UNHCR protection. Additionally, while an Israeli ofensive caused the displacement in 2006, in 2007, the Lebanese government bore responsibility for the forced displacement. As of September 2010, only 20 per cent of those displaced Palestinians had returned to their former place of habitual residence.124 he Lebanese Government established a High Relief Commission to coordinate return and compensation on behalf of Palestinian refugees displaced from Naher elBared.125 It worked jointly with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and UNRWA to reconstruct the camp. he Government also created a Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Commitee (LPDC) to deal with these maters, including the return of the refugees to their camps.126 UNRWA received enough funds to rebuild 36 per cent of the homes destroyed. Administrative, juridical and political hurdles have obstructed reconstruction. State and non-state partners aimed to resetle all Palestinian refugees in the camp by 2011.127 By October 2011, while more than 300 families had returned and three of its six schools had been reconstructed, comprehensive resetlement was far from complete.128 In the meantime, UNRWA has been the main, if not sole, provider of humanitarian needs to the displaced Palestinians.129 Whereas 90 per cent of displaced persons returned their homes within four days of the ceaseire in Lebanon, ive years ater the destruction of Naher el-Bared, Palestinian refugees still remain internally displaced. In part this is due to Lebanon’s lack of an internal displacement policy,130 but also it may be atributed to the lack of necessary political pressure and funding to complete the project. According to the Brookings Institute Project on Internal Displacement Study, in which the researchers surveyed iteen of the twenty countries with the highest number of IDPs, political will constitutes the main factor in determining a response to internal displacement.131 Another signiicant inding adds: r Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising hus one may conclude that the international scope of the 33-Day War, coupled with the cooperation of UNHCR, whose mandate is global and its inluential reach considerable, accounts for the diferential levels of protection enjoyed by internally displaced Palestinian refugees in 2006 and then 2007. Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis in March 2011, Palestinian refugees have again been forcibly displaced both internally and to neighbouring countries. his exodus is the most recent episode of Palestinian refugee secondary forced displacement in the Middle East and ofers new lessons on inter-agency collaboration between UNHCR and UNRWA. 4. PA L E ST I N I A N R E F U G E E S I N S Y R I A 4.2 Relationship of Palestinian refugees and UNRWA to the Syrian regime Syria has taken great pride in not only its protection of Palestinian refugees but also of the Palestinian cause itself. Accordingly, it has treated its refugee population favourably relative to its Arab neighbors.137 Together with Jordan, Syria afords the greatest amount of civil, economic, social, and cultural rights to their Palestinian refugee population.138 In 1956, Syria adopted Law 260 and granted Palestinians nearly the same rights as Syrian nationals, with the exception of the right to vote or participate in elections for the Syrian National Council or the Presidency.139 In October 1963, it adopted Law 1311 and granted Palestinian refugees travel documents. Notably, Palestinians do not need a re-entry permit to return to Syria, unlike in Egypt, for example. Moreover, like their Syrian counterparts, Palestinian refugees can change or obtain new travel documents from any Syrian representative oice abroad.140 Additionally, the Syrian government established a department within the Syrian Social Afairs and Labour Ministry to administer the afairs of Palestinian refugees. 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 UNRWA, ‘Where We Work: Syria’ (2013) <htp://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/syria> accessed 12 Mar 2012. Hearn interview, above n 96. ibid; Nabil Mahmoud as-Sahly, ‘Proiles: Palestinian Refugees in Syria’ Al-Majdal BADIL (1999). UNRWA, above n 133 (hese camps include Dar’a, Ein el Tal, Hama, Homs, Jaramana, Khan Dunoun, Khan Eshieh, Latakia, Neirab, Qabr Essit, Sbeineh, and Yarmouk). As-Sahly, above n 135. Akram and Rempel, above n 49. As-Sahly, above n 135 (note that restrictions on land and home ownership do exist). Hearn interview, above n 96. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 4.1 Palestinians in Syria As a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, approximately 90,000 Palestinians from the Galilee region of present-day Israel led to Syria for refuge.133 By the start of the uprising, their population had grown to nearly 500,000 and constituted between 2.8 to 3 per cent of Syria’s population and 10.5 per cent of the Palestinian refugees falling under UNRWA’s mandate.134 he majority of Palestinians were concentrated in the greater Damascus area due to favourable economic opportunities and access to services. he other 25 per cent of the Palestinian population lived in Latakia, Homs, Aleppo, and Der’a.135 here are nine oicial and three unoicial refugee camps in Syria that have been home to approximately 30 per cent of the refugee population.136 Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising r 4.3 Palestinian refugees in light of the Syrian crisis Although Hearn decided to keep Palestinians below the radar for their security, he took the opposite approach when regime forces atacked the Palestinian refugee camp in Latakia. In August 2011, ive months into the conlict, Bashar Al-Assad’s forces atacked the port city of Latakia, home to 10,000 Palestinians. he atack with gunships, tanks, and armoured vehicles forced more than 5,000 Palestinians to lee from the camp.149 Hearn explains that despite conirmation of this event, GAPAR and the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Afairs denied the atack.150 his prompted him to bring the issue to international atention by sharing the news story with BBC, CNN, and Aljazeera, among other global news agencies. he public outcry over the atacks caused the regime tremendous embarrassment and reduced their willingness to approach the camps at all.151 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 ibid. ibid. Nayef Jarrad, ‘Proiles: Palestinian Refugees in Syria’ Al-Majdal BADIL (1999). ibid. Hearn interview, above n 96 (he explains that all of UNRWA’s operations were open to Government consumption and were monitored closely). Hilal interview, above n 39. Hearn interview, above n 96. ibid. Press Association, ‘Syria Assault on Latakia Drives 5,000 Palestinians from Refugee Camp’ he Guardian (15 Aug2011) <htp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/15/syria-palestinians-latakia-assault> accessed 27 Mar 2012. Hearn interview, above n 96. ibid. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 Today that body is known as the Syrian General Authority for Palestine Arab Refugees (GAPAR). GAPAR has served as an interlocutor with UNRWA and has oicially managed the refugee camps. Despite its lack of resources, it has served as the focal point for the Government, the refugees, and UNRWA.141 According to Roger Hearn, UNRWA’s former Director of Afairs in Syria, it was seen as an inextricable part of the regime.142 his integration relects both the positive integration of Palestinian refugees into Syria as well as the regime’s desire to co-opt the Palestinian political bodies within its borders to mitigate the risk they could pose to national stability. Syria has refused to enter into negotiations with Israel until it withdraws from Arab and Palestinian lands. Accordingly, Syria has rejected the peace setlements achieved by Egypt and Jordan and supports separatist Palestinian forces outside the mainstream of Palestinian political groups.143 his staunch position also informs Syria’s policy towards, and relationship with, UNRWA.144 he Syrian regime views UNRWA as necessary but also as a threat and monitors its work closely.145 Like in Jordan and Lebanon, where UNRWA has been operating since 1948, in Syria, UNRWA has come under government surveillance, inluence, and, in many ways, control.146 As the Arab uprisings unfolded, this relationship became tense. Hearn explains that the relationship between the Syrian regime and UNRWA went from ‘sterling to horrible’ once he instructed his staf not to atend a pro-government rally.147 he tension made Hearn’s long-term position in Syria untenable. During his tenure, however, he decided that, as a mater of policy, it was in the Palestinians’ best interest to make them less visible during the Syrian uprising.148 r Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 ‘Palestinians Killed in “Nakba” Clashes’ Al Jazeera (15 May 2011) <htp://www.aljazeera.com/news/middlee ast/2011/05/2011515649440342.html> accessed 20 May 2011. Hearn interview, above n 96. Phil Sands, ‘Up to 12 Killed as Palestinian Refugees Are Drawn into Syria Revolt’ he National (8 June 2011) <htp:// www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/up-to-12-killed-as-palestinian-refugees-are-drawn-into-syria-revolt#page1> accessed 1 May 2012. Danish Immigration Service, ‘Report on Fact-Finding Mission to Syria and Lebanon, Conditions for Kurds and Stateless Palestinians in Syria etc.’ (17–27 Sept 2001) <htp://www.refworld.org/pdid/3df0f7c80.pdf> accessed 1 May 2012 (as of 2000, the following ten political parties existed in Syria: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Palestinian Revolutionary Communist Party (PRCP), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC), Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), Fatah al-intifada, Saiqa, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Hamas). Sands, above n 154. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. William Tucker, ‘Hamas Leaves Syria’ (In Homeland Security, 1 Mar 2012) <htp://inhomelandsecurity.com/hamas-leavessyria/> accessed on 1 May 2012. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 Tensions between Palestinian refugees and the regime had arisen at least two months before the atack on Latakia. In May 2011, Palestinians organized a global march of return onto the borders of Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory in order to airm their right to return.152 Israeli forces killed some of the Palestinian and Arab participants, including twenty-two persons in the Israeli occupied Golan Heights.153 Palestinian refugees in Syria, who looked upon the protest with suspicion, atributed responsibility for the deaths to the Popular Front for the Liberation of PalestineGeneral Command (PFLP-GC), who took part in organizing the march.154 he PFLP-GC is one of ten Palestinian political organizations that exist in Syria.155 It is seen as being close to, if not a branch of, Syria’s security service and secret police.156 Many Palestinian refugees believed that the Syrian government had facilitated the protest upon the Golan Heights, which it has not made accessible to protestors since its occupation in 1967, in order to divert atention away from its own internal unrest.157 he 50,000 Palestinians who mourned the fallen took their procession to the PFLP-GC headquarters where they threw stones at the building before seting it on ire.158 he PFLP-GC guards shot directly at the crowd and killed twelve of the protestors.159 he atack on the PLFP-GC oice arguably signalled that the Palestinian refugee population did not want to be drawn into the Syrian national conlict and did not want to be used as a ‘bargaining chip in an internal Syrian argument’.160 An independent Syrian analyst specializing in Palestinian afairs explains that this is why the protestors burned down the PFLP-GC oice but let the Hamas oice untouched, ‘Hamas has remained independent while the PFLP has openly sided with the Syrian government’.161 In late February 2011, Hamas abandoned its neutrality and let Syria for Qatar and Egypt. he group’s political leader, Khaled Meshaal, who had taken refuge in Syria since 1999, moved to Doha and his deputy, Moussa Abu Marzouk, is located in Cairo. he move signalled an end to Syrian patronage and a disavowal of the Assad regime.162 Ismail Haniyeh, the head of the Hamas government in Gaza, declared his support for the opposition forces in Syria declaring them, Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising r 5. S E CO N DA RY F O RC E D D I S P L A C E M E N T F RO M S Y R I A Palestinian refugees have led to Jordan from Syria since March 2011, when ighting began six kilometres from the Jordanian border in Dera’a. Many of the irst refugees who led from Dera’a had extended family in Jordan. As the crisis escalated and spread across Syria, Palestinians from other cities started to lee to Jordan as well.170 As of 29 October 2013, 9,657 Palestinian refugees from Syria have taken refuge in Jordan.171 he protracted and ongoing exodus of Palestinian refugees to Lebanon began in midJuly 2012 ater a string of mortar atacks upon the Yarmouk refugee camp killed twenty people.172 By September 2012, 3,000 Palestinian refugees had arrived in Lebanon,173 an additional 2,000 arrived in October 2012.174 he numbers of Palestinian refugees leeing Syria increased exponentially ater December 2012, when a Syrian jet bombed 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 ‘Hamas Political Leaders Leave Syria for Egypt and Qatar’ BBC News Middle East (28 Feb 2012) <htp://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-middle-east-17192278> accessed on 1 May 2012. ibid. ‘UNRWA Chief Advises Palestinians in Syria to Remain Neutral’ Kuwait News Agency (3 Sept 2012) <htp://www.kuna. net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2226160&language=en> accessed on 1 May 2012; DPA, ‘UN: Palestinians’ Neutrality in Syria Conlict Must Be Respected’ Haaretz (11 Mar 2012) <htp://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/un-palestiniansneutrality-in-syria-conlict-must-be-respected-1.417732> accessed on 1 May 2012. ‘PFLP-GC Protests Leader’s Position on Syria’ Ma’an News Agency (8 July 2012). ibid. ‘ibid. Lauren Williams, ‘Palestinian Camp Atack in Syria Sparks Fears of Factional Tensions’ he Daily Star (4 Aug 2012) (PA, Hamas, Islamic Jihad were all calling for neutrality, meanwhile FSA ighters had taken refuge in the Yarmouk). Christopher Phillips, ‘he Impact of Syrian Refugees on Turkey and Jordan’ he World Today (Oct 2012). ‘Syria Crisis Update 62’, above n 3; UNRWA, ‘Syria Crisis Situation Update: Issue 39’ (UNRWA 23 Mar 2013) <htp:// www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=1686> accessed on 1 Apr 2013. ‘PFLP-GC Protests’, above n 166. Mohammed Zaatari, ‘Palestinian Refugees from Syria Reside in an UNRWA School in Ain al-Hilweh’ he Daily Star (18 Sept 2012). Jonathan Broadberry, ‘Palestinians Escaping Syria Find Litle Relief in Lebanon’ Open Democracy (7 Oct 2012). Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 ‘heroic people … striving for freedom, democracy, and reform’.163 he move was an afront to the regime, which provided Hamas with refuge and aid ater their expulsion from Jordan.164 Still, the Palestinians, as well as those who speak on their behalf, have insisted on maintaining their neutrality in the conlict. Filippo Grandi, then Commissioner General of UNRWA, publicly appealed to Palestinian refugees in Syria to remain neutral and called upon all parties to respect their neutrality.165 he oicial Palestinian leadership, together with all the Palestinian political factions in Syria, agreed to remain neutral to the Syrian conlict.166 However, in early July, the PFLP-GC Secretary-General, Ahmed Jibreel, in contravention of his party’s political decisions, threw his support behind the Syrian regime in the conlict thereby undermining Palestinian neutrality.167 He has allegedly recruited hundreds of Palestinian gunmen to defend Palestinian refugee camps against rebel ighters. Moreover, in Dera’a, Homs, Hama, and Latakia, the Syrian opposition resented the Palestinian refugees for not joining the revolution. Despite their restraint and their insistence on neutrality, Palestinian refugees have helped support the protestors through the distribution of medical supplies and the provision of food.168 To complicate maters, Free Syrian Army forces have also taken refuge in Yarmouk refugee camp.169 hese confrontations, divergent loyalties, and unexpected circumstances have exposed Palestinian refugees to the brunt of Syria’s gruesome civil war, forcing them to lee to neighbouring countries. r Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising a mosque and a school inside the Yarmouk refugee camp.175 By late October 2013, their numbers had reached 49,000.176 he Syrian crisis has also caused the forced displacement of Palestinian refugees within Syria. As of October 2013, approximately 250,000 have become internally displaced persons (IDP) and are under UNRWA’s protection in Syria.177 Six thousand Palestinian refugees are in Egypt178 and an unspeciied number have led to Turkey.179 In November 2013, UNRWA announced that its US $36 million deicit would limit its ability to provide humanitarian services and pay 30,000 employees for the month of December 2013.180 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 Martin Chulov, ‘Palestinians lee to Lebanon ater jet bombs Syria’s largest refugee camp’ he Guardian (18 Dec2012) <htp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/dec/18/syria-palestinian-refugees-lee-yarmouk> accessed on 12 Mar 2013. ‘Syria Crisis Update 62’, above n 3; hanassis Cambanis, ‘Syria’s Refugees Overwhelming Relief Eforts and Host Countries, U.N. Oicials Says’ New York Times (4 Apr 2013). UNRWA, ‘Syria Crisis Situation Update: Issue 43’ (UNRWA, 20 Apr 2013) <htp://www.unrwa.org/etemplate. php?id=1721> accessed on 1 May 2013. ‘Syria Crisis Update 62’, above n 3. Relief Web, ‘Regional Analysis Syria’ (28 Mar 2013) <htp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/iles/resources/Regional%20 Analysis%20Syria%20-%20Part%20II%20Host%20Countries.pdf> accessed on 1 May 2013. AFP, ‘UN Palestinian Agency to Stop Paying Wages’ France 24 (19 Nov 2013) <htp://www.france24.com/en/20131119un-palestinian-agency-stop-paying-wages/?ns_campaign=editorial&ns_fee=0&ns_linkname=20131119_un_palestinian_agency_stop_paying_wages&ns_mchannel=RSS&ns_source=RSS_public> accessed on 1 May 2013. UNHCR, ‘Syria Regional Refugee Response: Jordan’ (2013) <htp://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107> accessed 1 May 2013. ‘Syria Crisis Update 62’, above n 3. ‘Jordan to Establish Bufer Zone for Palestinian Refugees from Syria’ Kuwait News Agency (9 Apr 2012) <htp://www.kuna. net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2232555&language=en> accessed 1 May 2013. ibid. ‘Jordan Concerned over Growing Palestinian Refugee Inlux’ Palestinian News Network (3 Sept 2012) <htp://english. pnn.ps/index.php/international/2575-jordan-concerned-over-growing-palestinian-refugee-inlux> accessed 20 Feb 2013 (‘Jordan prefers to transfer Palestinian refugees out of the country, over concerns that opening camps on Jordanian territories may cause a mass migration of the Palestinians from Syria’). ibid; see also Cohen, above n 93, 307 (the Kingdom evidenced its aversion to Palestinian refugees when it denied entry to the families of Palestinian women with Jordanian passports leeing Iraq. hey only entered Jordan ater the King passed a Royal Decree and, in that case, less than 500 persons beneited from the Decree). HRW ‘Nowhere to Flee’, above n 82. ibid. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 5.1 Jordan Since the conlict began, nearly 525,231 Syrians have led to Jordan and are registered with UNHCR.181 As of 29 October 2013, 9,657 Palestinian refugees have registered with UNRWA.182 Upon discovering seventeen Palestinian refugees among a wave of Syrian refugees in April 2012, Jordan considered developing a bufer zone to ofer them shelter without permiting them to enter the country.183 he Government commented that Palestinian entry into Jordan sets a ‘dangerous precedent’184 as it opens the possibility of mass migration of Palestinian refugees from Syria.185 Jordan prefers not to absorb any more Palestinians, who currently constitute 70 per cent of its population.186 While Jordan has not created a bufer zone with Syria to ofer Palestinian refugees shelter, it has detained Palestinians who have entered Jordan through unoicial crossings without the possibility for release, except to Syria.187 Jordanian oicials have detained these refugees in Cyber City, a walled complex of technology companies outside Ramtha.188 Jordan administratively detains these refugees and precludes their access to judicial or administrative review. Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising r 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 ‘Analysis: Palestinian Refugees from Syria Feel Abandoned’ IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis (29 Aug2012) <htp:// www.irinnews.org/Report/96202/Analysis-Palestinian-refugees-from-Syria-feel-abandoned> accessed 1 May 2013. ‘UNRWA Social Worker a “Life-saver” Says Palestine Refugee from Syria’ (27 Aug 2012) <htp://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=1421> accessed 1 May 2013. HRW ‘Nowhere to Flee’, above n 82; Amnesty International, ‘Growing Restrictions, Tough Conditions: he Plight of hose Fleeing Syria to Jordan’ (30 Oct 2013) 5. Amnesty, ibid. Interview by telephone with army member, Free Syria Army (14 Dec 2012), on ile with author. ibid. Bill Frelick and Meera Shah, ‘President’s Visit Shouldn’t Ignore Refugees in Peril’ Salon (22 Mar 2013) <htp://www.salon. com/2013/03/22/dont_ignore_syrian_children_in_peril/> accessed 1 May 2013 (‘Jordan has made a clear and explicit sovereign decision to not allow the crossing to Jordan by our Palestinian brothers who hold Syrian documents’). Interview by telephone with a Palestinian refugee (9 Dec 2012), on ile with author. ibid. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 Palestinians located in Cyber City are not allowed to move beyond 30 metres of the camp and, although it is only 12 kilometres from the city of Ramtha, it is not supported by public transport.189 UNRWA is able to provide basic goods to the Palestinians detained there.190 Jordan has also forcibly returned newly arriving Palestinians from Syria in violation of the customary law prohibition on refoulement.191 his has included forcing refugees to cross the border back into Syria at gunpoint as well as denying families entry with no reason.192 A member of the Free Syrian Army, whose job is to transport refugees from Syria to Jordan, explained that he began to discourage Palestinian refugees from atempting to make the journey to Jordan in April 2012 when the Government’s policy of exclusion and deportation became evident.193 Word of mouth has diminished the number of Palestinian refugees who even come to the border.194 In an October 2012 interview, the Jordanian Prime Minister, Abdullah Ensour, publicly announced Jordan’s policy of refusing Palestinian refugees from Syria entry into Jordan.195 his knowledge, however, has not stopped the most desperate families from atempting to cross the border. In one case, a Palestinian who was born in Iraq, but who has a Jordanian passport from her father because he immigrated to Iraq in the ities, and whose late husband passed his Iraqi citizenship on to their four children,196 let Iraq for Yemen in the late nineties as a result of the pressures created by US-imposed sanctions. Ater eleven years in Yemen, Yemeni authorities refused to renew the family’s paperwork and they travelled through Syria to Greek Cyprus in 2009. Greek authorities refused to grant them asylum and atempted to deport the family back to Iraq. Ater two years of failed atempts to acquire asylum in Cyprus, and fearing conditions in Iraq, the family travelled to Syria in May 2011. he husband died there in February 2012 and, within a few months, Syrian authorities discovered that she and her children had overstayed their transit visa. In June 2012, the family atempted to enter Jordan, but Jordanian oicials refused entry to the children, who lacked Jordanian passports. he mother and her four children remained stranded on the Jordanian-Syrian border for four days before Syrian oicials permited her children to enter. Since then, her children have been in Yarmouk, under UNHCR’s mandate, and she has been in Jordan, under UNRWA’s mandate. She is hopeful that her children will be eligible for third-country resetlement, even if she is not eligible to travel with them.197 Although she sought assistance from UNRWA, the agency was unable to successfully intervene on her behalf. r Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 ‘Syria Crisis Update 43’, above n 177. ibid. Interview with Lisa Gilliam, Deputy Director of the Executive Oice, UNRWA (Field Oice-Jordan, 11 Dec 2013). United Nations, ‘Syria Regional Response Plan ( Jan-June 2013)’. ibid. ibid. ‘Syria Crisis Update 43’, above n 177. HRW, ‘Nowhere to Flee’, above n 82. ‘Report on United Nations Conciliation’, above n 12. ‘Analysis: Palestine Refugees’, above n 189. HRW, ‘Nowhere to Flee’, above n 82. ibid. ‘Jordan Concerned’, above n 185. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 As of March 2013, UNRWA has intervened in ninety-one cases of refoulement and successfully stayed forty-one of those deportations to Syria.198 UNRWA has unconirmed reports of many more cases.199 While the principle of non-refoulement is squarely within UNHCR’s mandate, practical political considerations in Jordan make it diicult for them to actively support UNRWA’s advocacy on behalf of Palestinian refugees facing such risk.200 Indeed, all the United Nations Regional Response Plans to date, intended to coordinate an inter-agency response to the low of refugees from Syria, have excluded Palestinian refugees from the Jordanian section.201 In contrast to Palestinian refugees, Jordan has ofered Syrian refugees de facto temporary protection, regardless of whether or not they enter Jordan through an oicial border.202 Syrian refugees can enter without a visa, have access to the labour market, as well as to legal counselling and services.203 Syrian refugees who have entered Jordan irregularly have been detained until they establish their identity, pass a security check, and have a Jordanian national identiied as their guarantor, or someone responsible for cooperating with Jordanian authorities if any issues arise relating to the person in their care.204 UNHCR then registers these Syrians in a transit centre. Once registered, they move into the various towns and cities where they can move freely about Jordan.205 Syrians who are unable to ind guarantors are housed in Cyber City until one is located. his is not an ideal situation for Syrian refugees. Many are unable to work legally and are subject to labour exploitation, as well as to national resentment for burdening Jordan’s already meagre economy.206 Still, there is a clear distinction in the treatment of Syrian and Palestinian refugees leeing Syria. Even when Palestinian refugees from Syria have family in Jordan who are willing to be guarantors, Jordanian authorities prohibit them from leaving the camp to visit or stay with these relatives.207 he General Secretary at the Jordanian Ministry of the Interior atributed this disparate treatment to their respective conditions. He explains that, unlike their Syrian counterparts, Palestinian refugees were not facing violence in Syria.208 Moreover, the General Secretary added, the fact that the state had not deported its Palestinian refugees all together is a ‘humanitarian gesture’.209 Jordan’s Minister of the Interior adds that Jordan will not consider Palestinians leeing Syria as refugees because ‘… those Palestinians were forced to come to [ Jordan] and they are refugees in another country … [ Jordan] will only treat them as guests’.210 Although UNRWA and UNHCR have continued to hold high-level meetings to discuss the emergency situation, neither agency has been able to ofer meaningful Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising r protection to Palestinian refugees to overcome their exclusion, detention, and refoulement challenges.211 his has included appeals from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guteres, to aford greater protection for Palestinian refugees leeing Syria.212 Lisa Gilliam, UNRWA’s Deputy Director of its Executive Oice, participated in the response to the Palestinian refugee exodus from Iraq. She comments that there is a clear distinction between the treatment of Palestinian refugees who led Iraq and those currently leeing Syria: 5.2 Lebanon Although Lebanon’s domestic politics makes it similarly averse to absorbing more Palestinian refugees,214 it has, until August 2013, kept its borders open to those leeing Syria.215 As of November 2013, Lebanon has provided refuge to nearly one million Syrian refugees and 49,000 Palestinian refugees, placing signiicant strain on the country, which is already host to 400,000 Palestinian refugees who led their homes in 1948.216 On August 6, 2013, Lebanon sealed its border to Palestinian refugees and, as of 15 November 2013, this policy has not changed.217 he Government insists that the border is open but they have placed arbitrary restrictions on Palestinian movement.218 As of November 2013, approximately 150 Palestinians enter Lebanon each day, a signiicant drop from the 1,000 refugees who entered daily before August 2013.219 he reduced numbers do not indicate a drop of refugee low in absolute numbers. he low between Lebanon and Syria predating the new border policy was also much higher because Palestinian refugees could travel back and forth without the risk of being denied entry.220 In reported cases, Palestinian refugees have also been forced to pay bribes or provide sexual favours to Lebanese and Syrian personnel patrolling the border.221 Until March 2013, UNRWA did not have the capacity to staf the border and monitor the low of Palestinian refugees and depended on UNHCR staf to provide them with numbers 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 Gilliam interview, above n 200. Statement of Antonio Guterres, United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, at the hearing on ‘Syria’s Humanitarian Crisis’, United States Senate Foreign Relations Subcommitee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Afairs (19 Mar 2013). Gilliam interview, above n 200. Hilal Khashan, Palestinian Resetlement in Lebanon: Behind the Debate, Inter-University Consortium for Arab Studies (Montreal Studies on the Contemporary Arab World 1994). Cambanis, above n 176. ‘Syria Crisis Update 62’, above n 3. HRW, ‘Lebanon: Palestinians Fleeing Syria Denied Entry’ (8 Aug 2013) <htp://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/07/lebanon-palestinians-leeing-syria-denied-entry> accessed 31 Oct 2013. Interview with Emily Krehm (by Skype), Protection and Coordination Oicer, UNRWA-Lebanon (Field Oice, 1 Nov 2013). ibid. ibid. ibid. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 When I was Deputy Director in Syria, the Palestinian refugee issue was well-integrated into every general meeting of the UN humanitarian response. In Jordan, the extreme sensitivity the Palestinian inlux from Syria presents to Jordanian authorities seems to create a level of wariness on the part of sister agencies towards UNRWA.213 r Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 Interview with Catherine Richards, Field Protection Oicer, UNRWA-Lebanon (Field Oice, 2 Jan 2013). ibid. ‘Syria Crisis Update 43’, above n 177. Broadberry, above n 174. ‘Analysis: Palestine Refugees’, above n 189. Ein El Helweh, Nahr Bared, Rashidieh, Roushmalli, al Bas. Krehm interview, above 218. ‘Syria Regional Response Plan’, above n 201. ibid. Richards Interview, above n 222. ‘Syria Crisis Update 43’, above n 177. ‘Report Highlights Poor Conditions of Palestinian Refugees from Syria’ he Daily Star (29 Mar 2013) <htp://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2013/Mar-29/211848-report-highlights-poor-conditions-of-palestinian-refugees-fromsyria.ashx#axzz2PjsAaHIm> accessed 1 May 2013. Richards interview, above n 222. Interview with Dominique Tohme, Legal Adviser, UNHCR -Lebanon (Field Oice, 4 Jan 2013). ‘Syria Crisis Update 62’, above n 3 (Emergency Response Assistant, clerk, and three social workers to support the humanitarian response, and an Emergency Coordination Oicer). Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 and statistics instead.222 Since March 2013, UNRWA has added two members of staf to monitor and patrol the border.223 Like Jordan, Lebanon treats Syrian and Palestinian refugees diferently. Syrian refugees can cross the Lebanese border with their ID cards, obtain a six-month visa free of charge and renew it every six-months for up to one year.224 In contrast, Palestinian refugees must obtain an exit permit from the Ministry of Interior in Syria, must purchase a two-week transit visa for LBP 25,000 (US $17),225 and renew it every month for LBP 50,000 (US $33).226 Obtaining a visa in Lebanon is necessary to register births, to drive, and to obtain the special permits necessary for entrance into ive Palestinian refugee camps.227 herefore, while refugees can evade the cost-prohibitive visas, they face signiicant risks for being in irregular status.228 In February 2013, Lebanon’s General Security issued a circular waiving these fees for Palestinian refugees who wanted to leave within one year, in part, to facilitate their departure from Lebanon.229 UNRWA considers this among its protection achievements.230 Both Syrian and Palestinian refugees must obtain a visa that costs US $200 per person ater one year.231 Even ater Palestinian refugees have crossed into Lebanon, their conditions remain squalid. he majority of these refugees live in existing Palestinian refugee camps and half of those live with relatives.232 A January 2013 survey of the nearly 30,000 Syrian Palestinians in Lebanon found that 73 per cent of families did not have enough food to feed the entire family, only 10 per cent of working age Palestinian refugees have work. Fity-nine per cent of families are living in one room, while almost 54 per cent do not have running water.233 Palestinian children have enrolled in UNRWA schools where their major challenge is the language barrier; the curriculum in Syria is in Arabic whereas in Lebanon it is not.234 Since the beginning of the Syria Crisis up to January 2013, UNHCR grew its Lebanon-based staf by seven times to handle the population of 325,000 Syrian refugees.235 In contrast, UNRWA-Lebanon began to expand its capacity in November 2012. By January 2013, it had only created six new positions to provide for the additional 36,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria.236 Since January 2013, it has accelerated Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising r 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 Richards interview, above n 222. ‘Palestine Refugees Feel Abandoned’, above n 189. Richards interview, above n 222. ibid. ibid. Broadberry, above n 174 (UNRWA requested US $54 million to implement a regional response and by October 2012, it had only received US $6.83 million. Moreover, UNRWA has developed an US $8.26 million plan to cater for 10,000 displaced Palestinians and, as of October 2012, none of this additional money has been pledged). ibid. Richards interview, above n 222. ibid. ibid. ibid. ‘Syria Regional Response Plan’, above n 201 (this is the fourth inter-agency plan drated since March 2012; the irst three reports excluded Palestinian refugees all together). ibid. ibid 60. ibid 63. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 its expansion project and created new educational opportunities, hired extra teachers, extra counsellors, extended hospital hours, and hired more nurses and doctors.237 UNRWA was aware that Lebanese oicials would only tolerate a limited number of Palestinian refugees, this impacted its behaviour at the beginning of the crisis.238 It then made its presence to receive refugees known, but did not proactively go out to ind incoming refugees.239 he agency was also concerned not to inlate expectations of its ability to provide services, which remain limited due to budgetary constraints.240 Since October 2012, when Palestinian refugees began arriving in Lebanon from Syria in signiicantly higher numbers it has changed its approach.241 UNRWA has endured a budgetary shortfall since the start of the conlict.242 Initially, this was partly atributed to the fact that donors were largely unaware of the distinction between UNRWA and UNHCR, and ‘when they think of the Syrian crisis they will tend to support the UNHCR, not necessarily UNRWA’.243 Consequently, much of the initial NGO funding for refugees was only available to refugees registered with UNHCR.244 Although UNRWA and UNHCR atend inter-agency meetings, they were not able to efectively coordinate their eforts from the start of the conlict.245 Since this is a refugee crisis, coordination is led by UNHCR in the humanitarian sector meetings.246 When it speaks on behalf of refugees, it does not do so on behalf of Palestinian refugees, but asks UNRWA to do so.247 For the irst time since the start of the conlict, UNHCR included about 20,000 Palestinian refugees in the Lebanese section of the fourth Syria Regional Response Plan ( January – July 2013).248 he report states that ‘in view of the limited ability of the Lebanon-based Palestinian community to absorb, support and host additional refugees, it appears crucial that this group should also receive atention in the coming months’.249 he UNHCR report acknowledged that the burden on both Palestinian communities and UNRWA services is heavy, especially with additional Palestinian refugees arriving monthly. UNHCR, in collaboration with other UN agencies including UNRWA, will provide services to refugees, including Palestinian refugees from Syria. he report notes the following areas of assistance from UNRWA: legal and social counselling for people in detention,250 distribution of food vouchers,251 baby kits, various sanitation r Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising services, and water supply,252 amongst other services. Since then, UNRWA has been able to integrate itself into the ith Regional Response Plan 5 as well.253 his is beneicial to the refugees because a uniied United Nations approach pleases donors and forces the two agencies to improve their coordination.254 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 ibid. Krehm interview, above n 218. ibid. UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Highlights Dangers Facing Syrians in Transit, Urges Countries to Keep Borders Open’ (18 Oct 2013) <htp://www.unhcr.org/526114299.html> accessed 31 Oct 2012; MR, ‘Egypt’s Syrian Refugees: Cast Adrit’ he Economist (5 Oct 2013) <htp://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2013/10/egypts-syrian-refugees> accessed 31 Oct 2013. ‘Syria Crisis Update 43’, above n 177. ‘Life is Bleak for Syrian Refugees in Jordan’ DW (1 Nov 2013) <htp://www.dw.de/life-is-bleak-for-syrian-refugees-injordan/a-17198704> accessed 4 Nov 2013. ‘Syria Crisis Update 62’, above n 3. ‘Egypt Creates Exception for Palestinian Refugees Fleeing Syria’ Palestinian News Network (28 Mar 2013) <htp://english. pnn.ps/index.php/international/4331-egypt-creates-exception-for-palestinian-refugees-leeing-syria> 1 May 2013. ibid. ibid. Miriam Berger, ‘Fleeing Syria, Palestinians Find Haven and Hardships in Egypt’ Egypt Independent (18 Mar 2013) <htp:// www.egyptindependent.com/news/leeing-syria-palestinians-ind-haven-and-hardships-egypt> 1 May 2013. ibid. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 5.3 Egypt Palestinian refugees face considerable challenges inding refuge in Egypt. As of 29 October 2013, Egypt had ofered refuge to approximately 300,000 Syrian refugees, more than 122,000 of whom are registered with UNHCR.255 Originally, Egypt permited Syrian refugees entry without a visa and considered them eligible for a renewable three-month residency.256 In July 2013, when the military overthrew President Mohamed Morsi, Egypt changed this policy and imposed a mandatory visa for Syrian refugees.257 As of late October 2013, there are 6,000 Palestinian refugees in Egypt.258 hey should fall under UNCHR’s mandate since they are outside of UNRWA’s areas of operations and in Egypt, which is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention. However, the North African country has prohibited UNHCR from registering them in contravention of paragraph 7(c) of the Statute or Article 1(D) of the Convention as regards Palestinian refugees.259 he Egyptian government claims that Palestinians are ineligible for UNHCR’s protection in Egypt.260 his analysis contradicts UNHCR’s clear policy on the mater as outlined in its Statute as well as its 2009 Revised Note on Article 1(D). A senior protection oicer at UNHCR stated that even though the Egyptian government has ‘pledged to treat Syrians with Palestinian travel documents the same as other Syrian refugees’, this is not what happens in practice.261 he same oicer also noted that the Egyptian Foreign Ministry has actually asked UNHCR not to register Palestinians leeing Syria as they fall under UNRWA’s mandate.262 Hundreds of Palestinians have sought to register with UNHCR but, in compliance with the government’s request, the agency has refused to do so, leaving the Palestinian refugee population from Syria without access to basic international protection.263 Egypt also creates additional hurdles for Palestinian refugees before they are granted entry. It mandates that Palestinian refugees must arrive directly from Damascus into Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising r 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 ‘Egypt Creates Exceptions’, above n 259. ibid. ibid. ibid. Amnesty ‘Growing Restrictions’, above n 191. ibid. HRW, ‘Egypt: Syria Refugees Detained, Coerced to Return’ Human Rights Watch News (11 Nov 2013) <htp://www. hrw.org/news/2013/11/10/egypt-syria-refugees-detained-coerced-return> accessed 15 Nov 2013; Amnesty, ‘Growing Restrictions’, above n 191, 26. Maggie Fick and Abdel Rahman Youssef, ‘Surviving “Death Boat”, Syria Palestinians Locked Up in Egypt’ Reuters (19 Nov 2013). Amnesty, ‘Growing Restrictions’, above n 191, 26. ibid. UNHCR, ‘Dangers Facing Syrians in Transit’, above n 255. HRW, ‘Egypt’, above n 270. AFP, ‘Egypt Claims No Syrian Refugees Forced to Leave’ Ahram Online (13 Nov 2013) <htp://english.ahram.org.eg/ NewsContent/1/64/86377/Egypt/Politics-/-Egypt-claims-no-Syrian-refugees-forced-to-leave.aspx> accessed 15 Nov 2013. ibid. ‘Syrian, Palestinian Refugees Held in Egypt Begin Hunger Strike’ Reuters (22 Nov2013) <htp://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/22/us-egypt-palestinians-idUSBRE9AL0MT20131122> accessed 23 Nov2013. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 Egypt’s Cairo airport.264 his is a diicult threshold to overcome given the routine closure of Damascus airport.265 Alternatively, Palestinian refugees have atempted to enter through Lebanese and Turkish airports.266 hose refugees are either detained at Cairo airport and coerced to return to Syria or are forced to shutle between Egyptian, Lebanese, and Turkish airports.267 Presumably, UNRWA personnel have been so taxed within its areas of operations during the Syrian crisis that it has been unable to meaningfully intervene on behalf of these Palestinian refugees. Since July 2013, the situation has become much more precarious for all refugees.268 Egypt has made refugees scapegoats in its turbulent political climate and made it a policy to arrest and deport refugees to other countries, including back to Syria.269 Several humanitarian agencies have reported that Egypt has detained 1,500 refugees, including 250 children and more than 400 Palestinian refugees for not having up-to-date permits or for atempting to leave Egypt illegally.270 In some cases, detained Syrian refugees can legally leave Egypt to seek shelter elsewhere; Palestinians are never able to do so unless they return to Syria.271 Syrian and Palestinian refugees alike have atempted to lee Egypt by boat.272 In one instance, on 17 September 2013, the Egyptian navy opened ire on a boat headed towards Italy carrying 150 Syrian and Palestinian refugees. he navy killed two of the refugees, injured two others, and detained the survivors.273 In another instance, in early October 2013, a boat carrying 150 refugees sank of the coast of Egypt killing twelve refugees and leaving several others missing; Egypt detained the survivors.274 In November 2013, Egyptian authorities denied that it forced any refugees to leave but insist that they will continue to detain the refugees indeinitely until they leave the country.275 Egypt also announced that it would lit the mandatory visa for Syrians to enter Egypt.276 As of 4 November 2013, 300 refugees, including 211 Palestinians, remain in Egyptian custody.277 On 22 November 2013, ity-two Palestinian and Syrian refugees began a hunger strike to protest at their detention and demand that they be permited to seek refuge elsewhere.278 One Palestinian refugee involved in the hunger r Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising strike explained, ‘We will not eat until we die or until we are allowed to go to any country that will accept us’.279 Egypt has made no policy shits to allow Palestinians to register with UNHCR once in the country or to reduce the hurdles impeding their entry. 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 ibid. Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, ‘Syrian Refugees in Turkey: A Status in Limbo’, (Oct 2011). Tariq Hamoud, ‘he Impact of the Syrian Revolution on Palestinian Refugees’ JPRS Magazine (14 Feb2013) <htp://www. prc.org.uk/portal/index.php/english-media/jprs-magazine/2889-the-impact-of-the-syrian-revolution-on-palestinian-refugees> accessed 1 May 2013. UNHCR, ‘Syria Regional Refugee Response: Turkey’ (2013) <htp://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224> accessed 31 Oct 2012; UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Welcomes Turkey’s New Law on Asylum’ (12 Apr 2013) <htp://www.unhcr. org/5167e7d09.html> accessed 1 May 2013. ibid. ibid. ‘Syria Crisis Update 43’, above n 177, 16. ‘Syria Regional Response Plan’, above n 201, 7; UNHCR, ‘Reservations and Declarations to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees’ (31 Jan 1967) <htp://www.unhcr.org/4dac37d79.html> accessed 10 Mar2013 Amnesty ‘Growing Restrictions’, above n 191, 23. Akram and Rempel, above n 49. ibid. ibid 12. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 5.4 Turkey Syrian refugees began to trickle into Turkey from mid-March 2011 as they led from bombardment in Idlib, Hama, Homs, and Latakia.280 Many Palestinian refugees led Syria to Turkey in August 2011 when the Al Raml refugee camp in Latakia was bombed.281 According to UNHCR, there are approximately 506,551 Syrian refugees in the country, as of 31 October 2013.282 A litle less than half of those reside in state-run refugees camps.283 As a result of the growing number of refugees in cities and towns, in March 2013, Turkey decided to register the 70,000 urban refugees as well, whose numbers now reach 306,257.284 here is limited information on the number and location of Palestinian refugees in Turkey.285 Turkey has ratiied the 1951 Convention, but limits its compliance with the Convention to persons who have become refugees as a result of events occurring in Europe.286 As per its policy, Turkey has not extended refugee status, and therefore the possibility of asylum, integration, or resetlement for the Syrian refugees within its borders. It has, however, aforded the refugee populations protection under a temporary protection regime, in conformity with international standards, since October 2011.287 Temporary protection is a legal norm created to deal with mass inluxes of refugees escaping armed conlict or other forms of generalized violence.288 Along with non-refoulement and asylum, it is among the three forms of protection a state can ofer to refugees.289 It provides protection that is temporary in nature from the host state to speciic groups or individuals. It is granted with the understanding that it is an interim solution until the end of conlict, at which point the individuals or groups will return to their homes or will be ofered a more permanent solution elsewhere. Finally, under temporary protection the persons or groups beneit from fewer rights relative to Convention refugees.290 Accordingly, Turkey has admited persons leeing Syria without regard for proper documentation. Passports have suiced to aford the refugees a three-month stay, Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising r temporary shelter, and aid in Turkey. he temporary protection regime also protects refugees against forcible return to Syria. Palestinian refugees from Syria, as well as stateless persons, also fall under UNHCR’s mandate in Turkey and have beneited from the temporary protection regime without discrimination.291 Turkey changed this liberal policy in August 2012. Since then, Turkey has restricted entry for thousands of Syrian refugees who do not have passports or who are not in need of urgent medical care.292 In March 2013, Turkey deported 600 refugees back to Syria ater protests at the Akcakale refugee camp.293 Turkey has reportedly deported Syrian nationals on a smaller scale since then as well.294 Although speciic information is not known about Palestinian refugees, they have reportedly faced more diiculty entering Turkey than their Syrian counterparts since Turkey imposed more stringent standards.295 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 ‘Syria Crisis Update 43’, above n 177. Amnesty ‘Growing Restrictions’, above n 191, 23. Amnesty International, ‘Turkey Forces Hundreds of Syrian Refugees Back Across Border’ (28 Mar 2013). Amnesty ‘Growing Restrictions’, above n 191, 24. ibid; Fick and Youssef, above n 271. USAID, ‘Syria’ (2013) <htp://www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria> accessed 1 Dec 2013; UNHCR, ‘2013 UNHCR Country Operations Proile - Syrian Arab Republic: Working Environment’ (2013) <htp://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486a76. html> accessed 1 Dec 2013. ‘Syria Crisis Update 62’, above n 3. UNRWA, ‘Syria Crisis Situation Update: Issue 41’ (4 Apr 2013) <htp://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/emergency-reports/ syria-crisis-situation-update-issue-41> accessed 1 May 2013. See, eg, Anas Zarzar and Marah Mashi, ‘Syria: Armed Opposition Takes Yarmouk Refugee Camp’ Al-Akhbar (17 Dec 2012) <htp://english.al-akhbar.com/node/14411> accessed 10 March 2013. ‘Syria Crisis Update 62’, above n 3. ibid. UNRWA, ‘Syria Crisis Response Update: Issue 55’ (23 July 2013) <htp://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/emergencyreports/syria-crisis-situation-update-issue-55> accessed 1 May 2013. UNRWA, ‘Syria Crisis Response Update: Issue 56’ (29 July 2013) <htp://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/emergencyreports/syria-crisis-situation-update-issue-no-56> accessed 1 May 2013. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 5.5 Internal displacement within Syria As of late November 2013, approximately 6.5 million Syrians296 and 235,000 Palestinian refugees were internally displaced within Syria.297 Syrians appear to be under UNHCR’s protection, while Palestinian refugees are under UNRWA’s protection, and they are dependent on the respective agencies for humanitarian aid and protection.298 However, in light of reports of Syrians who have taken shelter in Palestinian refugee camps in Syria, it is not clear if the delineation between the two agencies is as stark as their respective updates would suggest.299 As of late October 2013, UNRWA is sheltering 8,272 persons and 86 per cent of them are Palestinian refugees.300 UNRWA is also providing shelter to 3,523 Palestinian refugees in non-UNRWA facilities in Damascus.301 In the best-case scenario, UNRWA and UNHCR are collaborating to protect persons based on their displaced status and humanitarian need regardless of nationality, as was the case in Lebanon in 2006. Syrian security forces have sealed of two Palestinian refugee camps, Yarmouk and Sbeineh, where armed opposition groups have allegedly resided.302 Palestinian refugees are now trapped within the camps and do not have access to emergency relief and the medical services provided by UNRWA.303 r Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising Meanwhile, UNRWA has strongly advocated on behalf of internally displaced Palestinian refugees. In February and March 2013, for example, the agency called on armed groups to respect the neutrality of the residents of Palestinian refugee camps.304 It has also called on armed groups to cease armed confrontations within residential areas.305 As a result of the overwhelming conlict, UNRWA has been forced to shit its regular assistance to Palestinian refugees, namely, health and educational services, to emergency relief.306 his includes cash subsidies as well as food and medical aid distribution.307 According to Filippo Grandi, UNRWA’s Commissioner-General, of the US $1.5 billion requested by UN-wide humanitarian appeal, US $90 million is earmarked for Palestinian refugees. By March 2013, half of that amount had been raised.308 6. O B S E RVAT I O N S A N D R E CO M M E N DAT I O N S 304 305 306 307 308 UNRWA, ‘UNRWA Condemns Atacks on Palestinian Children in Syria’ (27 Feb 2013), <htp://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=1655> accessed 1 May 2013; see also UNRWA, ‘UNRWA Deplores Brutal Killing of Two Palestine Refugees in Yarmouk’ (4 Mar 2013) <htp://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=1662> accessed 1 May 2013. ibid. UN News Centre, ‘Palestinian Refugees in Greater Need of Relief as Syria Crisis Escalates, Warns UN Oicial’ UN News Centre (11 Mar 2013) <htp://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44342&Cr=palestin&Cr1=syria#. UXdiXCshh0> accessed 1 Dec 2013. ibid. ibid. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 6.1 Observations he treatment of Palestinian refugees leeing Syria demonstrates a regression from the de facto policy of collaboration established by UNHCR and UNRWA during their secondary forced displacement in the Middle East. Jordan and Egypt have refused to recognize the refugee status of Palestinians leeing Syria. Both governments assert that Palestinians are only refugees in Syria indicating a static understanding of their refugee status in UNRWA’s areas of operation. To the extent that Palestinian refugees have been permited entry, Jordan and Egypt have done so as a humanitarian gesture rather than in conformity with a legal obligation. Since August 2013, even Lebanon has barred some Palestinian refugees entry into the country. As a result, Palestinians have faced detention, exclusion, and refoulement from Jordan and other countries in the Middle East. While UNHCR stepped in to resetle several thousand Palestinians leeing Iraq in the atermath of war and stranded at the Jordanian border, the agency has been unable to meaningfully intervene on behalf of Palestinian refugees in this instance. In Egypt, they lack any form of international protection in contravention of both the UNHCR Statute as well as the 1951 Refugee Convention. While UNCHR and UNRWA collaborated to assist the Palestinian refugees stranded at the EgyptianLibyan border in 1996, in this instance, UNHCR observes Egypt’s directive not to register Palestinians, and UNRWA is not present at all. UNRWA’s absence stands in stark contrast to its intervention in Kuwait in 1991 when it transcended its strict geographical mandate to assist forcibly displaced Palestinians. Palestinian refugees leeing to Lebanon also endure a protection gap, as indicated by the distinct, and inferior, entry and residence policies applicable to them. Nevertheless, they fare beter in Lebanon, where many are still permited entry and where they beneit from more inter-agency collaboration. In Lebanon, Palestinian refugees are included in Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising r Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 the UN’s regional response plan, which coordinates humanitarian assistance to refugees leeing Syria. Moreover, when UNRWA lacked the capacity to do so itself, UNHCR tried to monitor the low of Palestinian refugees at the Lebanese border on its behalf. Once admited entry, however, the refugees are housed separately and are under the strict divide of UNHCR and UNRWA mandates, including their care and assistance programmes. Moreover, in their earliest cluster meetings, UNHCR did not discuss the status of Syrian and Palestinian refugees as a single humanitarian category. Instead, it ofered UNRWA a seat at the table to represent the Palestinian refugees. his is in contrast to the treatment of Palestinian refugees who led Iraq into Syria, also an UNRWA area of operation, where the two agencies collaborated to aid the leeing population. he only diference seems to be that Palestinians who led Iraq were not registered with UNRWA as are those Palestinians leeing Syria today. his relects a geographic, rather than a needs-based, distinction. Turkey may be the only site where inter-agency de facto policies have been advanced. here, many Palestinians and most Syrians are permited entry, fall under UNHCR’s mandate, and beneit from Turkey’s temporary protection regime without distinction. Unlike Lebanon and Jordan, Turkey is not one of UNRWA’s areas of operation, which may explain why all refugees fall under UNHCR’s mandate. However, Egypt is like Turkey in that it is not an UNRWA area of operation, but it fails to implement such a positive policy. Notably, as the refugee low from Syria increases, Turkey’s policy has become less favourable to Syrians and Palestinians alike. here is too litle information on inter-agency collaboration within Syria to draw any conclusions about the comparative treatment of IDPs. While UNRWA is still able to operate with some staf, it is diicult to know the extent to which other UN agencies are providing assistance and protection for Palestinian refugees who have now been internally displaced. Whereas ad hoc inter-agency collaboration suiced to protect Palestinian refugees enduring secondary forced displacement from Kuwait, Libya, and Iraq, it has been inadequate in the case of the Syrian war. On its face, the major diference between this event and those that preceded it is the magnitude of the crisis as well as the status of Palestinian refugees as registrants, or not, of UNRWA. In Kuwait and Libya, only Palestinians endured forced displacement. he reduced scope of humanitarian need in those instances presumably made resources within UNHCR and UNRWA more available, thereby heightening the potential for inter-agency collaboration. However, even in Iraq, where Iraqis and Palestinians led in mass numbers and where the scope of the refugee crisis heavily burdened neighbouring countries and international donors, interagency collaboration was greater, and the protection gap alicting Palestinian refugees was much smaller than it is in the case of the Syrian war. As mentioned, the key distinction in these two cases is the status of Palestinian refugees; in Syria they are registered with UNRWA, in Iraq they are not. Although Palestinians led from Iraq into UNRWA’s areas of operation, they remained under UNHCR’s mandate and were assisted by UNRWA. In contrast, Palestinians leeing Syria into UNRWA’s areas of operation and beyond, during the course of the Syrian civil war, have remained strictly within UNRWA’s mandate, with the exception of Turkey. his approach has proven detrimental to Palestinian refugees who have led to Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon. Whereas, Middle Eastern states and UN r Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising agencies have treated Palestinians not registered with UNRWA like humanitarian refugees, they have treated Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA like stateless persons. here is incongruence between UNRWA status, which is geographically bound and restrictive, and the vulnerability faced by Palestinian refugees in a quickly changing Middle East. Presumably, UNHCR would have assisted Palestinian refugees from Syria had they lacked their UNRWA status. Such an outcome does not conform to the intent and spirit of the UNCHR Statute and the Refugee Convention, which justiies inter-agency collaboration. Moreover, historical practice illustrates the feasibility and eicacy of such collaboration. 6.2.1 Expand the scope of paragraph 7 (c) and article 1(D) in order to provide protection to Palestinian refugees inside and outside UNRWA’s areas of operation At a minimum, UNHCR should both clarify and expand its mandate as concerns Palestinian refugees. Presently, UNHCR’s mandate extends to Palestinians beyond UNRWA’s areas of operation. While Turkey has adhered to this policy, Egypt has not, thus indicating UNHCR’s failure to establish an explicit understanding with parties of the 1951 Convention in regard to the scope of Article 1(D). Such an understanding should be achieved with the handful of Arab parties to the Refugee Convention as a mater of priority. UNHCR should also revisit the limitations imposed upon its responsibilities to Palestinian refugees derived from paragraph 7(c) of its Statute. hese limitations are not as geographically severe as a cursory review of the text may suggest. Re-evaluation of its mandate’s scope should prompt UNHCR to coordinate, more proactively, with UNRWA to increase protection and assistance for Palestinian refugees. Both Article 1(D) and paragraph 7(c) aimed to avoid overlapping regimes, but certainly not to restrict protection for Palestinian refugees; historical experience demonstrates this as well. It is therefore in-line with the draters’ intent and spirit, of the UNHCR Statute as well as the Refugee Convention, to extend UNHCR’s protection 309 310 UN Inter-Agency Standing Commitee, ‘IASC Principals Transformative Agenda’ (UN Inter-Agency Standing Commitee 2012) <htp://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-template-default&bd=87> accessed 1Dec 2013. ibid. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 6.2 Recommendations Closing the protection gap alicting Palestinian refugees during secondary forced displacement in the Middle East necessitates greater and ongoing inter-agency collaboration during periods of calm and crisis alike. he Inter-Agency Standing Commitee Transformative Agenda, led by the UN Oice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Afairs (UN OCHA), sets the frame and spirit for greater coordination and should serve as the guide for protecting Palestinians from Syria.309 he Transformative Agenda emerged in the atermath of signiicant humanitarian crises in 2010. UN humanitarian agencies agreed that to beter respond to such emergencies, they must create a more empowered leadership, greater accountability to stakeholders, and improved coordination among the agencies.310 Beyond addressing the immediate crisis and future cases of secondary forced displacement, a long-term solution requires a more radical approach that is international in scope rather than focused on the nation-state. Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising r 6.2.2 Jointly-led cluster meetings In each country, the agencies should collaborate to speak in one voice at cluster meetings so that they represent the interests of all refugees, rather than set Palestinian refugees apart. Jointly-led cluster meetings relect one aspect of the IASC’s Transformative Agenda. Even without the presence of UN OCHA, the humanitarian aid cluster meetings should empower UNHCR, or whichever agency is leading the meetings, to discuss the condition and needs of Palestinian refugees as indistinguishable from other refugees, while relying on the lead agency as appropriate. his does not diminish the role of UNRWA. Instead, it emphasizes the indistinguishable humanitarian needs of Palestinian refugees from other refugees during armed conlict or a similar crisis. UNRWA will still be expected to play a leading role in registering those refugees, and determining and meeting their needs. UNHCR already coordinates the eforts of over sixty international and national agencies, as relected by UNHCR’s Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP).313 he RRP5 explains that: [t]he ability of humanitarian agencies to respond efectively and in a timely manner, regardless of the many challenges on the ground, will depend on their close coordination, particularly in view of the disparate nature of the displacement in host countries. Despite its emphasis on ‘close coordination’, the Plan excluded Palestinian refugees in the initial four versions. hey appear in the Lebanon chapter of the RRP5 but remain excluded from the other countries where they have taken shelter; Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt.314 311 312 313 314 See Goddard, above n 36. See Akram and Rempel, above n 49. ‘Syria Regional Response Plan’, above n 201. ibid 4 (‘Moreover, the Lebanon chapter of the response now includes activities targeting Palestinians from Syria who have also been forced to lee the country where they had been setled for generations’). Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 to Palestinian refugees when needed. As a strictly textual mater, Article 1(D) is meant to avoid overlapping legal regimes between UNRWA and UNHCR.311 However, other interpretations suggest that since the scope of protection available to Palestinian refugees diminished signiicantly when the UNCCP ceased to function, the UNHCR Statute could be extended to UNRWA’s areas of operation as well. his is particularly true in emergencies and when UNRWA alone is unable to address all the needs of the refugees.312 While the proper interpretation is certainly worth clarifying, doing so is beyond the scope of this paper. Suice it to say that the delineation between their mandates aimed to avoid redundancy in services and function, not to reduce protection, coordination, and cooperation available to Palestinian refugees. UNHCR and UNRWA should therefore collaborate to protect Palestinian refugees at all times, including during periods of calm, in ways that close the protection gap alicting Palestinian refugees and that avoid replicating their eforts. Whether such ongoing and close collaboration is a de facto or a de jure arrangement is not of pressing concern. Such collaboration should shape how the two agencies run meetings, fund-raise, monitor border crossings, and engage in emergency response, an area where UNHCR has greater experience. r Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising 6.2.3 Joint advocacy fund-raising campaigns UNHCR and UNRWA should conduct joint advocacy campaigns. Donors may be more eager to provide for new refugees as opposed to Palestinian refugees, whose inancial sponsors may sufer from donor fatigue. his was certainly true in the case of fund-raising eforts early in the Syrian conlict when donors who gave to UNHCR did not realize that they were not supporting all refugees leeing Syria. Donor fatigue remains a challenge in November 2013, thirty-two months into the conlict, as indicated by UNRWA’s end-of-year shortfall.319 In regards to the Syrian crisis, UNRWA 315 316 317 318 319 ‘Syria Regional Response Plan’, above n 201; Dumper, above n 4. Guterres, above n 212. See Akram and Rempel, above n 49. ibid 137–38 (Akram and Rempel make a bold proposal in their article aimed at providing durable solutions to Palestinian refugees. hey propose ive-year renewable, formalized temporary protection status for Palestinian refugees that would be internationally harmonized. An internationally harmonized approach would distribute responsibility for Palestinian refugees beyond the Arab region and would accommodate the legal and political interests of the states involved. It is based on the assumption that Palestinians be recognized as prima facie refugees entitled to the beneits of the Refugee Convention thereby obligating host states to provide them with temporary protection. It proposes a new burden-sharing approach that would mitigate the possibility of refoulement, exclusion, and discriminatory treatment currently endured by Palestinian refugees). UNRWA, ‘Funding Against 2013 Syria Regional Crisis Response’ (17 Oct2013) <htp://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/ iles/u43/unrwa_info_graphic20oct_0.png> accessed 1 Nov 2013 (UNRWA indicates that by mid-October 2013, it suffered from a 36% budget shortfall). Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 Presumably, this exclusion does not impact on Palestinian refugees seeking asylum in Turkey, where its temporary protection regime has been extended without discrimination. However, it does impact them in Jordan and Egypt, where they have been set apart and disadvantaged. UNHCR has expressed its desire to register Palestinians in Egypt315 and has expressed concerns over their treatment elsewhere in the Middle East.316 Overcoming these conditions is a political mater aimed at the governments of Jordan and Egypt. heir resistance to treating Palestinians as humanitarian refugees relects an anxiety that taking responsibility for Palestinian refugees is never a temporary commitment. Instead, their status as a prolonged refugee situation, coupled with their lack of access to durable solutions suspends Palestinian refugees in a tenuous limbo. Including Palestinian refugees in joint-cluster meetings, RRPs, and in coordinated humanitarian eforts more generally necessitates a political strategy aimed at addressing these concerns among host countries. Responsibility for doing so should not be borne by UNHCR and UNRWA alone, instead, it should be shared by other national and international humanitarian agencies, as well as other states. Middle Eastern countries have provided asylum to Palestinian refugees for over six decades.317 In 2003, they absorbed refugees from Iraq as a result of the war. More recently, Middle Eastern countries have absorbed refugees leeing from various countries undergoing transformational change in the course of the Arab uprisings. he Syrian civil war is yet another crisis that has necessitated the goodwill of these host states. Alleviating this pressure and these anxieties should be borne by an international community and not just states within the Mid East region. Other nation-states should be part of a broader solution aimed at burden-sharing, giving them greater authority to persuade the governments of Jordan and Egypt, for example, to treat Palestinian refugees without distinction.318 Doing so is the panacea to establishing greater coordination in all other areas. Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising r 6.2.4 Joint responsibility to monitor border crossings and to protect against refoulement Relative to UNCHR, UNRWA bears litle inluence upon host states. While UNHCR is global in scale, UNRWA is limited to ive areas of operation within the Middle East. In those areas in which it operates, UNRWA’s long-term presence subsumes it within the country’s government apparatus (for example, the GAPAR in Syria) or makes it dependent on the good will of the state to continue to operate independently (for example, Lebanon and Jordan). Its leverage to compel a host state to accept more Palestinian refugees is therefore quite diminished. In regard to non-host states like Iraq, Turkey, and 320 321 322 ibid. ANSAmed, ‘Mideast: UNRWA Can’t Pay December Wages’ (20 Nov 2013) <htp://www.ansamed.info/ansamed/en/ news/sections/politics/2013/11/20/Mideast-UNRWA-can-pay-December-wages_9653678.html> accessed 1 Dec 2013. UNHCR, ‘Syria Regional Response Plan – RRP: 2013 Income as of 5 December 2013’ (5 Dec 2013) <htps://data.unhcr. org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=3716> accessed 10 Dec 2013 (by early Dec, UNHCR experienced a 34% budgetary shortfall). Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 sufers from a 36 per cent budget shortfall.320 Agency-wide, it cannot pay its employees their December 2013 wages.321 Although UNHCR faces similar budget challenges, they have not impeded the delivery of aid to Syrian refugees.322 To alleviate this acute vulnerability facing Palestinian refugees, UNHCR and UNRWA should develop joint advocacy campaigns during humanitarian emergencies. While both agencies have reason to continue their independent fund-raising eforts for ongoing programmes, the unique nature of a crisis justiies the joint campaign. he funds collected should be placed into a common budget that is indiscriminately divided on a needs-basis. While it should be discouraged, UNHCR and UNRWA can permit state and individual donors to earmark their contribution. Joint campaigns may raise challenges for two reasons: i) distributing funds on a needs-basis will force UNRWA to increase its provisions to refugees to match UNHCR, thereby stretching UNRWA’s budgetary needs even further, and ii) this may create a stark contrast in the aid provided to long-standing UNRWA beneiciaries in its areas of concern. While the irst challenge may appear troubling, in fact, the joint campaign aims to create parity between UNHCR and UNRWA refugee beneiciaries during emergencies. Improving cash and aid provisions to Palestinian refugees is among the goals of beter coordination. he budgetary constraints currently endured may be alleviated as a result of the joint campaign. UNHCR’s extensive networks and experience in emergency preparedness and response makes its more adept at raising such exceptional funds. his should impose a minimal burden on UNHCR as the Palestinian refugee population, approximately 68,000, only constitutes about 0.3 per cent of the Syrian refugee population, approximately 2.2 million. As to the second challenge, this should not be a deterrent given the exceptional nature of refugee needs during a crisis. Longstanding refugees do not sufer from the acute lack of basic goods, health care, education, and shelter alicting refugees enduring secondary forced displacement. On the contrary, the low of Palestinian refugees from Syria has burdened the long-standing Palestinian refugee populations in Lebanon, and to a lesser extent, in Jordan. Greater aid for Palestinian refugees from Syria has the potential to ease the burden on the existing Palestinian refugee population rather than increase disparity and tension between them. r Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising 6.2.5 Resetlement UNHCR has initiated a Resetlement/Humanitarian Admission Programme and seventeen countries have agreed to participate in the programme so far.323 he refugee agency aims to resetle 30,000 refugees by the end of 2014, or 0.4 per cent of the total number of displaced persons.324 UNRWA lacks the mandate to achieve durable solutions on behalf of Palestinian refugees. his includes integration, repatriation, and resettlement. herefore, as UNHCR expands its Resetlement/Humanitarian Admission Programme on behalf of Syrian refugees, the protection gap between the two refugee populations will expand signiicantly. In the case that Palestinian refugees from Syria become eligible for resetlement, as did the Palestinians from Iraq, the agencies will be forced to contend with the fact that long-standing Palestinian refugees in the Middle 323 324 Megan Bradley, ‘Is Resetlement a Solution for Syria’s Refugee Crisis?’ (Brooking Institute Up Front, 13 Nov 2013) <htp:// www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/11/13-syria-refugee-crisis-bradley> accessed 15 Nov 2013 (86,000 of the 15.4 million refugees were resetled in 2012). ibid. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 Egypt, UNRWA’s inluence is also limited, relative to UNHCR, because it is considered to represent Palestinian refugees in particular areas of operation. Worse, perhaps, is the practical fact that UNRWA personnel may not be readily available at borders well beyond their areas of operation. his factor necessitates cooperation and coordination with UNHCR in order to overcome challenges of exclusion and refoulement. While UNHCR monitored the low of all refugees on the Syrian-Lebanon border when UNRWA lacked the capacity to do so, it only kept count of Palestinian refugees atempting to cross the border, not intervening on their behalf when necessary. Neither agency has been able to monitor or meaningfully intervene on their behalf in Turkey, Jordan, or Egypt. Joint monitoring projects should operate without distinction. his is a very diicult hurdle to overcome in light of state aversion to Palestinian refugees in general. Still, together the agencies can assist Palestinian refugees where possible by lobbying these states or, at the very least, to provide Palestinian refugees with options and resources to seek asylum elsewhere. he agencies should create a hierarchy of urgent cases to ensure that asylum seekers in exceptional need (for example, medical emergencies, victims of sexual abuse, or persons with a credible fear of persecution) are permited entry. Once permited entry, UNRWA and UNHCR should continue to collaborate to investigate cases where Palestinian refugees are at risk of refoulement. On its own, UNRWA can lobby host states to stay the refoulement of Palestinian refugees to Syria. Collaboration with UNHCR would increase its leverage for reasons mentioned above. Moreover, in cases where a refugee is at risk of refoulement and possesses a credible fear of persecution in Syria, the two agencies should collaborate to resetle the refugee. UNRWA lacks the mandate to resetle Palestinian refugees and there is no expectation that they take a lead in this process. However, for the sake of productive collaboration it should accompany UNCHR to determine whether the refugee’s fear is indeed credible and to assist, however appropriate, in the resetlement process. On its face, UNRWA does not have the authority to assist in resetlement cases but, as demonstrated by the resetlement of Palestinian refugees from Kuwait in 1991, doing so is practically expedient and beneicial. Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising r 325 326 327 328 329 UNCHR, ‘Press Release: First Group of Syrian Refugees Flies to Germany for Temporary Relocation’ (11 Sept 2013) <htp://www.unhcr.org/523076919.html> accessed 15 Nov 2013. ibid. Anna Lekas Miller, ‘Syria: From Refugees to Asylum Seekers’ Truthout (19 Oct 2013) <htp://truth-out.org/news/ item/19471-syria-from-refugees-to-asylum-seekers> accessed 15 Nov 2013. ibid. Fick and Youssef, above n 271 (Palestinian refugees seek to travel by boat from Egypt’s shores towards Europe, despite the high and fatal risks involved. A mother of twins who atempted to lee, and who Egyptian authorities have since detained, explained ‘We were running away from death … we said to ourselves, ‘we might die anyway’, but at least we had some hope for something when we got on the boat’). Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 East remain ineligible for similar relief. Resolving this issue requires a thorough examination of the legal frameworks in each of the host state as well as states beyond the Mideast region. Doing so is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, some of the issues and likely challenges associated with resetlement will be highlighted. Resetlement will only beneit a handful of Syrian refugees. For 2013, UNHCR sought to resetle 10,000 Syrians in need of humanitarian assistance and 2,000 in acute need.325 Germany’s humanitarian admission programme aims to admit 5,000 refugees, making it the largest relocation programme to date. It will ofer refugees a permit for two years that can be extended if the situation in Syria does not improve.326 he United States has commited to admit 2,000 refugees and has already received 6,000 asylum applications.327 By July 2013, it had only admited 33 Syrians for asylum.328 he greatest number of refugees that UNHCR can resetle is very small relative to the number of refugees that it cannot resetle. herefore, as it continues to develop this programme, UNHCR should consider innovative programmes to enhance the living conditions of the majority of refugees in their host states. his includes building medical and educational infrastructure to serve the refugee population as well as developing economic opportunities for them. his should be on behalf of Syrian and Palestinian refugees without distinction. Palestinian refugees are never eligible for resetlement and this creates a conlict for a broad resetlement programme. In the case of Iraq, resetlement became available to Palestinians as a result of their non-UNRWA status as well as the international advocacy conducted on their behalf. In this case, nearly all the Palestinian refugees leeing Syria have UNRWA status placing them outside the scope of UNHCR’s Statute. Even the 6,000 refugees in Egypt who clearly fall within the scope of UNHCR’s Statute, have been denied the agency’s protection for political reasons. Recent rumours suggesting that Sweden planned to resetle 200 Palestinians detained in Egypt caused tremendous joy and disappointment among that population.329 Addressing the needs of the Palestinian refugee population who are not eligible for resetlement is critical. Investing in local development programmes to beneit the refugee population without distinction provides one such possibility. Beyond investing locally to beneit Syrian and Palestinian refugees alike, UNHCR and UNRWA should collaborate to resetle exceptional cases. As mentioned above, this includes Palestinian refugees at risk of refoulement who face a credible fear of persecution in Syria. his should also include Palestinian refugees in acute humanitarian need. hese provisions are inadequate to deal with the systemic unavailability of durable solutions to Palestinian refugees. Addressing this issue requires a more thorough examination aimed at long-term solutions. he intervention here is intended to address how to r Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising enhance inter-agency collaboration, especially during secondary forced displacement and emergencies more generally.330 7. CO N C LU S I O N Even if Palestinian refugees were not exposed to the risk of secondary and tertiary forced displacement, the existing legal regime does not adequately protect them. Since the balance of responsibilities between UNHCR and UNRWA does not aford 330 Akram and Rempel, above n 49. Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 6.2.6 Institutionalized and/or consistent inter-agency collaboration improves preparation for secondary forced displacement In addition to facilitating more meaningful cooperation during secondary forced displacement, institutionalized and/or consistent inter-agency collaboration will enable UNHCR and UNRWA to beter prepare for the secondary forced displacement of Palestinian refugees. he protection gaps alicting Palestinians leeing Syria during its civil war could have been anticipated before the August 2011 atack on Latakia or since then. he agencies, together and/or separately, should have begun discussions with neighbouring states, other UN agencies, and humanitarian organizations about the possible low of, and responsibility for, Palestinian refugees well before the July 2012 atacks on Yarmouk, when refugees began to lee Syria in greater numbers. his would have been preferable to the wait-and-see approach that seems to operate in Egypt and Jordan. Consistent collaboration and beter preparedness can foster rich civil society partnerships that could signiicantly enhance care and assistance to Palestinian refugees. Similar relationships helped generate global atention for stranded Palestinian refugees who atempted to lee Iraq following the US atacks. his advocacy, and the atention it garnered, ultimately prompted UNHCR to ind durable solutions on their behalf. Establishing new ongoing collaborative models could include reinterpreting Article 1(D) and paragraph 7(c) as permiting overlapping legal regimes between UNHCR and UNRWA. Or, with a more pragmatic approach, the two agencies could strengthen their de facto policies and make them known to one another, to UNRWA host states, and to Arab state parties to the Refugee Convention. At a minimum, new strides should be made in institutionalizing UNHCR and UNRWA shared responsibilities for Palestinian refugees during moments of calm and crisis alike among host states. Failure to do so will continue to expose Palestinian refugees to acute vulnerability during armed conlict, humanitarian crisis, and emergencies in the Middle East and to discriminatory treatment and inferior protection relative to their displaced counterparts. In this spirit, UNRWA needs to join the Inter-Agency Standing Commitee and more actively participate with its humanitarian colleagues in discussions and policies pertaining to the international humanitarian architecture. UNRWA should be much more proactive at advancing its agenda and needs with its UN partners, the ICRC, and others. It needs to build partnerships with international NGOs and expand its reach to become a greater part of the humanitarian system. In particular, UNRWA should forge a closely alliance with UN OCHA who should incorporate Palestinian refugees in all of its reporting and advocacy. Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising r Downloaded from http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on June 22, 2015 Palestinian refugees durable solutions, they remain in limbo, suspended between their objectiication in a prolonged conlict and their vulnerability as refugees. his is true in times of calm and is exacerbated during incidents of secondary forced displacement in the Middle East. While UNHCR and UNRWA collaboration has suiced to bridge this gap in such incidents since the early nineties, these de facto policies have proven insuicient in the course of the Syrian civil war. he magnitude of the crisis has relentlessly stretched the two agencies’ inancial and personnel resources to their limit, thereby limiting the potential for inter-agency collaboration. Additionally, the designation of Palestinians leeing Syria as UNRWA registrants has limited the reach of UNCHR’s protection at borders, within UNRWA’s areas of operation, as well as within states that are party to the Refugee Convention. Adequately closing this gap requires the two agencies to continue the luid operational and geographic collaboration established during previous incidents of secondary forced displacement, regardless of the status of the displaced Palestinian refugees. he drating history of the Refugee Convention and UNCHR’s Statute, together with agency practice, makes clear that the intention was not to delimit protection to Palestinians but to avoid overlapping legal regimes and redundant services. he protection gap alicting Palestinian refugee populations leeing Syria should shater the suspicion of such redundancy. Beyond the horizon of pressing crises, now and into the future, the agencies should also consider viable options for closing the protection gap by making durable solutions available to Palestinian refugees. Achieving this requires political will that rests in the hands of states and not the UN agencies they empower. Until then, all these eforts will remain ad hoc, insuicient, yet absolutely necessary.

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Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising: Filling the Protection Gap during Secondary Forced Displacement

Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising: Filling the Protection Gap during Secondary Forced Displacement

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