Russian Federation

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 17 May 2022

[UPDATE May 2022: A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report documents Russian forces' use of cluster munitions in attacks across Ukraine. At least six types of cluster munition has been used by Russia since the beginning of its invasion in February 2022. Evidence indicates that Ukraine has used them at least once.]

Summary

Non-signatory Russia says it cannot join the convention as it regards cluster munitions as legitimate weapons despite the humanitarian risks associated with their use. Russia last participated in a meeting of the convention in 2012. It abstained from the vote on a key United Nations (UN) resolution in December 2020, which urged states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”

Russia—and the Soviet Union before it—is a major producer, stockpiler, and exporter of cluster munitions. Russia continued to develop newer models of cluster munitions in 2020, but there is no information on the status of any production and transfers. Russia has participated in a joint military operation with the Syrian government since September 2015, which has seen the widespread use of cluster munitions.

Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Russia is one of the most vocal critics of the convention and has not taken any steps to accede as it sees military utility in cluster munitions. Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov stated in 2016 that “our country strictly complies with its commitments, including with regard to cluster munitions (CMs) that Russia views as a legal means of warfare.”[1] In 2017, Russia said its assessment of the convention “has not changed” and called it “a politicized document that tailors the very definition” of cluster munitions “to the interests of individual states which are trying to preserve their one-sided military and technical advantages.”[2] Russia reiterated this position in November 2020, calling cluster munitions “a lawful form of munitions.”[3]

Russia never participated in the Oslo Process that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[4] When the convention opened for signature in December 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed Russia’s opposition to “unjustified restrictions and bans on cluster munitions,” which it defended as “a legitimate type of weapon that is not banned by international humanitarian law and plays a significant role in the defense interests of Russia.”[5]

Russia participated as an observer in meetings of the convention in 2010 and 2011. It has been invited to, but has not attended any of the convention’s meetings since then.[6]

In December 2020, Russia abstained from the vote on a key UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution urging states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[7] Russia has previously voted against the annual resolution promoting the convention.[8]

In 2014, Russia criticized and expressed “serious concern” at the use of cluster munitions “against civilian population” in eastern Ukraine.[9] However, it did not acknowledge or take any measures to address the use of cluster munitions by Russian-backed armed opposition groups in eastern Ukraine (see Use section below).

Russia has not condemned the use of cluster munitions in Syria or Yemen. However, it voted in favor of a 2015 UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution that expressed concern at evidence of cluster munition use in Darfur, Sudan.[10] Russia also voted in favor of a 2014 UNSC resolution that expressed concern at the “indiscriminate” use of cluster munitions in South Sudan.[11]

Russia is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Russia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and, after opposing CCW discussions on cluster munitions for years, changed its position in 2011 to support an effort led by the United States (US) to conclude a new CCW protocol on cluster munitions.[12] That initiative failed in November 2011, which ended CCW deliberations on cluster munitions, leaving the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole international instrument specifically dedicated to ending the suffering caused by these weapons. Since 2011, Russia has not proposed any more CCW work on cluster munitions.

Development and production

Russia, and historically the Soviet Union, is a major producer and exporter of cluster munitions. Additionally, several states inherited stocks of cluster munitions when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Our records on the production, usage, and export of cluster munitions…are confidential and will not be publicized.”[13]

According to international technical reference materials and corporate marketing, three state-owned Russian companies have produced cluster munitions:

  • Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise (air-dropped bombs);
  • Mechanical Engineering Research Institute (120mm, 152mm, and 203mm artillery projectiles); and
  • Splav State Research and Production Enterprise Rocket (122mm, 220mm, and 300mm rockets).

Russia is continuing to develop new cluster munitions, but information on production is limited. In July 2020, Splav, which is part of state-owned arms company Rostec, displayed a new generation of multi-barrel rocket launchers at its refurbished rocket assembly facility in Tula, south of Moscow.[14] Photographs from the event show 9M55K 300mm cluster munition rockets and 9N235 fragmentation submunitions made for the Tornado-S system, a modernized version of the BM-30 Smerch rocket.[15]

In early 2018, Russia began testing the “Drel” RBK-500U guided cluster bomb developed by Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise, according to the company.[16]

As of July 2021, there is no evidence that Russia has deployed either of these new cluster munitions.

Transfer

There is limited information available on Russian arms transfers, including cluster munitions. However, at least 35 states have stockpiled cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin, including 21 states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[17]

At least 10 States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions that have stockpiled cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin have formally declared the stocks, providing types and quantities, as listed in the following table:

Stockpiled Soviet/Russian cluster munitions declared by States Parties[18]

Type of cluster munition

Cluster munition

Submunition

States that declared stockpiles (quantity of cluster munitions)

Bomb

RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M

PTAB-2.5M

Bulgaria (488), Croatia (9), Cuba (663), Moldova (14), Hungary (17), Mozambique (199), Peru (657), Slovakia (20)

RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh

AO-1SCh

Bulgaria (238), Croatia (5), Cuba (282), Moldova (24), Côte d’Ivoire (68), Mozambique (9), Peru (388)

RBK-500 AO-2.5RT

AO2.5RT

Bulgaria (201), Moldova (16), Peru (198), Czech Republic (191), Slovakia (50)

RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5M

SHOAB-0.5M

Bulgaria (36)

RBK-500-255 PTAB-10.5

PTAB-10.5

Moldova (8), Slovakia (23)

RBK-500-255 PTAB-2.5

PTAB-2.5

Moldova (16)

RBK-500-355 AO-10

AO-10

Slovakia (22)

Dispenser

BKF AO-2.5RT

AO-2.5RT

Bulgaria (3,086), Cuba (336), Hungary (247), Slovakia (63)

BKF PTAB-2.5

PTAB-2.5

Bulgaria (1,957), Cuba (382), FYR Macedonia (1,438), Slovakia (72)

BKF PTAB-2.5KO

PTAB-2.5KO

Hungary (23)

Projectile

3-O-13

O-16

Moldova (834)

Missile

9N123K

9N24

Bulgaria (8)

Rocket

9M27K

9N210

Moldova (473)

Stockpiling

In 2009, Russia acknowledged that it possesses a “large” stockpile of cluster munitions “stored throughout the state” and said disposing of such a wide range of obsolete cluster munitions would be time-consuming and “a significant financial expenditure.”[19] In November 2011, Russia said its cluster munitions stockpile was similar in size to that of the US, which then reported stockpiling 5.5 million cluster munitions.[20]

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The quantity and types of cluster munitions stockpiled in the Russian Ministry of Defence are confidential and will not be publicized.”[21] The following list of types stockpiled is based on a wide variety of publicly available sources.

Cluster munitions stockpiled by the Russian Federation[22]

Type

Caliber

Carrier name

Number of submunitions

Submunition type

Projectile

120mm

(unknown)

30

Dual-purpose

152mm

3-O-23

42

Dual-purpose

152mm

3-O-13

8

Dual-purpose

203mm

3-O-14

24

Fragmentation

240mm

3-O-8

14

Fragmentation

Dispenser

BKF ODS 35

8

FAE

BKF AO-2.5RT

96

Fragmentation

BKF PTAB-1M

248

HE/AT

BKF PTAB-2.5

96

HE/AT

Bomb

PROSAB-250

90

HE

RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M

42

HE/AT

RBK 250-275 AO-2.5RT

60

Fragmentation

RBK 250-275 AO-2.5RTM

60

Fragmentation

RBK 250-275 AO-1SCh

150

Fragmentation

RBK 250-275 PTAB 2.5M

30

HE/AT

RBK-500 AO-2.5RT

126

Fragmentation

RBK-500-255 PTAB-10.5A

30

HE/AT

RBK-500-375 AO-10

30

HE/AT

RBK-500 AO-2.5RTM

108

Fragmentation

RBK-500 PTAB-1M

268

HE/AT

RBK-500 PTAB 2.5

75

HE/AT

RBK-500 PTAB 2.5M

268

HE/AT

RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5

565

Fragmentation

RBK-500 SPBE

15

SFW

RBK-500 SPBE-D

15

SFW

RBK-500 SPBE-K

15

SFW

RBK-500 OFAB-50UD

10

Fragmentation

Rocket

122mm

Grad (9M218)

45

3-O-33 Dual-purpose

122mm

Grad (9M217)

2

SFW

220mm

Uragan (9M27K)

30

9N210 Fragmentation

220mm

Uragan (9M27K1)

30

9N235 Fragmentation

300mm

Smerch (9M55K)

72

9N235 Fragmentation

300mm

Smerch (9M55K1)

5

SFW

300mm

Smerch (9M55K5)

600

Dual-purpose

Missiles

9K52 Luna-M with 9N18K

42

9N22 Fragmentation

9M79 Tochka with 9N123K

50

9N24 Fragmentation

Note: FAE = fuel air explosive; HE/AT = high explosive antitank; SFW = sensor-fuzed weapon.

Use

Use in Syria

In Syria, there is strong evidence that Russia stockpiles cluster munitions at its airbase at Hmeymim, southeast of Latakia city, and that it is using cluster munitions or, at a minimum, directly participating together with Syrian government forces in attacks that have used cluster munitions on opposition-held areas of governorates.

Russian and Syrian government forces use many of the same aircraft and weapons and frequently carry out operations together.[23] There have been at least 687 cluster munition attacks in Syria since July 2012, including at least one attack between 1 August 2020 and 31 July 2021. Previously, Cluster Munition Monitor reported at least a dozen attacks using cluster munitions in Syria between August 2019 and July 2020.

There was a significant increase in the use of cluster munitions in Syria after Russia began its joint operation with Syrian government forces on 30 September 2015.[24] All except two types of the cluster munitions used in Syria since 2012 were manufactured by the Soviet Union/Russia.[25]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has not explicitly denied Russia’s involvement in using cluster munitions in Syria, but has claimed that cluster munitions have been used in accordance with international humanitarian law and not indiscriminately.[26] In December 2016, Russia issued a three-page position paper on the use of cluster munitions in Syria that concluded that “the question of the involvement of the Russian military personnel in the cases of indiscriminate CMs [cluster munitions] use in Syria [is] totally inappropriate.”[27] In December 2015, the Russian Defense Ministry stated that “Russian aviation does not use [cluster munitions]” and that “there are no such munitions at the Russian air base in Syria.”[28]

The civilian harm caused by the use of cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations from more than 145 states.[29]

In July 2019, research organization Conflict Intelligence Team identified an RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5 cluster bomb and RBK-500 AO-2.5RT cluster bomb on display at the Patriot Military Park in Moscow as part of an exhibition of weapons and military equipment used by Russia in its joint military operation in Syria.[30]

Previous use

In 2014–2015, Russian-backed insurgents used cluster munition rockets in eastern Ukraine.[31] Ukrainian government forces were also responsible for cluster munition rocket attacks.[32] Russia expressed concern at Ukrainian government use of cluster munitions, but never commented on cluster munition attacks by separatist forces.[33] There has been no evidence or allegations of new use of cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine by any party since a February 2015 ceasefire went into effect.[34]

During an August 2008 conflict with Georgia, Russia used cluster munitions including RBK-500 AO-2.5RTM cluster bombs and Uragan ground-fired rockets containing 9N210 and 9N235 submunitions. Russia used cluster munitions in or near nine towns and villages in the Gori-Tskhinvali corridor south of the South Ossetian administrative border.[35] Russia denied using cluster munitions in Georgia.[36]

Russian forces used cluster munitions in Chechnya from 1994–1996 and again in 1999.[37]

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, cluster munitions were also used by various forces in several conflicts in Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Tajikistan. The extent of involvement of Russian forces in this use of cluster munitions is not known but cannot be discounted.

The Soviet Union used cluster munitions from 1979–1989 in Afghanistan. It first used cluster munitions in 1943 against German armed forces during World War II.[38]



[1] Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Letter to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Regarding Cluster Munitions in Syria,” 10 August 2016; and “Russia’s Position on the Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” Position Paper annexed to letter to HRW, from Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 9 December 2016.

[2] Russia expressed “concern about the humanitarian impact of the arbitrary use of cluster munitions,” but called the convention “a very poor example of how to reach agreement on arms control” that “is a cynical attempt to repartition [sic] the market for cluster munitions.” “Statement of the Russian Federation,” UN General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 20 October 2017.

[3] Statement of the Russian Federation, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 6 November 2020.

[4] Russia attended a regional meeting held during the Oslo Process as an observer (in Brussels, Belgium in October 2007). For details on Russia’s policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through 2009, see HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 230–235.

[5] “Russia explains refusal to join cluster bombs convention,” Interfax: Russia & CIS Military Newswire,8 December 2008. Similar language was used in a September 2009 letter to the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). See, letter from Sergey Ryabkov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the CMC, 18 September 2009. Unofficial translation by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[6] Russia participated as an observer in the convention’s Meetings of States Parties in 2010 and 2011.

[7]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 75/62, 7 December 2020.

[8] Russia voted against the resolution in 2015–2017 and 2019, and abstained from the resolution in 2018.

[9] Statement of Russia, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, 23 October 2014. The next day Russia told a UN Security Council (UNSC) debate on the situation in Ukraine that “there is an alarming and growing number of civilian victims, including children, as the result of…prohibited munitions, including cluster bombs.” Provisional report of the 7287th meeting of the UN Security Council, S/PV.7287, 24 October 2014.

[10] The five permanent members of the UN Security Council voted in favor of the resolution in addition to non-permanent members Angola, Chad, Chile, Jordan, Lithuania, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Spain, and Venezuela.

[11] The resolution noted “with serious concern reports of the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions” and called for “all parties to refrain from similar such use in the future.” UNSC, “Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2155 (2014), Extends Mandate of Mission In South Sudan, Bolstering Its Strength to Quell Surging Violence,” SC11414, 27 May 2014.

[12] At the CCW’s Third Review Conference in 2006, Russia stated, “We cannot accept the logic of restrictions or even bans on ammunition artificially and groundlessly declared as the most ‘dangerous weapons.’ This path would lead us to a stalemate. It could only result in a split and weaken the [CCW] and its Protocols.” Statement by Anatoly I. Antonov, Director, Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CCW Third Review Conference, Geneva, 7 November 2006.

[13] Letter from Sergey Ryabkov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to HRW, 20 March 2009.

[15] According to Rostec, President Vladimir Putin reportedly set an objective in 2016 for the company to use only Russian components in the modernized multi-launch rocket systems. See Rostec, “The New Rocket System Passes Official Tests,” 25 January 2017.

[16] Piotr Butowsky, “Russia set to finalise PBK-500U glide bomb evaluation,” Jane’s 360, 9 January 2018; and Michael Peck, “Cluster Bombs Are Back—and America and Russia Can’t Get Enough,” The National Interest, 21 April 2018.

[17] Russian or Soviet-era cluster munitions have been stockpiled by 11 States Parties to the convention (Bulgaria, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iraq, Moldova, Mozambique, Peru, and Slovakia) and at least two dozen non-states parties (Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Mongolia, North Korea, Poland, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yemen). See the relevant Cluster Munition Monitor ban policy country profile source for more information.

[18] All information in this table is taken from Article 7 reports submitted by States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The reports for all States Parties can be accessed here: UN in Geneva, Article 7 Database.

[19] Statement of the Russian Federation, CCW Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 12 November 2009. Notes by Landmine Action.

[20] Statement of the Russian Federation, CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 18 November 2011. Notes by HRW. An October 2004 report to the US Congress by the US Department of Defense disclosed a stockpile of 5.5 million cluster munitions containing about 728.5 million submunitions.

[21] Letter from Sergey Ryabkov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to HRW, 20 March 2009.

[22] The data in this table comes from the following sources: Publishing House “Arms and Technologies,” undated; Information Centre of Defence Technologies and Safety, “The XXI Century Encyclopedia, ‘Russia’s Arms and Technologies,’ Volume 12: Ordnance and Munitions,” CD Version, 2006; Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air–Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2004), pp. 414–415, and 422–432; Leland S. Ness and Anthony G. Williams, eds., Jane’s Ammunition Handbook 2007–2008 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2007), pp. 572, 597–598, 683, 703–706, 715–716, and 722–723; US Defense Intelligence Agency, “Improved Conventional Munitions and Selected Controlled-Fragmentation Munitions (Current and Projected),” partially declassified and made available to HRW under a Freedom of Information Act request; and “Russia’s Arms Catalog: Volume IV, Precision Guided Weapons and Ammunition, 1996–1997,” Military Parade: Moscow, 1997, pp. 138–139, 148–152, 373–392, 504, and 515–516. This research has been supplemented by information found on the Splav State Research and Production Enterprise corporate website.

[23] However, Russia is the only force in Syria to operate Sukhoi SU-25 and SU-34 fighter-ground attack jets used to deliver RBK-series cluster bombs. HRW, Amnesty International, and others have compiled credible evidence, including videos and photographs, documenting SU-25 and SU-34 jets near or involved in attacks near sites when cluster munitions were used. Amnesty International, “Syria: Russia’s shameful failure to acknowledge civilian killings,” 23 December 2015; and HRW, “Russia/Syria: Daily Cluster Munition Attacks,” 8 February 2016.

[24] See the Syria country profile. The Russian Ministry of Defense appeared to acknowledge responsibility for a June 2016 attack on coalition-backed armed opposition forces near the Syrian al-Tanf border crossing with Iraq, which the United Kingdom (UK) and US said used RBK-500 AO-2.5RT/RTM cluster munitions. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “On June 18 Russia and US held teleconference on implementing the Memorandum on preventing aerial incidents in Syria,” 19 June 2016. See also, The New Syrian Army (NSyA_Official), “Russians are lying with E-conference & more updates on our FB page. ‪#NSyA ‪#RuAF.’’ 19 June 2016, 13:18 UTC. Tweet (no longer accessible, as of August 2018).

[25] Cluster munition rockets manufactured in Egypt have also been used in Syria, while the Islamic State has used cluster munitions rockets of unknown origin containing a DPICM-type submunition called “ZP-39” in Syria. Soviet or Russian cluster munitions used in Syria include RBK-series cluster bombs containing AO-1SCh, AO-2.5RT, PTAB-2.5M, PTAB-2.5KO and ShOAB-0.5 submunitions; Smerch 9M55K and Uragan 9M27K-series surface-to-surface rockets containing 9N235 submunitions; and Tochka 9M79-series ballistic missiles. More advanced RBK-500 SPBE bombs containing SPBE sensor-fuzed submunitions and a ground-fired 240mm 3-O-8 rocket-assisted mortar projectile have been used in Syria since September 2015

[26]Russia’s Position on the Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” Position Paper annexed to letter to HRW from Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 9 December 2016.

[27]Russia’s Position on the Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” Position Paper annexed to letter to HRW from Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 9 December 2016. In the cover letter, Lavrov states, “I expect our paper to be taken into account during the preparation of future Human Rights Watch reports on the activities of the Russian military personnel in the fight against terrorism in Syria.”

[28] Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Russian Defence Ministry commented on briefing of Amnesty International,” 23 December 2015.

[29] More than 145 countries have condemned the use of cluster munitions in Syria via national statements and/or by endorsing resolutions or joint statements.

[30] Mark Krutov, “There is nothing to hide: Banned cluster bombs in Patriot Park,” Radio Liberty (translated from Russian), 26 July 2019.

[32] HRW, “Ukraine: Widespread Use of Cluster Munitions,” 20 October 2014.

[33] Statement of Russia, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, 23 October 2014.

[34]Russia’s Position on the Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” Position Paper annexed to letter to HRW from Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 9 December 2016.

[36] Ibid.; see also, HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 232–233.

[37] Mennonite Central Committee, “Clusters of Death: The Mennonite Central Committee Cluster Bomb Report,” July 2000, ch. 3.

[38] Mennonite Central Committee, “Drop Today, Kill Tomorrow: Cluster Munitions as Inhumane and Indiscriminate Weapons,” June 1999, p. 5.