15 Foreign Policy Recommendations for the Next German Government

The existing Federal Security Council should be expanded into a National Security Council to better reflect the complexity of security policy interrelationships, improve coordination and forward planning, and reconcile tactical decisions with long-term strategic considerations. This should cover the entire spectrum of security policy, including climate, energy, and health policy, and thus contribute to Germany's Comprehensive Approach.

For the further development of the strategic culture, as a framework for foreign policy action and priority-setting, and for communicating Germany's goals and interests internally and externally, the upcoming German government should regularly present a national strategy document. This paper, as well as interim reports on an annual basis, should be the subject of broad debates in the Bundestag.

In line with Germany's comprehensive concept of security, the future German government should increase its spending in all areas of international affairs: 2 percent of GDP for defense, 0.7 percent for development and humanitarian aid, and 0.3 percent for diplomacy. 

Germany must advocate for a comprehensive foreign climate policy at the national, European, and international level. This includes, among other things, new green climate partnerships and a comprehensive review of trade, economic, development, and security policies through the lens of the climate-security nexus.

In a world marked by numerous bloody conflicts, foreign policy decision-making power also requires a military underpinning. The next German government must commit itself – based on the 2 percent target – to secure long-term funding for the Bundeswehr, advance the modernization of the armed forces, including equipping them with armed drones, and rule out a unilateral withdrawal from NATO's nuclear sharing.

To address current and future challenges and compete with China, close transatlantic ties are crucial. The results of the EU-US summit in June are promising – comprehensive efforts by Germany are needed to put the decisions into practice – for example in the areas of climate, trade, technology.

The European Union will only be able to act more effectively if Germany lives up to its leadership role in the EU. This must also mean that Germany commits to a "European imperative." The actions of the German government should be assessed primarily on whether they help the EU to recover economically and politically and enable it to become a more credible international actor that can protect its values and interests on its own.

Introducing qualified majority voting (QMV) in foreign policy is a key step to make the EU more capable of acting internationally. While almost all parties in Germany are in favor of QMV, there has been a lack of concrete initiatives so far – this needs to change under the upcoming federal government. A first step could be a voluntary veto waiver by the federal government. In addition, Germany must help raise the cost of veto use and develop a willingness to move forward with like-minded European partners when there is no consensus.

Another building block for a greater capacity of the EU to act internationally is the strengthening of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the position of the EU High Representative. Germany should press for the High Representative to always be at the table in diplomatic initiatives by European states, such as in the Normandy format or the E3. Also, when traveling abroad, German cabinet members should go to appointments with the respective foreign government not only with their ambassador but with a duo of a German ambassador and an EEAS representative.

Instead of Sunday speeches about a European Army, Germany should work to ensure that actual capabilities grow out of existing initiatives such as PESCO, EAD, and EDF and that integrated, operational forces are gradually built up and the consolidation of the European defense industry is driven forward.

Given the increasing importance of digital technologies for the state, the economy, and everyday life, and the manifold security implications, the German government must work to strengthen Europe's digital sovereignty. Our Munich Security Brief "Update Required" shows where Europe is still ahead, where it must catch up, and how its technological capabilities serve not only Europe but also the transatlantic partnership.

In addition to increasing its financial contribution to Euro-Atlantic security, Europe must assume more responsibility in its eastern and southern neighborhood. This includes not only military engagement but above all economic, diplomatic, and legal means. The future German government should become a driving force of a proactive European neighborhood policy.

Germany must dispel old illusions about Putin's Russia and seek a more pragmatic approach to dealing with Russia. While the door to dialogue should always be open and cooperation in areas of common interest should continue to be sought, Germany must recognize that a substantial improvement in relations depends crucially on the Russian government. Starting with a review of its Russian policy, the new German government should work toward a common European and transatlantic approach, increase defense capabilities and resilience, and deepen exchanges with Russian society. In addition, the ongoing tensions surrounding the Nord Stream 2 pipeline underscore the need for a common European approach in the energy sector as well.

To meet the challenges posed by China, Europe must speak with one voice. Germany's role is crucial for the development of a European – and, based on this, a transatlantic – strategy toward China. The next government must rethink Germany's past business-centric approach and seek the right balance of cooperation and competition in individual policy areas. The report "Mind the Gap: Priorities for Transatlantic China Policy" lays out a transatlantic agenda focused on achieving quick wins in seven issue areas, from economics to values to security. 

Short-term measures to address emergencies must be combined with investments in long-term crisis resilience. For example, funding gaps for humanitarian initiatives must be closed, the 0.7% ODA (Official Development Assistance) target must be implemented, the share of development funding for health must be increased, and efforts to achieve universal health coverage must be deepened.